Israel
This is a roundup of some of the fast-accumulating forecasts for Egypt and the Middle East, particularly those taking a longer view (including some of my own).
General
- Threats to US interests — “Were demonstrations to spread in a big way to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a catastrophe could be looming. A more enlightened, pro-American regime than the one now in Jordan is hard to imagine. As for the Saudi royal family, it is probably the worst possible form of government for that country except for any other that might credibly replace it. (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
- Relations with the US — “Any freely elected govt will want to distance itself from U.S policies.” (Shadi Hamid, The Atlantic, 1/25/11)
- The Gulf — The Gulf states are relatively safe from unrest. (Michael Binyon, Al Jazeera English, 1/28/11)
- Diversity of outcomes — Even if protesters were going into these protests intending the same outcomes (and they aren’t), the outcomes will be different. A relatively secular, middle-class nation like Tunisia will emerge drastically different from a crisis than a place like Yemen. Look to Eastern Europe in 1989, which yielded everything from rapid democratization in Czechoslovakia to a murky power transfer in Romania. (Future Atlas)
- “Normalized” politics — “Whatever the outcome of these uprisings, it seems clear that Arabs and their new leaders will be focused for years to come on the imperfections within their own societies — perhaps to a greater degree than on injustices committed by Israel and the West abroad. …. Politics may thus become normalized in the Arab world, rather than radicalized.” (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
Economics
- Jobs and poverty — The demands of so many protesters around the region — jobs and food — may be internally at odds. Statism in the Middle East suppresses growth and entrepreneurship, but also provides the region a lower level of abject poverty. Freeing up the economies of the region could provide opportunity but could cause poverty and inequality to spike. (Future Atlas)
- The Chinese model — For the portion of the protesters who are motivated by economic opportunity and prosperity above all, the “Chinese model” — authoritarianism with freewheeling capitalism — could look good. (Future Atlas)
Israeli-Arab issues
- Israel — Democratic Arab states will tend to be less friendly to Israel than many current regimes, as long as the peace process is frozen. While the occupation continues, peacemaking will tend to be viewed as collaboration. (Future Atlas)
- The peace process — “Prolonged crisis in Egypt will hurt Palestinian-Israel peace process, not clear what following Mubarak may mean for peace process either.” (Vali Nasr, 1/29/11)
Egypt
- Limited unity — “Once Mubarak goes, the open source movement will evaporate — after that, divergent motivations repeatedly fork the movement.” (John Robb, 1/30/11)
- Uncertain outcomes — “The ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power.” (Stratfor, 1/29/11)
- Islamists — “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt functions to a significant extent as a community self-help organization and may not necessarily try to hijack the uprising to the extent as happened in Iran.” (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
- Getting the army to stand down — “Militaries don’t leave politics easily. Even after Mubarak goes there could still be a battle to get military to leave politics.” (Vali Nasr, 1/30/11) “If the military’s senior leaders decide that Mubarak’s ouster and a subsequent democratic transition would unacceptably risk reducing the military’s political and cultural power, they will be more likely to defend the regime.” (Michael Wahid Hanna, The Atlantic, 1/29/11)
- Military vested interests — The Egyptian military may not look favorably on a more open and equitable economic system, as it has its own business interests, established to help invest it in the status quo. (Future Atlas)
- End of Mubarak — “Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.” (Stratfor, 1/29/11) Mubarak will fall and the army will take over. (Mike Murphy, “Meet the Press,” 1/30/11)
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Image copyright FutureAtlas.com — usable with attribution and link. Fire background courtesy Dave Hogg (Flickr).
The US is preparing to push for new sanctions against Iran in light of its nuclear program, aiming to interfere with Iranian trade more broadly.
A comprehensive sanctions approach has more chance of success than efforts so far, and Iran might be more susceptible to pressure in the wake of the post-election political and societal divides that have opened up. But analysts note that sanctions may be weakened by Russian and Chinese resistance, and that sanctions may simply may not be enough to change Iran’s course. One problem is that Iran is fixing one vulnerability, building up its capacity to refine gasoline.
Some US politicians are talking about regime change in Iran in place of more gradual measures. Sanctions might bring this about, but the US lacks leverage, and pushing for it might delegitimize the very forces that might replace the current government. In any case, regime change would not guarantee an end to the nuclear program: support for aspects of it is widespread among Iranians, and Iran’s strategic situation will remain largely the same.
A military strike is also put forward as plausible, but most analysts see it as at best a delaying tactic. It also has severe potential downsides:
- It might well mean an angrier, more aggressive Iran, possibly more determined to pursue nuclear weapons.
- A strike might rally the populace around the regime and even around the nuclear program, reducing the impact of sanctions or regime change.
- Iran has substantial ways to retaliate against the US, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.
- If Israel carries out an attack, it runs the risk of turning the Iranian-Israeli struggle from a cold war to a hot one, increasing the danger to Israel in the medium- and long-term, especially when Iran acquires nuclear arms anyway.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report today on Israel’s religious right and the settlements, arguing that this sector of Israeli society must be dealt with if a peace process is to advance.
The driving trend is that “national-religious and ultra-orthodox Israelis have gained influence and leverage. Entrenched in many West Bank settlements, they benefit from demographic trends: Israel’s army is increasingly dependent on their manpower and politicians on their votes.” The report goes on:
Together, the national-religious and ultra-orthodox carry weight far in excess of their numbers. They occupy key positions in the military, the government and the education and legal sectors, as well as various layers of the bureaucracy. They help shape decision-making and provide a support base for religious militants, thereby strengthening the struggle against future territorial withdrawals from both within and without state institutions.
(For more on the military, see this UPI article from earlier this month; it says that “The infiltration of the military by religious zealots has been under way for three decades, and much of the officer corps — up to 30 percent by some estimates — now consists of men from religious extremist groups.” The ICG report has more detail.)
The ICG continues:
The religious right believes it has time on its side. Its two principal camps – the national-religious and ultra-orthodox – boast the country’s highest birth rates. They have doubled their population in West Bank settlements in a decade. They are rising up military ranks.
The ICG offers a number of ameliorative measures. The most interesting is this: “While some settlers will be determined no matter what to remain on what they consider their Biblical land, here, too, ideas are worth exploring. In negotiations with Palestinians, Israel could examine whether and how settlers choosing to remain might live under Palestinian rule.”
In some sense, Israel seems to be becoming Middle Eastern: Western values are being replaced by religious and nationalist fervor. The consequences could be severe:
- A fundamentalist Israel may simply be incapable of seeking a just peace, suggesting increasingly dark prospects for the nation.
- American values and interests will diverge ever more sharply from such an Israel, straining the bonds between the two countries.
- Secular and moderate Israelis may find their country increasingly unwelcome, which could drive a brain drain that would undermine Israel’s creativity and competitiveness.
- This change could speed the estrangement of American Jews from Israel, a process that some say has already begun. And American Jewish support is the central driver of American support for Israel.
Middle East Progress this week interviewed retired Israeli colonel Shaul Arieli about Israel’s settlements, which are now arguably the chief obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Arieli made these points:
- Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories continue to expand, and “outposts” are being made more substantial. This expansion is occurring outside the main “settlement blocs,” including in settlements beyond the “separation barrier.”
- The Palestinian Authority “have fulfilled all of their Road Map commitments,” but Israel has contravened them by continuing to expand settlements.
- “Settlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands.
- “To guarantee the settlers’ safety, Israel prevents the Palestinians from using more and more main transportation routes, which of course hinders the development of the Palestinian economy.”
- Israel has about 600 checkpoints and roadblocks in Palestinian territory, another impediment to the Palestinian economy.
- Since the 1993 Oslo Accords,” the number of Israelis residing beyond the Green Line multiplied two and a half times—today the formal number of settlers is 470,000 versus 222,000 in 1993, including in Jerusalem.”
- “Under any model of agreement, even under the Geneva Accords in which Israel annexes only two percent of the West Bank, not more than 100,000-120,000 settlers would have to be evacuated.”
- “Israel’s military supremacy combined with international guarantees and legitimacy as well as with the Palestinian interest to avoid risking the results achieved in a peace agreement would all protect Israel’s security after a withdrawal takes place.”
In other words, the trendline is still negative, but Arieli sees paths forward.
(Image courtesy Wikipedia Commons)
“Israeli leaders are seriously considering a dormant Saudi plan offering a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for lands captured during the 1967 war,” reports say.
The 2002 Saudi plan is unusually straightforward, and has been endorsed by the 22-member Arab League: Arab states would fully recognize Israel in return for Israel’s relinquishing the territories it occupied in 1967–the West Bank, Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Israelis in favor of the plan still have qualms about elements that may endorse some kind of large -scale “right of return,” in which Palestinians could go to Israel if they or their families were uprooted in 1948.
Foreign Policy offers the odds on six new states achieving independence:
1. Kosovo
Odds — “strong”: driven by US and EU support, it has a good shot at full independence from Serbia
2. South Sudan
Odds — “not great”: a 2011 “referendum will probably happen; and it will probably come out in favor of independence; and Khartoum will almost certainly find a way around the results.”
3. Somaliland
Odds — “very good”: effectively independent from Somalia since 1991, it already has its own government, army, and currency; international organizations will attend to the disastrous state of the rest of Somalia first, however
4. Iraqi Kurdistan
Odds — “fair”: Turkey’s strong opposition may be overruled by facts on the ground if Iraq disintegrates
5. Palestine
Odds — “good”: “details” in the way of a two-state solution will eventually overcome the objections of “the extreme radical wings” on both sides
6. Taiwan
Odds — “poor”: China is getting stronger and stronger, and Taiwan “will accept autonomous status” under China
The NYT reports on a key issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the Palestinians “right of return”.
Some 700,000 Palestinians were driven or fled from their homes at Israel’s founding in 1948, and their descendants number some 4.3 million, based on UN refugee numbers. So “returning” to Israel might be morally reasonable, but is practically extreme, as it would swamp the Jewish majority.
The article suggests some positive changes:
- While Palestinians insist on the right, more grant that it is impractical, or not what they would actually want to do if given the choice.
- Polling suggests that many Palestinians want acknowledgement of the justice of their cause, but would be willing to compromise if that acknowledgment was made, and most would not move back to the Israel if given the option.
A Palestinian shift could enhance the potential of a 5-year-old Arab League proposal to
offer the Jewish state normal ties with all Arab countries if it fully withdraws from land it occupied in 1967, accepts a Palestinian state and agrees to a “just solution” for Palestinian refugees.
If the Palestinians can step back from the more extreme versions of their national narrative, it can be hoped that the Israelis can do the same.
In the November 2006 Atlantic Monthly, 39 experts were asked about U.S. support for Israel.
“How do you think U.S. support for Israel will change over the next decade?”
- 68% “It will stay about the same”
- 30% “It will decrease significantly”
- 3% “It will increase significantly”
In the “about the same” majority, one respondent said that the support will be relatively constant, but, “as our power and influence in the region bleed away, Israel will not find our support as reassuring as in the past.”
From the decrease camp, comments included:
U.S. power will diminish globally and in the Middle East. As that occurs, we will be forced to be more critical and strategic in our relations with Israel in order to advance the broad spectrum of our interests. Today’s almost unquestioning support is not sustainable.
The experts were also asked to describe U.S. support for Israel under the Bush administration. They responded:
- 62% Too strong
- 38% About right
- 0% Not strong enough
Remarks by the majority included:
The Bush administration … believes that the only way to demonstrate America’s commitment to Israel’s security is to unquestioningly back all of its policies. That belief is profoundly mistaken. … Ultimately, nothing threatens Israeli security more than America’s uncritical support of unwise Israeli policies.
We have now become so closely identified with Israel … that we may actually be hurting Israel’s longer-range interests. Our ‘honest broker’ role is diminished, and we therefore have less clout with Israel’s foes and less capability to moderate violence directed at Israel.
The Bush administration has chosen to treat Middle East diplomacy as a zero-sum game, in which gains by Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas are by definition American losses, and vice versa. The result, of course, is that the United States always loses, because if you insist that the [people] of the region choose between Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, they are going to choose the other side every time.
Curiously, a plurality of Israelis agrees with the “too strong” opinion, or did in polling a couple of years ago. Forty percent said that US support for Israel is excessive, perhaps reflecting the sense among some Israelis the Bush administration was failing differentiate among Israeli policies and factions.
Ralph Peters recently offered a map of how the Middle East might look if borders were redrawn to better reflect sectarian and ethnic divides. (Click on “Next” under the map, then click on the map to enlarge.)
Among the changes that would unfold in this scenario:
- Kurdistan becomes a large, independent state, at the expense of Turkey, Iraq, and other countries. Says Peters, “A free Kurdistan, stretching from Diyarbakir through Tabriz, would be the most pro-Western state between Bulgaria and Japan.”
- The remainder of Iraq divides into Sunni and Shia states, and the Shia portion unites with Shia areas of Saudi Arabia.
- Saudi Arabia also loses Mecca and Medina to an “Islamic sacred state.”
- Iran loses territory to the Kurds and Arab Shia, and to Baluchistan to the southeast.
- Pakistan is much-diminished, transferring lands to Baluchistan and Afghanistan.
- Afghanistan gains from Pakistan but loses to Baluchistan and Iran.
- “For Israel to have any hope of living in reasonable peace with its neighbors, it will have to return to its pre-1967 borders.”
Peters concludes:
Correcting borders to reflect the will of the people may be impossible. For now. But given time — and the inevitable attendant bloodshed — new and natural borders will emerge.
Pronouncements from Hamas officials indicate that some in the movement hold a potential moderate position that could be conducive to peace. Said Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, “We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm.” Another official stated that “We believe in two states living side by side.”
Of course, this offers no guarantees. Moderates would have to win out in Palestinian politics, and the performance of Hezbollah against the recent Israeli offensive may strengthen the hand of rejectionists. Israel too would have to find the political will to meet the moderates half way.
Still, the components of the two-state solution remain in view, if at a distance.