Palestine
Middle East Progress this week interviewed retired Israeli colonel Shaul Arieli about Israel’s settlements, which are now arguably the chief obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Arieli made these points:
- Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories continue to expand, and “outposts” are being made more substantial. This expansion is occurring outside the main “settlement blocs,” including in settlements beyond the “separation barrier.”
- The Palestinian Authority “have fulfilled all of their Road Map commitments,” but Israel has contravened them by continuing to expand settlements.
- “Settlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands.
- “To guarantee the settlers’ safety, Israel prevents the Palestinians from using more and more main transportation routes, which of course hinders the development of the Palestinian economy.”
- Israel has about 600 checkpoints and roadblocks in Palestinian territory, another impediment to the Palestinian economy.
- Since the 1993 Oslo Accords,” the number of Israelis residing beyond the Green Line multiplied two and a half times—today the formal number of settlers is 470,000 versus 222,000 in 1993, including in Jerusalem.”
- “Under any model of agreement, even under the Geneva Accords in which Israel annexes only two percent of the West Bank, not more than 100,000-120,000 settlers would have to be evacuated.”
- “Israel’s military supremacy combined with international guarantees and legitimacy as well as with the Palestinian interest to avoid risking the results achieved in a peace agreement would all protect Israel’s security after a withdrawal takes place.”
In other words, the trendline is still negative, but Arieli sees paths forward.
(Image courtesy Wikipedia Commons)
“Israeli leaders are seriously considering a dormant Saudi plan offering a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for lands captured during the 1967 war,” reports say.
The 2002 Saudi plan is unusually straightforward, and has been endorsed by the 22-member Arab League: Arab states would fully recognize Israel in return for Israel’s relinquishing the territories it occupied in 1967–the West Bank, Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Israelis in favor of the plan still have qualms about elements that may endorse some kind of large -scale “right of return,” in which Palestinians could go to Israel if they or their families were uprooted in 1948.
Foreign Policy offers the odds on six new states achieving independence:
1. Kosovo
Odds — “strong”: driven by US and EU support, it has a good shot at full independence from Serbia
2. South Sudan
Odds — “not great”: a 2011 “referendum will probably happen; and it will probably come out in favor of independence; and Khartoum will almost certainly find a way around the results.”
3. Somaliland
Odds — “very good”: effectively independent from Somalia since 1991, it already has its own government, army, and currency; international organizations will attend to the disastrous state of the rest of Somalia first, however
4. Iraqi Kurdistan
Odds — “fair”: Turkey’s strong opposition may be overruled by facts on the ground if Iraq disintegrates
5. Palestine
Odds — “good”: “details” in the way of a two-state solution will eventually overcome the objections of “the extreme radical wings” on both sides
6. Taiwan
Odds — “poor”: China is getting stronger and stronger, and Taiwan “will accept autonomous status” under China
The NYT reports on a key issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the Palestinians “right of return”.
Some 700,000 Palestinians were driven or fled from their homes at Israel’s founding in 1948, and their descendants number some 4.3 million, based on UN refugee numbers. So “returning” to Israel might be morally reasonable, but is practically extreme, as it would swamp the Jewish majority.
The article suggests some positive changes:
- While Palestinians insist on the right, more grant that it is impractical, or not what they would actually want to do if given the choice.
- Polling suggests that many Palestinians want acknowledgement of the justice of their cause, but would be willing to compromise if that acknowledgment was made, and most would not move back to the Israel if given the option.
A Palestinian shift could enhance the potential of a 5-year-old Arab League proposal to
offer the Jewish state normal ties with all Arab countries if it fully withdraws from land it occupied in 1967, accepts a Palestinian state and agrees to a “just solution” for Palestinian refugees.
If the Palestinians can step back from the more extreme versions of their national narrative, it can be hoped that the Israelis can do the same.
Pronouncements from Hamas officials indicate that some in the movement hold a potential moderate position that could be conducive to peace. Said Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, “We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm.” Another official stated that “We believe in two states living side by side.”
Of course, this offers no guarantees. Moderates would have to win out in Palestinian politics, and the performance of Hezbollah against the recent Israeli offensive may strengthen the hand of rejectionists. Israel too would have to find the political will to meet the moderates half way.
Still, the components of the two-state solution remain in view, if at a distance.
Two encouraging news items from the Middle East:
Israel is reportedly considering compromising on Jerusalem, divesting itself of almost all Arab neighborhoods, whose inhabitants consider themselves under occupation.
Ceasing to be an occupier is essential to Israel’s chances for peace, whether a cold peace of separation, or something better.
On the other side of the divide, a Hamas member tells NPR that Hamas is discussing indirect recognition of Israel.
Abandoning the savage fantasy of Israel’s destruction is the first and most basic step any Palestinian entity must take toward a viable future.
The March elections in Israel represent a step toward a more stable future for the country — but only a preliminary one.
An Israeli political science professor suggests in the CSM that Israel was presented with three futures to choose from:
- “the right-wing utopia of greater Israel by blood and fire”
- “the left-wing utopia of peace and harmony”
- disengagement from the Palestinians, as a compromise
In this view, the rise of the new centrist Kadima party represents the third choice.
The election results suggest a rejection of Likud and the right, as Steve Clemons notes.
Disengagment would offer Israel its best shot at peace in decades, but even Kadima does not seem willing to pursue it fully. The unilateral borders under discussion will not fall along the 1967 boundaries, and, more importantly, may include large numbers of Palestinians on the Israeli side. This is especially problematic in Jerusalem, where a compromise reflecting the wishes of the city’s two populations would be an important step in defanging Muslim hostility to Israel.
Meanwhile, the role of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States does not reflect the evolving situation on the ground, argues Daniel Levy in the IHT. He concludes
In short, if Israel is indeed entering a new era of national sanity and de-occupation, then the role of the Lobby in U.S.-Israel relations will have to be rethought, and either reformed from within or challenged from without.
Steven Erlanger recently offered some unusually forward-looking analysis of post-election Palestine in the IHT.
Principal points:
- Hamas takes a long view, and is likely to focus on a domestic agenda for now, maintaining a cease-fire with Israel.
- As the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ “victory has enormous resonance for radical Islam everywhere.”
- The “peace process” of recent years is over.
- Hamas will not abandon the “right of resistance,” and fundamentally believes that Israel is on land that is irrevocably Muslim, precluding recognition of the state.
- That said, it might offer a long-term truce in return for Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders and the right of return for Palestians driven from their land in 1948, and for their descendants.
- “A long, hostile quiet may be possible” while the two sides “pursue parallel unilateralisms.”