Humanitarian intervention



Published May 19th, 2006 by Future Atlas

The depths of Darfur

Rebel factions are fighting each other in Darfur, and using some of the same tactics as Sudanese government forces, displacing and killing civilians.

The tactics of the rebels have grown so similar to those of their enemies that an attack on this dusty village on April 19 bore all the marks of the brutal assault that first forced its people to flee their homes three years ago. Soldiers in uniform, backed by men toting machine guns on camels, flooded the village, burning huts, shooting, looting and raping.

This is another piece of evidence that any intervention in Darfur would not be easy or quick.

  • An international force will have no real partners in either the government or the rebels.
  • For the foreseeable future, there will be no one to hand off to. Darfur under either Sudan’s central government or rebel groups would be subject at any time to a return to brutality, and rule by either is unlikely to be competent or gentle. The situation will be much more dire than in Bosnia or Kosovo, and those have already required international supervision for a decade.

Ultimately, real intervention in Darfur means long-term intervention. Anything short of another UN protectorate seems likely to demonstrate that the international community was never really serious about the situation.

Published May 17th, 2006 by Future Atlas

Humanitarian intervention: a genocide prevention unit?

Michael O’Hanlon at Brookings offers an unusual approach to the Darfur issue, one which could be applied to other humanitarian intervention situations: rapidly recruit and deploy a special American division specifically to deployment in Darfur — “a Peace Corps with guns — with individuals enlisting specifically for this purpose.”

Even if somehow this force proves unnecessary in Sudan - an unlikely proposition - there will be other conflicts for which such a force could prove very useful in the future. The notion is this: of all those well-intentioned and admirable Americans rallying to call attention to Darfur and demand action, ask for volunteers to join a genocide prevention division for two years.

The new unit would allow action without much additional strain on overstretched American forces, he argues, though some regular troops would be used to leaven the humanitarian division.

This concept would also address a primary problem of humanitarian intervention: risking lives for optional actions. Enlistees in such a force would have signed up for exactly that.

However, Winds of Change suggests some problems with the idea, and notes some similar proposals from the past.