WMD
A new analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security attempts to answer that question, the Washington Post reports.
A military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would probably only delay the country’s progress toward nuclear-weapons capability, according to a study that concludes that such an attack could backfire by strengthening Tehran’s resolve to acquire the bomb. The analysis by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security found that Iran’s uranium facilities are too widely dispersed and protected — and, in some cases, concealed too well — to be effectively destroyed by warplanes. And any damage to the country’s nuclear program could be quickly repaired.
Moreover, Albright told the Post, Iran would likely emerge more intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. He said that:
an Israeli or U.S. attack would result in broader popular support for Iran’s ruling clerics and could lead Tehran to sever ties with the U.N. nuclear watchdog. “Iran would likely launch a ‘crash’ program to quickly obtain nuclear weapons,” Albright said in an interview. “An attack would likely leave Iran angry, more nationalistic, fed up with international inspectors and nonproliferation treaties, and more determined than ever to obtain nuclear weapons.”
New polling in Iran offers mixed signals to those who hope for “moderation.”
A strong majority of Iranians favors allowing all reformist candidates to contest elections, and 86% say that all leaders of their country should be elected.
At the same time, a slim majority of Iranians says that Iran should develop nuclear weapons–51% are in favor of this, with only 39% opposed.
So Iran’s potential interest in nuclear weapons is not confined to a tiny ruling group, and even the advent of full democracy might not dispel it.
The Washington Post recently detailed developments in synthetic life: microorganisms guided by completely artificial DNA.
While there are many upsides — artificial organisms might be able to produce cheap biofuels and high-tech chemicals — this technology also has potentially dire security implications.
A biotech watchdog organization, the ETC Group, put it this way:
Ultimately synthetic biology means cheaper and widely accessible tools to build bioweapons, virulent pathogens and artificial organisms that could pose grave threats to people and the planet.
Unlike nuclear weapons, this would not require a vast state-run program. Says the article,
the technology is quickly becoming so simple, experts say, that it will not be long before “bio hackers” working in garages will be downloading genetic programs and making them into novel life forms.
In other words, small groups and even individuals could create immensely dangerous pathogens. (See the movie “Twelve Monkeys” for one such scenario.)
Researchers say that fully artificial cells might be achieved within a year.
Image: NIH
According to a recent New York Times article, many in the US intelligence community “believe that Pakistan, not Iraq, is the place Mr. Bush should consider the ‘central front’ in the battle against terrorism,” as it threatens “political meltdown in the one country where Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and nuclear weapons are all in play.”
The article includes these forecasts:
- “If serious divisions emerge in Pakistan’s army, they could also threaten the security of Pakistan’s potent nuclear arsenal.”
- “Some experts … argue that Pakistan’s army is overwhelmingly moderate and will remain so, even without General Musharraf.”
- Instability in Pakistan “could cripple a renewed [US] effort to turn around the war against Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.”
Despite Pakistan now constituting one of the chief threats to American security, there may be little the US can do about it: according to “recent intelligence assessments,” “American influence over events in Pakistan may be ebbing fast.”
Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress polled 108 foreign affairs experts across the political spectrum about terrorism and related issues.
Asked what country is likely to be the next al Qaeda stronghold, the experts said:
- Pakistan — 35%
- Iraq — 22%
- Somalia — 11%
- Sudan — 8%
- Afghanistan — 7%
The experts also put Pakistan at the head of the list most likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists by 2012:
- Pakistan — 74%
- North Korea — 42%
- Russia — 38%
- Iran — 31%
- United States — 5%
The experts were divided about how to change US policy toward Pakistan: about a third favored sanctions against the country, and a similar number advocated increasing US aid.
Pakistan likely tops both lists both because of ideological forces at work within the country, and because it is regularly cited as one of the states most likely to fall apart.
Writing in The Telegraph, historian Niall Ferguson attempts to make the case for immediate military action against Iran via a future scenario perspective.
His scenario includes these ideas:
- It would not be difficult to stop Iran’s nuclear program with preventive airstrikes.
- This is a repeat of the history of the 1930s, with a dictator arming for war.
- Iran will have nuclear-armed missiles by 2007.
- China will threaten to intervene on the side of Iran in the resulting 2007-2011 war.
Analysis
Ferguson’s assumptions are weak:
- It appears doubtful that bombing will easily arrest Iran’s nuclear program. According to Seymour Hersh, definitive targets have not even been identified.
- Ferguson strains to invoke the Hitler analogy, but Hitler was absolute dictator of one of the most powerful, technologically advanced nations on Earth. Ahmadinejad is the bureaucratically constrained head of a weak nation highly vulnerable to disruption.
- Ferguson explicitly criticizes as delusion the idea that “the West” is still in a position to dominate the Middle East, but a ready resort to force depends on that very idea.
Ferguson exaggerates the pace of change:
- No credible sources foresee a nuclear arsenal in Iranian hands by 2007. A decade after that appears more likely.
- China will have neither the capability nor the inclination to intervene in the Middle East in the next few years.
He may be accelerating the plausible timetables of his scenario in order to heighten the apparent urgency.
Given that he is a historian, Ferguson’s strangest omission is that he fails to address the possible medium- and long-term consequences of the course he advocates. These include:
Writing in Prospect Online, Philip Gordon of Brookings is skeptical that an American attack on Iran is likely.
His argument hinges on a clear difference he sees between the Iran and Iraq situations:
In the case of Iraq, as was already clear at the time, many influential Americans were certain that an invasion would be easy, successful, and a step toward a safer world, and thus actually preferred the use of force to a diplomatic “success.” On Iran, I know of almost no one who denies that an attack would have serious negative consequences and who sees it as anything other than a last resort.
He suggests that President Bush would receive advice that would deter him from military action from all quarters; this is worth reproducing at length:
From the CIA: “Mr President, we cannot tell you with certainty how far along the Iranians are towards a bomb, nor can we tell you where all the key nuclear facilities are. We know they convert uranium ore to nuclear fuel at Esfahan, that they enrich uranium at Natanz and that they are building a heavy-water research reactor at Arak. But there may well be dozens of other secret facilities scattered around the country we don’t know about. We don’t have good sources in Iran, and we didn’t even know about these sites until Iranian dissidents told us about them in 2002. Our best estimate, in any case, is that Iran will not be able to produce a bomb for at least five years.”
From the military: “Mr President, we can certainly do serious damage to Iran’s known nuclear facilities. The above-ground targets are easy to hit, and even the buried centrifuge facilities at Natanz—reportedly about 30 feet underground and covered by at least 10 feet of concrete—can probably be destroyed with our GBU-28 “bunker-busters.” But we might have to strike it many times—or possibly even consider using tactical nuclear weapons—to be certain. Moreover, to do this job right, we’d need to hit dozens of different facilities scattered around the country, many of which are in built-up civilian areas and/or protected by air-defence sites that would have to be destroyed. So there would be considerable collateral damage.”
From the state department: “Mr President, we would have almost no international support for an attack on Iran and our image throughout the world—especially the Muslim world—would be seriously damaged. But the real problem would be Iran’s potential retaliation. This would almost certainly include efforts to destabilise Iraq and Afghanistan (including attacks on our 150,000 troops in those two places), support for terrorist attacks against US citizens and interests and threats to the free passage of oil through the straits of Hormuz. We must also recognise that an attack would likely strengthen Iranian extremists and undermine reformers, that any setback to the program would likely only be temporary, and that any debate within Iran about the utility of a nuclear weapons programme would end.
From domestic political advisers: “Mr President, unlike three years ago on Iraq, we would not have widespread public support, and there is almost no chance that we could get a congressional resolution supporting the use of force. So you—and the Republican party—would have to accept full political responsibility for what comes next. And by the way, oil would probably shoot up to over $100 per barrel.”
He ends with a warning:
If […] America’s allies decide that even economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation are too much to ask for in the effort to bring Iran back to the table, then Bush’s options will in effect be reduced to a very clear choice between doing nothing and bombing Iran. I still don’t think he’d want to do the latter, but America’s allies and counterparts on the Security Council ought at least to realise that refusing to support sanctions on Iran would be the best way to find out.
Max Boot gave his advice on Iran on “All Things Considered” on NPR this evening.
He said that it was basically inevitable that Iran would end up with nuclear weapons, so the US should bomb, in hopes of delaying the process.
The logic behind this is obscure, as it would ensure that we would face an angrier, nuclear-armed Iran. As Steve Clemons writes in The Washington Note:
There are many options between war and appeasement. One of these involves a calculation of whether Iran will eventually acquire nukes if it really, really wants them. If one believes that despite the course of action Sy Hersh has written about that Iran will one day end up with nukes — then a pissed-off, hostile-to-America, democratically legitimate, nuclear weapons nation is the worst outcome.
Clemons’ point about democratic legitimacy is worth noting. Asked to identify “the biggest surprise for the United States” of a democratic Iran, Daniel Byman wrote in the June 2005 Atlantic Monthly that “A peaceful and democratic Iran would still want a nuke (though the right carrots might dissuade it from pursuing one).”
That is more hopeful than Boot’s outlook — and many suggest that pursuing such a bombing campaign would undermine the already weak opposition and block any opening for change.
David E. Sanger, writing in the NYT, considers whether the world might “learn to live with a nuclear Iran.”
Key points:
- “The reality is that most of us think the Iranians are probably going to get a weapon, or the technology to make one, sooner or later. The optimists around here just hope we can delay the day by 10 or 20 years, and that by that time we’ll have a different relationship with a different Iranian government.” — Bush administration official
- As a state, Iran could be deterred, some think.
- Egypt and Saudi Arabia might seek their own nuclear weapons, but the West could dissuade them.
- Nuclear weapons would make Iran “the dominant regional power in the Middle East,” possibly “as powerful as Israel.”
- Iran doesn’t have to build a bomb; it merely needs people to believe that it can do so quickly.
- The US has said that it cannot “tolerate” a nuclear North Korea, but it is already doing just that.
- Containment might work with Iran, but Iran’s going nuclear would trigger “a world of proliferation like we have not seen before,” according to Brent Scowcroft.
Sanger suggests that this is worth thinking about because all other options might be worse. That seems to be case with military options:
- Airstrikes might or might not delay an Iranian nuclear arms program.
- An American invasion would likely end in defeat, leaving Iran bitter and militant for decades.