Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are illustrating that the unrest spreading across the Middle East will not happen the same way in any two places, nor are all authoritarian countries equally susceptible.
Writing in the Washington Post, Scott Wilson offers a hint at why Saudi Arabia has remained largely quiet:
The aging monarchy of Saudi Arabia, home to roughly a fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves, governs a population where many are influenced by the most extreme interpretation of Islam, one hostile to Western culture. The cosmopolitan Saudi elite fear the majority and have accepted the Sauds as an alternative to a more severe Islamist government. How the octogenarian leadership would weather a popular uprising is unclear.
In other words, the kind of cosmopolitan, educated elite who were crucial to the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt may know that instability, and perhaps even democracy, would not bode well for them or their values. Wilson implies that they see the Saudi government as a force tamping down the retrograde inclinations of the country’s populace, and that a (post-)Saudi democracy might be even more repressive, because that is what the populace might want.
The Saudi rulers also have enough money that they can prevent the level of poverty that have helped bring people to the streets in many countries.
As for Bahrain, Vali Nasr tweeted today, “Bahrain protest is existential threat to Sunni monarchy and minority rule. Regime will react much more harshly than Mubarak.”
Nasr is identifying a key variable: whether a country is ruled by a minority — Syria with its Alawis is an example — that would have much to lose in a democracy.
Bahrain is dominated by a Sunni minority. Unlike in Egypt, where the ruling partly might plausibly win an election in a few years, democracy in Bahrain likely means defeat: the Sunnis could plausibly foresee being shut out of power for years, even decades. They might even be subjected to economic reprisal as the Shia majority use government to divert resources and opportunities to themselves.
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Image courtesy NASA
Some patterns are emerging from the Middle East unrest that began in Tunisia.
This chart combines three factors that seem relevant:
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen are highly similar when plotted against these variables.
- They all have a “5″ level of civil liberties, as assigned by Freedom House; this might be characterized as medium-bad.
- While their income levels vary, they have similar poor levels of economic freedom, characteristic of the state-heavy Arab approach. This chart reflects a multiplier effect for higher levels of economic freedom.
Is it predictive? Where countries end up on the plot may reflect these factors:
- Countries too far to the right on civil liberties — at 6/7 levels — may be too repressive for people power to succeed. Thus, Iran already had its Egypt moment (for now), but it was suppressed. This will be tested as people attempt to demonstrate in Syria.
- Countries too high on the chart may be purchasing stability with wealth (and economic openness). Poverty is absent as a driver, and more of the population is effectively middle class. (Though note Bahrain, which cannot be called truly stable.)
- Countries to the left on civil liberties may be offering enough room to prevent a buildup. Morocco — which is hardly free — may be the test of that.
This is a roundup of some of the fast-accumulating forecasts for Egypt and the Middle East, particularly those taking a longer view (including some of my own).
General
- Threats to US interests — “Were demonstrations to spread in a big way to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a catastrophe could be looming. A more enlightened, pro-American regime than the one now in Jordan is hard to imagine. As for the Saudi royal family, it is probably the worst possible form of government for that country except for any other that might credibly replace it. (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
- Relations with the US — “Any freely elected govt will want to distance itself from U.S policies.” (Shadi Hamid, The Atlantic, 1/25/11)
- The Gulf — The Gulf states are relatively safe from unrest. (Michael Binyon, Al Jazeera English, 1/28/11)
- Diversity of outcomes — Even if protesters were going into these protests intending the same outcomes (and they aren’t), the outcomes will be different. A relatively secular, middle-class nation like Tunisia will emerge drastically different from a crisis than a place like Yemen. Look to Eastern Europe in 1989, which yielded everything from rapid democratization in Czechoslovakia to a murky power transfer in Romania. (Future Atlas)
- “Normalized” politics — “Whatever the outcome of these uprisings, it seems clear that Arabs and their new leaders will be focused for years to come on the imperfections within their own societies — perhaps to a greater degree than on injustices committed by Israel and the West abroad. …. Politics may thus become normalized in the Arab world, rather than radicalized.” (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
Economics
- Jobs and poverty — The demands of so many protesters around the region — jobs and food — may be internally at odds. Statism in the Middle East suppresses growth and entrepreneurship, but also provides the region a lower level of abject poverty. Freeing up the economies of the region could provide opportunity but could cause poverty and inequality to spike. (Future Atlas)
- The Chinese model — For the portion of the protesters who are motivated by economic opportunity and prosperity above all, the “Chinese model” — authoritarianism with freewheeling capitalism — could look good. (Future Atlas)
Israeli-Arab issues
- Israel — Democratic Arab states will tend to be less friendly to Israel than many current regimes, as long as the peace process is frozen. While the occupation continues, peacemaking will tend to be viewed as collaboration. (Future Atlas)
- The peace process — “Prolonged crisis in Egypt will hurt Palestinian-Israel peace process, not clear what following Mubarak may mean for peace process either.” (Vali Nasr, 1/29/11)
Egypt
- Limited unity — “Once Mubarak goes, the open source movement will evaporate — after that, divergent motivations repeatedly fork the movement.” (John Robb, 1/30/11)
- Uncertain outcomes — “The ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power.” (Stratfor, 1/29/11)
- Islamists — “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt functions to a significant extent as a community self-help organization and may not necessarily try to hijack the uprising to the extent as happened in Iran.” (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
- Getting the army to stand down — “Militaries don’t leave politics easily. Even after Mubarak goes there could still be a battle to get military to leave politics.” (Vali Nasr, 1/30/11) “If the military’s senior leaders decide that Mubarak’s ouster and a subsequent democratic transition would unacceptably risk reducing the military’s political and cultural power, they will be more likely to defend the regime.” (Michael Wahid Hanna, The Atlantic, 1/29/11)
- Military vested interests — The Egyptian military may not look favorably on a more open and equitable economic system, as it has its own business interests, established to help invest it in the status quo. (Future Atlas)
- End of Mubarak — “Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.” (Stratfor, 1/29/11) Mubarak will fall and the army will take over. (Mike Murphy, “Meet the Press,” 1/30/11)
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Image copyright FutureAtlas.com — usable with attribution and link. Fire background courtesy Dave Hogg (Flickr).
The AP reported last week that some “Tea Party” leaders and Oklahoma legislators are discussing forming a militia to defend against encroachment by the federal government.
There are other indicators that extremism is finding new purchase.
In February, a man used his light plane to launch a terrorist suicide attack on a government office in Austin, Texas. He appeared to be a troubled man acting alone, but that is the case with many people who are also political terrorists, such as the Fort Hood shooter Major Hassan. Stack invoked politics directly as a motive:
I can only hope that the numbers quickly get too big to be white washed and ignored that the American zombies wake up and revolt; it will take nothing less. I would only hope that by striking a nerve that stimulates the inevitable double standard, knee-jerk government reaction that results in more stupid draconian restrictions people wake up and begin to see the pompous political thugs and their mindless minions for what they are.
Stack is citing classic insurgency theory as well: trigger an overreaction that fuels a rebellion.
His manifesto is also highly reminiscent of much of the rhetoric emanating from factions of the Tea Party movement, which brings us to the question: is that movement symptomatic of a threat to American stability? There are a number of worrying signs:
- Scale: There has been a right wing of this ilk for decades, but this incarnation seems larger and has more tendrils into the “mainstream.” If even a tiny fraction of turned toward violence, they might number in the tens of thousands.
- Celebration of violence: Tea Partiers have formed ties with “militia” groups that have preparing for violence as their central activity.
- Lack of restraining mechanism: In the past, mainstream media and the Republican Party provided dampers on the spread of right-wing radicalism. Now, extremists can confirm their views with them own media (which includes some corporate media entities as well). And the most of the Republican Party is either silent in the face of extremism, or actively panders to or reinforces it.
- Irrationality: The strong role of anger, and the strange visions of socialism and / or fascism, are also worrying. One could have a perfectly rational (or at least reality-based, if passionate) movement that favored radically downsizing government, but this doesn’t seem to be that movement. Many seem to have headed straight for the black helicopter rabbit holes.
Foreign terrorists can do the US harm; domestic extremism is orders of magnitude more dangerous, as it can undermine fundamental stability.
And the danger does not have to involve violence: a competent and trusted government is rare in the world, and one’s of America’s biggest competitive advantages. Destroying that trust and dismantling that competence would deal a severe blow to American prospects.
The WaPo reported today on a trend that could have impacts from African stability to the global food supply: companies and governments from developing nations are leasing or buying large swaths of agricultural land, especially in Africa, but also in Southeast Asia and Latin America.
The WaPo article focuses on Ethiopia, which uses only about a quarter of its arable land despite facing chronic food shortages. Indian investment there has already reached $2.5 billion, and Saudi Arabian and Chinese firms are moving in as well, with active encouragement from the Ethiopian government.
This could have positive effects:
- This kind of project could increase global farmland and the global food supply.
- This could bring new flows of investment to poor nations, and improve their infrastructures.
- Access to inexpensive food might rise in the land-leasing countries.
- People could gain access to paid work, and learn modern farming skills.
However, the potential downsides seem serious:
- Land may be diverted from local food production to exports, increasing hunger.
- Poor locals might be deprived of land and water so that governments or elites can profit from it.
- This could extend the “resource curse” to agriculture, as it could enable elites to make money from farmland while largely excluding their own countrymen from the benefits. The WaPo article notes an Ethiopian river that is now to be used for irrigation, with locals banned from watering their cows in it.
- With many of the companies coming from India, Saudi Arabia, and China, the potential for serious ill-treatment of workers, and even human rights abuses, is vast. Indian and Chinese companies often treat their own workers abysmally, and Saudis sometimes revert to near-enslavement of foreigners, so the fate of African workers could be grim — especially if their own governments fail to protect them, which is likely in many poorly governed countries.
- The land leases run for as long as 99 years; exactly what this means, and how far the rights of the leasing country extend, could bring diplomatic clashes.
- The sum of the problems above points suggests that this trend could drive instability in some land-leasing countries.
(Image courtesy mrflip, Flickr)