Self-determination
The gathering conflict between Georgia and Russia suggests a couple of larger issues:
- Self-determination: South Ossetia illustrates the fact that there simply are no rules for self-determination–when and how one place is allowed to separate from another. And no country consistently advocates a particular set of rules: as is the case with Abkhazia, South Ossetia would appear to have as much right as Kosovo to leave its parent state, and has been separate for years longer than Kosovo, but countries take opposite approaches to the two issues.
- NATO: The US wishes to extend NATO membership to Georgia. That Georgia could end up at war with Russia over a strategically trivial and morally muddy issue suggests some of the potential problems with that course. It would potentially subject the alliance to a clash with Russia without any key interests at stake (at least for NATO). Alternately, and more likely, it would extend NATO promises that would not ultimately be kept, as members would likely (and sensibly) balk at aiding Georgia in many scenarios, risking turning NATO into another hollow CENTO or SEATO.
NPR today offered a rare focus on Abkhazia, the region that broke away from Georgia in the 1990s.
It is a curious mirror image of Kosovo: Russia, adamantly opposed to independence for Kosovo, supports Abkhazia’s freedom (at least from Georgia), while the US favors subjecting the Abkhaz to Georgian rule, though they appear to have much the same case as the Kosovars for independence.
The parallel is not lost on the Abkhaz, who have poor relations with the Georgians:
Abkhazia’s leaders say the West has so far refused to listen to their arguments, but they cite the precedent set by Kosovo. One day, they say, the international community will have to realize the only way to avert war over Abkhazia is to recognize its independence.
Angus Reid polling explains why Bolivia’s constitutional troubles are “more likely to split the nation in two” than to bring it peace.
As the indigenous Andean majority assert their newfound political power, the wealthier, more Hispanic lowland areas such as Santa Cruz are growing restive, and there is talk of separation. Angus Reid reports that “General Luis Trigo Antelo, the Bolivian Armed Forces’ commander in chief, has warned Santa Cruz and other departments seeking to call similar referendums on autonomy that the army will ‘not allow separatism.’”
The article concludes with this warning: “the fragile stability could break in the following months, as the stand-off between the rich and poor departments heightens the possibility of military action.”
Image: Mabel Flores (Flickr)
The Chinese response to unrest by Tibetans in the last two weeks has once again revealed how unlikely Tibetan self-determination is for the foreseeable future.
China is still willing to use force, and seems ready to escalate the level of force far beyond what has so far been employed.
And the Chinese seem ready to shrug off international condemnation: the sacred unity of China is far more important to them.
Tellingly, the government’s depiction of events — with the Tibetans as violent “splittists” manipulated by outside forces — seems to find widespread support among ordinary Chinese. So even a substantially democratized China might still keep a tight rein on Tibet, because the electorate would favor this.
(Image usable with credit and link to FutureAtlas.com)
Kosovo declared independence today.
As the International Crisis Group explains, Serbian rejection of the move will create ongoing complications:
Serbia plans to respond with legal challenges, by cold-shouldering Kosovo’s institutions on the ground and entrenching its own parallel local administrations, schools and healthcare in Serb areas, both in the north and in the scattered patchwork of enclaves south of the Ibar where the majority of the remaining Serbs live. Belgrade expects international security forces to shield them from Kosovo Albanian interference. . . . The stage will then be set for a multi-year contest for influence over Kosovo’s Serb areas, with the EU missions liaising and playing referee.
This raises two possibilities:
- future instability, either in the form of active opposition by Serbia or secessionist moves by the 10% Serbian minority in Kosovo
- gradual defusing of the issue by post-historical Europe; if the EU absorbs both places in time, the borders hardly matter
Benazir Bhutto’s assassination is straining ties between Pakistan’s ethnic groups, the Washington Post reports.
Comprised of four ethnicity-based provinces, Pakistan’s stability was already threatened by restiveness in Baluchistan and among the Pashtun of the North-West Frontier Province. Now Sindh, Bhutto’s homeland, may be added to the list, as Sindhis turn against the Punjabi-dominated military and the Punjabi elite.
Witte of the Post reports that mourners at Bhutto’s funeral chanted “We don’t need Pakistan!” and crowds of Sindhis have been shouting “Leave Sindh!” at soldiers. Some Sindhis are now threatening succession and war.
Still, Witte writes, “few believe the country is in imminent danger of fracturing,” and more people in Sindh and other provinces believe that substantial autonomy should devolve from the center to the four regions.
Others say that simply giving all groups a say might suffice: “Democracy is the way to keep Pakistan together,” says one NGO leader.
A group of American Indian activists has declared independence from the US.
The small group, claiming to be acting on behalf of the Lakota, will claim parts of South Dakota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming.
This is more a political stunt than a serious movement: genuine separatism is rare among American Indians, and their populations are too small and dispersed to create viable independent entities.
Only the Navajo and Hopi are partial exceptions in the lower 48 states; native peoples of Alaska, with large swaths of territory and, in some cases, oil wealth, might also be more likely candidates for independence movements.
Overall, the probability of a successful Native American succession movement is very low for the foreseeable future.
The Washington Post reported last week on the possible breakup of Belgium into Flanders and Wallonia.
The Flemings and Walloons have diverging outlooks on many issues, and are already substantially separated; the articles notes that “each side has its own autonomous parliament, political parties, schools, newspapers, television stations, celebrities, Boy Scouts and pigeon-racing clubs.”
In recent poll, 40% of Belgians said that Belgium will not exist in a decade.
In some respects, Europe now provides the ideal environment in which to pursue this kind of self-determination: the two parties could separate peacefully, and both new countries would then exist within the larger European Union. That is the most likely course if a division of Belgium proceeded.
The larger European project might not be well-served by such a path, however: every Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia that appears within its borders adds to the drag on decision-making, and reduces the chance of Europe being a vigorous, decisive actor in the larger world. At some point, it might come to resemble the Holy Roman Empire more than the United States of Europe.
Foreign Policy offers the odds on six new states achieving independence:
1. Kosovo
Odds — “strong”: driven by US and EU support, it has a good shot at full independence from Serbia
2. South Sudan
Odds — “not great”: a 2011 “referendum will probably happen; and it will probably come out in favor of independence; and Khartoum will almost certainly find a way around the results.”
3. Somaliland
Odds — “very good”: effectively independent from Somalia since 1991, it already has its own government, army, and currency; international organizations will attend to the disastrous state of the rest of Somalia first, however
4. Iraqi Kurdistan
Odds — “fair”: Turkey’s strong opposition may be overruled by facts on the ground if Iraq disintegrates
5. Palestine
Odds — “good”: “details” in the way of a two-state solution will eventually overcome the objections of “the extreme radical wings” on both sides
6. Taiwan
Odds — “poor”: China is getting stronger and stronger, and Taiwan “will accept autonomous status” under China
A new poll illustrates the challenge of reconciling the Taiwanese and Chinese views of the island.
Three-fourths of Taiwanese (76.1%) say that Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs solely to the people of the island, while only 15% essentially agree with China’s position that sovereignty is held by both Taiwan and the mainland.
Given that China explicitly rejects Taiwan’s right to self-determination, the continuing threat of future conflict is plain.