Security
The Washington Post reports today on the effect of the Iraq war on the other end of the Arab world, Morocco.
The most salient points:
- Moroccans are being recruited to go off to Iraq by terrorist groups. Extremist recruiters look for men who are particularly outraged by events there and in Palestine.
- Extremist groups across North Africa, from Morocco to Tunisia are finding common cause, partly based on events in Iraq.
- According to a Moroccan expert, “Al-Qaeda has the same strategy as the United States: it wants to win in Iraq so it can transform the whole region. They are fixated on Iraq.”
So al-Qaeda benefits from continued American presence in Iraq. It might also benefit from a withdrawal, if the “few thousand” foreign fighters can play a meaningful role in the aftermath of such a withdrawal.
Either way, every Arab country will be dealing with returning militants who have been trained by the Iraq war, potentially adding to instability.
With Fidel Castro seriously ill, it is worth considering the diverse scenarios that could unfold for a post-Castro Cuba.
FIDELISMO WITHOUT FIDEL
Cuba’s current communist system persists.
Trajectory – Without Castro, would tend to transition toward the China Option or Normal Cuba scenarios.
- Cuba’s system is pervasive and generally competent.
- US antagonism makes the defiance of the current regime necessary in the eyes of many Cubans.
- Venezuelan aid and possible Cuban oil finds could keep the existing system afloat.
Counterforces:
- Castro has always been central to the Cuban Revolution, and its durability in his absence is uncertain.
- There is substantial desire for change of some kind on the island.
- The Cuban government is probably disinclined to use large-scale force to maintain its rule if opposition builds.
THE CHINA OPTION
The Communist Party takes the China route: abandoning socialism but maintaining authoritarian rule.
Trajectory – Would tend to transition to Normal Cuba scenario.
- This would alleviate Cubans’ most common complaint, that they suffer from material deprivation.
- Raul Castro, Fidel’s younger brother and likely successor, is said be less ideologically rigid than the older Castro.
Counterforces:
- Cuba’s past experiences, and the low danger of violent upheaval, are likely to make full democracy preferable to large numbers of Cubans.
- As revolutionary movements go, Cuba’s has been relatively sincere in its approach.
NORMAL CUBA
Cuba becomes a normal Latin American democracy. The Communist Party transitions to one among many parties, and retains a substantial following.
Trajectory – Likely to persist, with slight danger of slipping into the Neo-Batista right-wing authoritarianism scenario or one of the left-wing authoritarian scenarios.
- High levels of education and an ideology of citizenship may have prepared Cuba well for democracy.
- The US will likely offer substantial incentives to promote this outcome.
Counterforces:
- Like any ruling elite, the Communist Party will have elements that wish to retain power.
- Cuban-Americans might push the US to maintain its hard-line stance, impeding a transition.
NEO-BATISTA
Cuban-Americans achieve power and impose a right-wing dictatorship.
Trajectory – Would likely evolve toward a Normal Cuba scenario, but could revert via revolt to a Fidelismo scenario.
- Significant elements of the Cuban-American leadership remain extremist and might not accept the compromises that most transition scenarios are likely to entail.
Counterforces:
- The Cuban population would strongly resist a new right-wing dictatorship.
- US and world expectations for democracy would be high.
- Much of the Cuban-American population expects and favors democracy.
COLLAPSE
Contending forces tear the government apart and prevent an organized transition, creating chaos and violence.
Trajectory – Would gradually coalesce into Normal Cuba or one of the authoritarian scenarios.
- Castro might prove to be the crucial structural element in Cuba’s political system.
- The existing system is all most Cubans have known, and has been in place nearly half a century.
Counterforces:
- The current system is pervasive and competent.
- Internal divisions in Cuba don’t seem to be sharp.
- The US has strong incentives not to create a refugee-generating failed state 90 miles off its shores.
- Many Cubans would wish to prevent the opening for direct intervention by the US that this would open up.
BAY OF PIGS II
The US launches a military invasion to hasten a transition of its liking. It is met with substantial resistance.
Trajectory – Would likely result in an eventual compromise that evolved toward a Normal Cuba scenario. Less likely would be such sharp resistance that the US loses heart and retreated, leaving Cuba to the Fidelismo outcome.
- The impatience of Cuban-American extremists could lead them to push for military intervention.
- Americans tend to have a black-and-white view of Cuba that does not reflect reality.
Counterforces:
[Cuba’s future / Cuban scenarios / Cuba scenarios / future of Cuba]
A WP article reveals some of the thinking behind American policy toward the outbreak of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah:
- “‘The president believes that unless you address the root causes of the violence that has afflicted the Middle East, you cannot forge a lasting peace,’ said White House counselor Dan Bartlett.”
- “In the administration’s view, the new conflict is not just a crisis to be managed. It is also an opportunity to seriously degrade a big threat in the region, just as Bush believes he is doing in Iraq. Israel’s crippling of Hezbollah, officials also hope, would complete the work of building a functioning democracy in Lebanon and send a strong message to the Syrian and Iranian backers of Hezbollah.”
- “The U.S. position also reflects Bush’s deepening belief that Israel is central to the broader campaign against terrorists and represents a shift away from a more traditional view that the United States plays an ‘honest broker’s’ role in the Middle East.”
- “‘He thinks he is playing in a longer-term game than the tacticians,’” according to a “former senior administration official.”
Outcome analysis
- Root causes — Central root causes of Middle Eastern instability are support for Islamic extremists and Arab-Israeli enmity. Both are reinforced by Israel’s current course of action.
- Degrading Hezbollah — A military campaign is likely to have a marginal and temporary effect, while bolstering the organization’s prestige in the larger Middle East. This may start with Lebanon: Mideast experts “warned that the military campaign is turning mainstream Lebanese public opinion against Israel rather than against Hezbollah.”
- Building Lebanese democracy — This campaign is more likely to strain or collapse Lebanese democracy.
- Syria and Iran — They are not harmed by this campaign, and Israel is giving them the opportunity to burnish their images in the eyes of the Mideast public: when other Arab governments sit passively, they are at least indirectly supporting resistance to Israeli actions.
- Fighting terrorism — Making Israel more central to the US campaign only undermines that effort (and some want to blend Israeli and US policy thoroughly, as explained here). Apparent unconcern for innocents on one side of the conflict undercuts the central moral narrative of US opposition to terrorism; the next time the US decries the dealth of civilians in a terrorist act, millions of people will recall the hundreds of civilians who died in Lebanon while the US sped up shipments of bombs for use there.
- Longer-term strategy — The Bush administration appears to be attempting longer-term strategy based on gut feel, without an awareness of the actors, the stakes involved, or how the situation is perceived.
Writing in The Telegraph, historian Niall Ferguson attempts to make the case for immediate military action against Iran via a future scenario perspective.
His scenario includes these ideas:
- It would not be difficult to stop Iran’s nuclear program with preventive airstrikes.
- This is a repeat of the history of the 1930s, with a dictator arming for war.
- Iran will have nuclear-armed missiles by 2007.
- China will threaten to intervene on the side of Iran in the resulting 2007-2011 war.
Analysis
Ferguson’s assumptions are weak:
- It appears doubtful that bombing will easily arrest Iran’s nuclear program. According to Seymour Hersh, definitive targets have not even been identified.
- Ferguson strains to invoke the Hitler analogy, but Hitler was absolute dictator of one of the most powerful, technologically advanced nations on Earth. Ahmadinejad is the bureaucratically constrained head of a weak nation highly vulnerable to disruption.
- Ferguson explicitly criticizes as delusion the idea that “the West” is still in a position to dominate the Middle East, but a ready resort to force depends on that very idea.
Ferguson exaggerates the pace of change:
- No credible sources foresee a nuclear arsenal in Iranian hands by 2007. A decade after that appears more likely.
- China will have neither the capability nor the inclination to intervene in the Middle East in the next few years.
He may be accelerating the plausible timetables of his scenario in order to heighten the apparent urgency.
Given that he is a historian, Ferguson’s strangest omission is that he fails to address the possible medium- and long-term consequences of the course he advocates. These include:
John Robb at Global Guerrillas argues that a US attack on Iran could have far-reaching consequences, in three waves:
- Instability intensifies in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and oil prices spike.
- American targets are hit by terrorist attacks around the world. US forces in Iraq are forced to withdraw. The US falls into political crisis. “Radical reductions” in global economic activity occur.
- “A gulf monarchy falls. Successful terrorist attacks on oil production systems have deepened the global energy crisis …. The global economy goes into a severe and prolonged contraction. The worst finally happens: China’s export oriented economy collapses,” and the country fragments.
Analysis
- This is virtually certain as an outcome of US attack
- The scope and effect of terrorist attacks are uncertain. Withdrawal from Iraq would probably be accelerated, with negative consequences, including a strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq (at least temporarily). The effects on oil supplies could be severe, as Iran has at least the power to disrupt the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, both the US and Iran would face mounting pressure to get the oil flowing again, and might work out a modus vivendi that enabled this. However, if the conflict escalates and the US appears bent on destroying the Iranian regime, Iran would have no reason for restraint.
- Severe economic consequences depend on the scope and duration of the disruption. The causal ties to the fall of a Gulf monarchy and the fragmentation of China are not at all certain.
Amidst real costs and fantasies of defeat (and some fantasies of victory), a movement is growing among American liberals to “redeploy” American troops out of Iraq.
There are a number of reasons that the idea is worth considering:
- The Iraq war has undermined the war on terror — 87% of top foreign policy experts agreed that it has had a negative impact.
- Iraqis think we should leave — 70% of Iraqis say the US should leave, with half of these saying in 6 months, the other half in 2 years (as of 1/06; see p. 6 of this report).
- The US military is strained — resources for dealing with other contingencies are limited.
- The US presence drives the war — a large portion of insurgents appear to be motivated by the fact of occupation.
However, setting a fixed, short-term timetable for leaving Iraq would appear to make a number of outcomes more likely:
- Iraqi government collapse — The government remains weak and riddled with factions. With no American referee, it is not clear that the government would hold together.
- Full-scale civil war — While the US remains, the worst levels of civil war can be averted. A civil war is underway, but it so far does not involve large-scale sectarian conflict over territory, with the mass killings and population transfers that is likely to involve.
- A victory for terrorism — Iraq had nothing to do with the war on terror, but the Bush administration made it part of it, by creating the conditions in which al-Qaeda could prosper. A precipitous withdrawal (such as the end of 2006) would be seen by global jihadists and the Muslim world as a victory for terror, with future consequences for the US and for the people of other possible jihadist battlegrounds. (This Vietnam-style “credibility” argument has its limits: our presence in Iraq also helps global terrorists, and so one might have to choose between the two downsides.)
- Disaster for the Iraqi people — Iraqis have suffered terribly because of the invasion, and things could get much worse. Legally and morally, the US has a responsibility for the situation that cannot lightly be set aside. In the next couple of years, that responsibility will only have been discharged when the Iraqi government says that it is time for the US to set a schedule for departure.
Juan Cole advocates reducing and reconfiguring US forces for genuine anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, but that is rather different than simply leaving.
Colin Powell opposed the Iraq war (while facilitating it) partly because of the “you break it, you own it” principle. By this reasoning, the US broke Iraq, it now owns the situation, and redeploying quietly out of the store doesn’t change this.
A reader asks:
I’m wondering if perhaps the key to a turnaround in the Middle East would be for some sort of massive joint action — like a Saudi/Egypt/U.S./Iraq anti-Iranian ground war or something? I’m certainly not recommending this, but if Iran does become only a military option…?
In anything like the present situation, no one but the US would join military action, particularly a ground invasion. That should deter us, which would be a very good thing: a ground invasion would end in defeat for the US.
Iran could not destroy any American unit, and we could occupy any chosen square mile of the country, but we would not have the stomach to outlast the virtually united resistance of the 70-million strong Iranian nation. Consider the fact that the Sunnis of Iraq are straining US military capabilities, and basically fighting us to a draw, despite essentially being a nation of only 5 million. Iran has 24 million males of military age.
As to the larger situation, if “turnaround” refers to reducing terrorism and instability, an effective course should diminish the forces that stoke those things.
Invading Iran would drive up both, creating far more of their basic ingredient: angry people who believe that the West is cruel and violent and thus deserves violence.
Writing in Prospect Online, Philip Gordon of Brookings is skeptical that an American attack on Iran is likely.
His argument hinges on a clear difference he sees between the Iran and Iraq situations:
In the case of Iraq, as was already clear at the time, many influential Americans were certain that an invasion would be easy, successful, and a step toward a safer world, and thus actually preferred the use of force to a diplomatic “success.” On Iran, I know of almost no one who denies that an attack would have serious negative consequences and who sees it as anything other than a last resort.
He suggests that President Bush would receive advice that would deter him from military action from all quarters; this is worth reproducing at length:
From the CIA: “Mr President, we cannot tell you with certainty how far along the Iranians are towards a bomb, nor can we tell you where all the key nuclear facilities are. We know they convert uranium ore to nuclear fuel at Esfahan, that they enrich uranium at Natanz and that they are building a heavy-water research reactor at Arak. But there may well be dozens of other secret facilities scattered around the country we don’t know about. We don’t have good sources in Iran, and we didn’t even know about these sites until Iranian dissidents told us about them in 2002. Our best estimate, in any case, is that Iran will not be able to produce a bomb for at least five years.”
From the military: “Mr President, we can certainly do serious damage to Iran’s known nuclear facilities. The above-ground targets are easy to hit, and even the buried centrifuge facilities at Natanz—reportedly about 30 feet underground and covered by at least 10 feet of concrete—can probably be destroyed with our GBU-28 “bunker-busters.” But we might have to strike it many times—or possibly even consider using tactical nuclear weapons—to be certain. Moreover, to do this job right, we’d need to hit dozens of different facilities scattered around the country, many of which are in built-up civilian areas and/or protected by air-defence sites that would have to be destroyed. So there would be considerable collateral damage.”
From the state department: “Mr President, we would have almost no international support for an attack on Iran and our image throughout the world—especially the Muslim world—would be seriously damaged. But the real problem would be Iran’s potential retaliation. This would almost certainly include efforts to destabilise Iraq and Afghanistan (including attacks on our 150,000 troops in those two places), support for terrorist attacks against US citizens and interests and threats to the free passage of oil through the straits of Hormuz. We must also recognise that an attack would likely strengthen Iranian extremists and undermine reformers, that any setback to the program would likely only be temporary, and that any debate within Iran about the utility of a nuclear weapons programme would end.
From domestic political advisers: “Mr President, unlike three years ago on Iraq, we would not have widespread public support, and there is almost no chance that we could get a congressional resolution supporting the use of force. So you—and the Republican party—would have to accept full political responsibility for what comes next. And by the way, oil would probably shoot up to over $100 per barrel.”
He ends with a warning:
If [...] America’s allies decide that even economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation are too much to ask for in the effort to bring Iran back to the table, then Bush’s options will in effect be reduced to a very clear choice between doing nothing and bombing Iran. I still don’t think he’d want to do the latter, but America’s allies and counterparts on the Security Council ought at least to realise that refusing to support sanctions on Iran would be the best way to find out.
The death of Zarqawi could have mixed results for al-Qaeda, the WP reports.
His ruthless targeting of civilians was opposed by the global al-Qaeda leadership, as it alienated both Arab public opinion and the larger Iraqi insurgency; Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq was becoming increasingly isolated.
Analysts argue that Zarqawi’s death could undercut his group’s recruitment of foreign fighters, and other foreign jihadis might turn away from al-Qaeda in Iraq.
They also argue that the Zarqawi group is less militarily important than several other foreign insurgent units, including some led by Egyptians, Saudis, and Algerians.
Al-Qaeda has a chance to assert greater control over its Iraqi franchise, but faces problems if that franchise loses too much “market share” of the insurgency. According to a German counterterrorism expert, “By losing Zarqawi, they run the danger of losing Iraq as a battlefield to the nationalist insurgents and others who aren’t interested in bin Laden or the global jihad.”
This presents broader problems for al-Qaeda:
If al-Qaeda fails to maintain a high-profile stake in the conflict with U.S. forces in the region, the analysts said, its relevance in the jihadist movement will quickly diminish. …. Others said Zarqawi’s death is likely to widen the factional splits that have been developing for years within the global movement. More and more, Islamic radical groups are becoming splintered and are only loosely affiliated. While they may be united in a broader struggle against the United States and the West, they often have different aims and tactics.
Terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in Iraq yesterday by a US airstrike.
Forecasters were cautious about the significance of the event.
On NPR, former DIA Middle East chief Jeffrey White said Zarqawi’s death could help dampen the extreme wing of the Iraqi insurgency. However, reduced extremism could actually help unify the insurgency, he said, as Zarqawi’s tactics were controversial within the resistance forces.
Zarqawi’s group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, deliberately targeted civilians, which most Iraqis disapproved of.
Juan Cole suggests that Zarqawi was not as important as some might think:
There is no evidence of operational links between his Salafi Jihadis in Iraq and the real al-Qaeda; it was just a sort of branding that suited everyone, including the US. Official US spokesmen have all along over-estimated his importance. … But Zarqawi has in my view has been less important than local Iraqi leaders and groups. I don’t expect the guerrilla war to subside any time soon.
The NYT acknowledged that his program of igniting sectarian conflict was already well underway:
“Zarqawi may be gone, but the conflagration that he set alight continues to burn,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorist expert at the Rand Corporation in Washington. “That is the reality. He has already set in motion powerful forces that won’t necessarily stop just because he is dead.”
Al Qaeda in Iraq is loosely organized, the NYT states, and only a small part of the overall insurgency.
It should also be kept in mind that Zarqawi only rose to prominence as a result of the US invasion of Iraq; while his death is very positive in itself, it only partially undoes the progress jihadists have made in the country in the environment the US effectively created.