Terrorism
In a New York Times article by Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, analysts say that Al Qaeda has lashed out at President-elect Obama in a new video because he “challenged its worldview,” with his multiracial, multicultural background.
Mazzetti and Shane wrote, “American antiterrorism officials and other experts dismissed the video as a desperate tactic by a terrorist group that suffered a defeat in the global war of ideas with Mr. Obama’s election.”
They quote Dr. Ronald Walters: ““You’re talking about someone who looks like the rest of the world, and that’s got to be threatening to them.”
(Image copyright FutureAtlas.com and usable with attribution and link)
The Washington Post recently detailed developments in synthetic life: microorganisms guided by completely artificial DNA.
While there are many upsides — artificial organisms might be able to produce cheap biofuels and high-tech chemicals — this technology also has potentially dire security implications.
A biotech watchdog organization, the ETC Group, put it this way:
Ultimately synthetic biology means cheaper and widely accessible tools to build bioweapons, virulent pathogens and artificial organisms that could pose grave threats to people and the planet.
Unlike nuclear weapons, this would not require a vast state-run program. Says the article,
the technology is quickly becoming so simple, experts say, that it will not be long before “bio hackers” working in garages will be downloading genetic programs and making them into novel life forms.
In other words, small groups and even individuals could create immensely dangerous pathogens. (See the movie “Twelve Monkeys” for one such scenario.)
Researchers say that fully artificial cells might be achieved within a year.
Image: NIH
Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress polled 108 foreign affairs experts across the political spectrum about terrorism and related issues.
Asked what country is likely to be the next al Qaeda stronghold, the experts said:
- Pakistan — 35%
- Iraq — 22%
- Somalia — 11%
- Sudan — 8%
- Afghanistan — 7%
The experts also put Pakistan at the head of the list most likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists by 2012:
- Pakistan — 74%
- North Korea — 42%
- Russia — 38%
- Iran — 31%
- United States — 5%
The experts were divided about how to change US policy toward Pakistan: about a third favored sanctions against the country, and a similar number advocated increasing US aid.
Pakistan likely tops both lists both because of ideological forces at work within the country, and because it is regularly cited as one of the states most likely to fall apart.
The Post offers credible evidence of an increasing split between Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq.
The local insurgents have tactical, strategic, and even moral issues with the al-Qaeda approach, and clashes between the groups have grown.
This suggests increased likelihood for two outcomes:
- By peeling off the Islamist and global goals of al-Qaeda, it leaves the insurgents more focused on one goal: getting the US to leave. That makes it more possible to end the war with an American departure.
- It lowers the stakes for the US: some level of insurgent success — for instance, Sunni Arabs in charge of some or most of Iraq — is less likely to go hand in hand with al-Qaeda success, and result in a safe haven for Islamic terrorism. An insurgent leader in the article expressly blames al-Qaeda for provoking the occupation of Iraq via September 11th; his concern is clearly his own nation and people, not Caliphatist fantasies.
However, the insurgents are highly fragmented, and a Sunni politician notes that this reduces their ability to counter al-Qaeda. He warns, “If they do not unite, they will be weakened. Then al-Qaeda will manage to make their Islamic state in Iraq, and it will be a sad day for the country and the world.”
The Washington Post reports today on the effect of the Iraq war on the other end of the Arab world, Morocco.
The most salient points:
- Moroccans are being recruited to go off to Iraq by terrorist groups. Extremist recruiters look for men who are particularly outraged by events there and in Palestine.
- Extremist groups across North Africa, from Morocco to Tunisia are finding common cause, partly based on events in Iraq.
- According to a Moroccan expert, “Al-Qaeda has the same strategy as the United States: it wants to win in Iraq so it can transform the whole region. They are fixated on Iraq.”
So al-Qaeda benefits from continued American presence in Iraq. It might also benefit from a withdrawal, if the “few thousand” foreign fighters can play a meaningful role in the aftermath of such a withdrawal.
Either way, every Arab country will be dealing with returning militants who have been trained by the Iraq war, potentially adding to instability.
A WP article reveals some of the thinking behind American policy toward the outbreak of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah:
- “‘The president believes that unless you address the root causes of the violence that has afflicted the Middle East, you cannot forge a lasting peace,’ said White House counselor Dan Bartlett.”
- “In the administration’s view, the new conflict is not just a crisis to be managed. It is also an opportunity to seriously degrade a big threat in the region, just as Bush believes he is doing in Iraq. Israel’s crippling of Hezbollah, officials also hope, would complete the work of building a functioning democracy in Lebanon and send a strong message to the Syrian and Iranian backers of Hezbollah.”
- “The U.S. position also reflects Bush’s deepening belief that Israel is central to the broader campaign against terrorists and represents a shift away from a more traditional view that the United States plays an ‘honest broker’s’ role in the Middle East.”
- “‘He thinks he is playing in a longer-term game than the tacticians,’” according to a “former senior administration official.”
Outcome analysis
- Root causes — Central root causes of Middle Eastern instability are support for Islamic extremists and Arab-Israeli enmity. Both are reinforced by Israel’s current course of action.
- Degrading Hezbollah — A military campaign is likely to have a marginal and temporary effect, while bolstering the organization’s prestige in the larger Middle East. This may start with Lebanon: Mideast experts “warned that the military campaign is turning mainstream Lebanese public opinion against Israel rather than against Hezbollah.”
- Building Lebanese democracy — This campaign is more likely to strain or collapse Lebanese democracy.
- Syria and Iran — They are not harmed by this campaign, and Israel is giving them the opportunity to burnish their images in the eyes of the Mideast public: when other Arab governments sit passively, they are at least indirectly supporting resistance to Israeli actions.
- Fighting terrorism — Making Israel more central to the US campaign only undermines that effort (and some want to blend Israeli and US policy thoroughly, as explained here). Apparent unconcern for innocents on one side of the conflict undercuts the central moral narrative of US opposition to terrorism; the next time the US decries the dealth of civilians in a terrorist act, millions of people will recall the hundreds of civilians who died in Lebanon while the US sped up shipments of bombs for use there.
- Longer-term strategy — The Bush administration appears to be attempting longer-term strategy based on gut feel, without an awareness of the actors, the stakes involved, or how the situation is perceived.
John Robb at Global Guerrillas argues that a US attack on Iran could have far-reaching consequences, in three waves:
- Instability intensifies in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and oil prices spike.
- American targets are hit by terrorist attacks around the world. US forces in Iraq are forced to withdraw. The US falls into political crisis. “Radical reductions” in global economic activity occur.
- “A gulf monarchy falls. Successful terrorist attacks on oil production systems have deepened the global energy crisis …. The global economy goes into a severe and prolonged contraction. The worst finally happens: China’s export oriented economy collapses,” and the country fragments.
Analysis
- This is virtually certain as an outcome of US attack
- The scope and effect of terrorist attacks are uncertain. Withdrawal from Iraq would probably be accelerated, with negative consequences, including a strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq (at least temporarily). The effects on oil supplies could be severe, as Iran has at least the power to disrupt the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, both the US and Iran would face mounting pressure to get the oil flowing again, and might work out a modus vivendi that enabled this. However, if the conflict escalates and the US appears bent on destroying the Iranian regime, Iran would have no reason for restraint.
- Severe economic consequences depend on the scope and duration of the disruption. The causal ties to the fall of a Gulf monarchy and the fragmentation of China are not at all certain.
Amidst real costs and fantasies of defeat (and some fantasies of victory), a movement is growing among American liberals to “redeploy” American troops out of Iraq.
There are a number of reasons that the idea is worth considering:
- The Iraq war has undermined the war on terror — 87% of top foreign policy experts agreed that it has had a negative impact.
- Iraqis think we should leave — 70% of Iraqis say the US should leave, with half of these saying in 6 months, the other half in 2 years (as of 1/06; see p. 6 of this report).
- The US military is strained — resources for dealing with other contingencies are limited.
- The US presence drives the war — a large portion of insurgents appear to be motivated by the fact of occupation.
However, setting a fixed, short-term timetable for leaving Iraq would appear to make a number of outcomes more likely:
- Iraqi government collapse — The government remains weak and riddled with factions. With no American referee, it is not clear that the government would hold together.
- Full-scale civil war — While the US remains, the worst levels of civil war can be averted. A civil war is underway, but it so far does not involve large-scale sectarian conflict over territory, with the mass killings and population transfers that is likely to involve.
- A victory for terrorism — Iraq had nothing to do with the war on terror, but the Bush administration made it part of it, by creating the conditions in which al-Qaeda could prosper. A precipitous withdrawal (such as the end of 2006) would be seen by global jihadists and the Muslim world as a victory for terror, with future consequences for the US and for the people of other possible jihadist battlegrounds. (This Vietnam-style “credibility” argument has its limits: our presence in Iraq also helps global terrorists, and so one might have to choose between the two downsides.)
- Disaster for the Iraqi people — Iraqis have suffered terribly because of the invasion, and things could get much worse. Legally and morally, the US has a responsibility for the situation that cannot lightly be set aside. In the next couple of years, that responsibility will only have been discharged when the Iraqi government says that it is time for the US to set a schedule for departure.
Juan Cole advocates reducing and reconfiguring US forces for genuine anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, but that is rather different than simply leaving.
Colin Powell opposed the Iraq war (while facilitating it) partly because of the “you break it, you own it” principle. By this reasoning, the US broke Iraq, it now owns the situation, and redeploying quietly out of the store doesn’t change this.
A reader asks:
I’m wondering if perhaps the key to a turnaround in the Middle East would be for some sort of massive joint action — like a Saudi/Egypt/U.S./Iraq anti-Iranian ground war or something? I’m certainly not recommending this, but if Iran does become only a military option…?
In anything like the present situation, no one but the US would join military action, particularly a ground invasion. That should deter us, which would be a very good thing: a ground invasion would end in defeat for the US.
Iran could not destroy any American unit, and we could occupy any chosen square mile of the country, but we would not have the stomach to outlast the virtually united resistance of the 70-million strong Iranian nation. Consider the fact that the Sunnis of Iraq are straining US military capabilities, and basically fighting us to a draw, despite essentially being a nation of only 5 million. Iran has 24 million males of military age.
As to the larger situation, if “turnaround” refers to reducing terrorism and instability, an effective course should diminish the forces that stoke those things.
Invading Iran would drive up both, creating far more of their basic ingredient: angry people who believe that the West is cruel and violent and thus deserves violence.
The death of Zarqawi could have mixed results for al-Qaeda, the WP reports.
His ruthless targeting of civilians was opposed by the global al-Qaeda leadership, as it alienated both Arab public opinion and the larger Iraqi insurgency; Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq was becoming increasingly isolated.
Analysts argue that Zarqawi’s death could undercut his group’s recruitment of foreign fighters, and other foreign jihadis might turn away from al-Qaeda in Iraq.
They also argue that the Zarqawi group is less militarily important than several other foreign insurgent units, including some led by Egyptians, Saudis, and Algerians.
Al-Qaeda has a chance to assert greater control over its Iraqi franchise, but faces problems if that franchise loses too much “market share” of the insurgency. According to a German counterterrorism expert, “By losing Zarqawi, they run the danger of losing Iraq as a battlefield to the nationalist insurgents and others who aren’t interested in bin Laden or the global jihad.”
This presents broader problems for al-Qaeda:
If al-Qaeda fails to maintain a high-profile stake in the conflict with U.S. forces in the region, the analysts said, its relevance in the jihadist movement will quickly diminish. …. Others said Zarqawi’s death is likely to widen the factional splits that have been developing for years within the global movement. More and more, Islamic radical groups are becoming splintered and are only loosely affiliated. While they may be united in a broader struggle against the United States and the West, they often have different aims and tactics.