Terrorism
John Robb at Global Guerrillas argues that a US attack on Iran could have far-reaching consequences, in three waves:
- Instability intensifies in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and oil prices spike.
- American targets are hit by terrorist attacks around the world. US forces in Iraq are forced to withdraw. The US falls into political crisis. “Radical reductions” in global economic activity occur.
- “A gulf monarchy falls. Successful terrorist attacks on oil production systems have deepened the global energy crisis …. The global economy goes into a severe and prolonged contraction. The worst finally happens: China’s export oriented economy collapses,” and the country fragments.
Analysis
- This is virtually certain as an outcome of US attack
- The scope and effect of terrorist attacks are uncertain. Withdrawal from Iraq would probably be accelerated, with negative consequences, including a strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq (at least temporarily). The effects on oil supplies could be severe, as Iran has at least the power to disrupt the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, both the US and Iran would face mounting pressure to get the oil flowing again, and might work out a modus vivendi that enabled this. However, if the conflict escalates and the US appears bent on destroying the Iranian regime, Iran would have no reason for restraint.
- Severe economic consequences depend on the scope and duration of the disruption. The causal ties to the fall of a Gulf monarchy and the fragmentation of China are not at all certain.
Amidst real costs and fantasies of defeat (and some fantasies of victory), a movement is growing among American liberals to “redeploy” American troops out of Iraq.
There are a number of reasons that the idea is worth considering:
- The Iraq war has undermined the war on terror — 87% of top foreign policy experts agreed that it has had a negative impact.
- Iraqis think we should leave — 70% of Iraqis say the US should leave, with half of these saying in 6 months, the other half in 2 years (as of 1/06; see p. 6 of this report).
- The US military is strained — resources for dealing with other contingencies are limited.
- The US presence drives the war — a large portion of insurgents appear to be motivated by the fact of occupation.
However, setting a fixed, short-term timetable for leaving Iraq would appear to make a number of outcomes more likely:
- Iraqi government collapse — The government remains weak and riddled with factions. With no American referee, it is not clear that the government would hold together.
- Full-scale civil war — While the US remains, the worst levels of civil war can be averted. A civil war is underway, but it so far does not involve large-scale sectarian conflict over territory, with the mass killings and population transfers that is likely to involve.
- A victory for terrorism — Iraq had nothing to do with the war on terror, but the Bush administration made it part of it, by creating the conditions in which al-Qaeda could prosper. A precipitous withdrawal (such as the end of 2006) would be seen by global jihadists and the Muslim world as a victory for terror, with future consequences for the US and for the people of other possible jihadist battlegrounds. (This Vietnam-style “credibility” argument has its limits: our presence in Iraq also helps global terrorists, and so one might have to choose between the two downsides.)
- Disaster for the Iraqi people — Iraqis have suffered terribly because of the invasion, and things could get much worse. Legally and morally, the US has a responsibility for the situation that cannot lightly be set aside. In the next couple of years, that responsibility will only have been discharged when the Iraqi government says that it is time for the US to set a schedule for departure.
Juan Cole advocates reducing and reconfiguring US forces for genuine anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, but that is rather different than simply leaving.
Colin Powell opposed the Iraq war (while facilitating it) partly because of the “you break it, you own it” principle. By this reasoning, the US broke Iraq, it now owns the situation, and redeploying quietly out of the store doesn’t change this.
A reader asks:
I’m wondering if perhaps the key to a turnaround in the Middle East would be for some sort of massive joint action — like a Saudi/Egypt/U.S./Iraq anti-Iranian ground war or something? I’m certainly not recommending this, but if Iran does become only a military option…?
In anything like the present situation, no one but the US would join military action, particularly a ground invasion. That should deter us, which would be a very good thing: a ground invasion would end in defeat for the US.
Iran could not destroy any American unit, and we could occupy any chosen square mile of the country, but we would not have the stomach to outlast the virtually united resistance of the 70-million strong Iranian nation. Consider the fact that the Sunnis of Iraq are straining US military capabilities, and basically fighting us to a draw, despite essentially being a nation of only 5 million. Iran has 24 million males of military age.
As to the larger situation, if “turnaround” refers to reducing terrorism and instability, an effective course should diminish the forces that stoke those things.
Invading Iran would drive up both, creating far more of their basic ingredient: angry people who believe that the West is cruel and violent and thus deserves violence.
The death of Zarqawi could have mixed results for al-Qaeda, the WP reports.
His ruthless targeting of civilians was opposed by the global al-Qaeda leadership, as it alienated both Arab public opinion and the larger Iraqi insurgency; Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq was becoming increasingly isolated.
Analysts argue that Zarqawi’s death could undercut his group’s recruitment of foreign fighters, and other foreign jihadis might turn away from al-Qaeda in Iraq.
They also argue that the Zarqawi group is less militarily important than several other foreign insurgent units, including some led by Egyptians, Saudis, and Algerians.
Al-Qaeda has a chance to assert greater control over its Iraqi franchise, but faces problems if that franchise loses too much “market share” of the insurgency. According to a German counterterrorism expert, “By losing Zarqawi, they run the danger of losing Iraq as a battlefield to the nationalist insurgents and others who aren’t interested in bin Laden or the global jihad.”
This presents broader problems for al-Qaeda:
If al-Qaeda fails to maintain a high-profile stake in the conflict with U.S. forces in the region, the analysts said, its relevance in the jihadist movement will quickly diminish. …. Others said Zarqawi’s death is likely to widen the factional splits that have been developing for years within the global movement. More and more, Islamic radical groups are becoming splintered and are only loosely affiliated. While they may be united in a broader struggle against the United States and the West, they often have different aims and tactics.
The NYT reports on a pattern of harassment and mistreatment of American Muslims at airports and borders. For instance:
Taleb Salhab and his wife say they too were dragged away in handcuffs at the border crossing in Port Huron, Mich., as their two preschool daughters wailed in the back seat of their car. The Salhabs were discharged after four hours of questioning, with no explanation from customs officers.
A significant problem is the watch list of suspicious names: bizarrely, it is merely a list of names, not a list of people, and so innocent citizens and travelers are continually flagged as being “on the list.” For Muslims, who have a relatively small pool of names, the problem is particularly acute.
Most of those wrongly placed on the watch list seethe with frustration and anger, finding it unbelievable that a technologically advanced country like the United States has been unable to develop a list that can distinguish between a lurking terrorist and a harmless citizen with a Muslim name.
Treating Muslim immigrants like they are potential enemies, and abusing them in the process, is an excellent recipe for ending up in the situation of France or Britain: threatened by a hostile group of Islamic extremists embedded in the society which could have embraced them.
(In a different sphere, the same principle applies to the larger immigration debate. It is mostly about Hispanic immigration, and the anti-immigrant forces who would personalize the policy problem — harassing or arresting individual immigrants — risk bringing about the very situation they fear: an alienated and numerous minority adjacent to an alternate homeland. This would be a long time developing, but is not unimaginable.)
Cirincione at Carnegie is warning that the Bush administration may be seriously considering attacking Iran, changing his view in light of ominous signs.
I used to think that the Bush administration wasn’t seriously considering a military strike on Iran, because it would only accelerate Iran’s nuclear program. But what we’re seeing and hearing on Iran today seems awfully familiar. That may be because some U.S. officials have already decided they want to hit Iran hard.
Ground is being prepared, he suggests:
The unfolding administration strategy appears to be an effort to repeat its successful campaign for the Iraq war. It is now trying to link Iran to the 9/11 attacks by repeatedly claiming that Iran is the main state sponsor of terrorism in the world (though this suggestion is highly questionable). It is also attempting to make the threat urgent by arguing that Iran might soon pass a “point of no return” if it can perfect the technology of enriching uranium, even though many other nations have gone far beyond Iran’s capabilities and stopped their programs short of weapons. And, of course, it is now publicly linking Iran to the Iraqi insurgency and the improvised explosive devices used to kill and maim U.S. troops in Iraq, though Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Peter Pace admitted there is no evidence to support this claim.
He and others have already outlined likely consequences of such a strike.
The WP today explores in more detail one such consequence: that Iran could retaliate against US forces in Iraq, and strike American targets elsewhere — though the article offers little in the way of solid evidence.
Experts in the article reiterate some of the consequences, saying “airstrikes would most likely inflame the Muslim world, alienate reformers within Iran and could serve to unite Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, which have only limited contact currently.”