Israel
“Israeli leaders are seriously considering a dormant Saudi plan offering a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for lands captured during the 1967 war,” reports say.
The 2002 Saudi plan is unusually straightforward, and has been endorsed by the 22-member Arab League: Arab states would fully recognize Israel in return for Israel’s relinquishing the territories it occupied in 1967–the West Bank, Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Israelis in favor of the plan still have qualms about elements that may endorse some kind of large -scale “right of return,” in which Palestinians could go to Israel if they or their families were uprooted in 1948.
Foreign Policy offers the odds on six new states achieving independence:
1. Kosovo
Odds — “strong”: driven by US and EU support, it has a good shot at full independence from Serbia
2. South Sudan
Odds — “not great”: a 2011 “referendum will probably happen; and it will probably come out in favor of independence; and Khartoum will almost certainly find a way around the results.”
3. Somaliland
Odds — “very good”: effectively independent from Somalia since 1991, it already has its own government, army, and currency; international organizations will attend to the disastrous state of the rest of Somalia first, however
4. Iraqi Kurdistan
Odds — “fair”: Turkey’s strong opposition may be overruled by facts on the ground if Iraq disintegrates
5. Palestine
Odds — “good”: “details” in the way of a two-state solution will eventually overcome the objections of “the extreme radical wings” on both sides
6. Taiwan
Odds — “poor”: China is getting stronger and stronger, and Taiwan “will accept autonomous status” under China
The NYT reports on a key issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the Palestinians “right of return”.
Some 700,000 Palestinians were driven or fled from their homes at Israel’s founding in 1948, and their descendants number some 4.3 million, based on UN refugee numbers. So “returning” to Israel might be morally reasonable, but is practically extreme, as it would swamp the Jewish majority.
The article suggests some positive changes:
- While Palestinians insist on the right, more grant that it is impractical, or not what they would actually want to do if given the choice.
- Polling suggests that many Palestinians want acknowledgement of the justice of their cause, but would be willing to compromise if that acknowledgment was made, and most would not move back to the Israel if given the option.
A Palestinian shift could enhance the potential of a 5-year-old Arab League proposal to
offer the Jewish state normal ties with all Arab countries if it fully withdraws from land it occupied in 1967, accepts a Palestinian state and agrees to a “just solution” for Palestinian refugees.
If the Palestinians can step back from the more extreme versions of their national narrative, it can be hoped that the Israelis can do the same.
In the November 2006 Atlantic Monthly, 39 experts were asked about U.S. support for Israel.
“How do you think U.S. support for Israel will change over the next decade?”
- 68% “It will stay about the same”
- 30% “It will decrease significantly”
- 3% “It will increase significantly”
In the “about the same” majority, one respondent said that the support will be relatively constant, but, “as our power and influence in the region bleed away, Israel will not find our support as reassuring as in the past.”
From the decrease camp, comments included:
U.S. power will diminish globally and in the Middle East. As that occurs, we will be forced to be more critical and strategic in our relations with Israel in order to advance the broad spectrum of our interests. Today’s almost unquestioning support is not sustainable.
The experts were also asked to describe U.S. support for Israel under the Bush administration. They responded:
- 62% Too strong
- 38% About right
- 0% Not strong enough
Remarks by the majority included:
The Bush administration … believes that the only way to demonstrate America’s commitment to Israel’s security is to unquestioningly back all of its policies. That belief is profoundly mistaken. … Ultimately, nothing threatens Israeli security more than America’s uncritical support of unwise Israeli policies.
We have now become so closely identified with Israel … that we may actually be hurting Israel’s longer-range interests. Our ‘honest broker’ role is diminished, and we therefore have less clout with Israel’s foes and less capability to moderate violence directed at Israel.
The Bush administration has chosen to treat Middle East diplomacy as a zero-sum game, in which gains by Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas are by definition American losses, and vice versa. The result, of course, is that the United States always loses, because if you insist that the [people] of the region choose between Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, they are going to choose the other side every time.
Curiously, a plurality of Israelis agrees with the “too strong” opinion, or did in polling a couple of years ago. Forty percent said that US support for Israel is excessive, perhaps reflecting the sense among some Israelis the Bush administration was failing differentiate among Israeli policies and factions.
Ralph Peters recently offered a map of how the Middle East might look if borders were redrawn to better reflect sectarian and ethnic divides. (Click on “Next” under the map, then click on the map to enlarge.)
Among the changes that would unfold in this scenario:
- Kurdistan becomes a large, independent state, at the expense of Turkey, Iraq, and other countries. Says Peters, “A free Kurdistan, stretching from Diyarbakir through Tabriz, would be the most pro-Western state between Bulgaria and Japan.”
- The remainder of Iraq divides into Sunni and Shia states, and the Shia portion unites with Shia areas of Saudi Arabia.
- Saudi Arabia also loses Mecca and Medina to an “Islamic sacred state.”
- Iran loses territory to the Kurds and Arab Shia, and to Baluchistan to the southeast.
- Pakistan is much-diminished, transferring lands to Baluchistan and Afghanistan.
- Afghanistan gains from Pakistan but loses to Baluchistan and Iran.
- “For Israel to have any hope of living in reasonable peace with its neighbors, it will have to return to its pre-1967 borders.”
Peters concludes:
Correcting borders to reflect the will of the people may be impossible. For now. But given time — and the inevitable attendant bloodshed — new and natural borders will emerge.
Pronouncements from Hamas officials indicate that some in the movement hold a potential moderate position that could be conducive to peace. Said Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, “We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm.” Another official stated that “We believe in two states living side by side.”
Of course, this offers no guarantees. Moderates would have to win out in Palestinian politics, and the performance of Hezbollah against the recent Israeli offensive may strengthen the hand of rejectionists. Israel too would have to find the political will to meet the moderates half way.
Still, the components of the two-state solution remain in view, if at a distance.
Future Atlas noted in March that “a democratic or at least popularly supported Iraqi government could emerge as a harsh and more effective critic of Israel,” making prospects poor for an Israel-friendly Iraq that some invasion advocates imagined before the war.
That was illustrated this week when Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki strongly condemned Israel’s actions in Lebanon, and called them “aggression.”
The NYT noted that:
The resentment of the Iraqi government toward Israel calls into question one of the rationales among some conservatives for the American invasion of Iraq — that an American-backed democratic state here would inevitably become an ally of Israel and, by doing so, catalyze a change of attitude across the rest of the Arab world.
Israel’s advocates seem to attribute Arab and Muslim views of Israel to propaganda and misinformation; though both influence these views, at the heart of enmity for the Jewish state is how it actually treats the Arabs under its rule and beyond.
Views of Israel could also undo another American goal for the invasion: faced with Israeli military dominance, future Iraqi leaders — even democratically elected ones — may renew their interest in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
A WP article reveals some of the thinking behind American policy toward the outbreak of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah:
- “‘The president believes that unless you address the root causes of the violence that has afflicted the Middle East, you cannot forge a lasting peace,’ said White House counselor Dan Bartlett.”
- “In the administration’s view, the new conflict is not just a crisis to be managed. It is also an opportunity to seriously degrade a big threat in the region, just as Bush believes he is doing in Iraq. Israel’s crippling of Hezbollah, officials also hope, would complete the work of building a functioning democracy in Lebanon and send a strong message to the Syrian and Iranian backers of Hezbollah.”
- “The U.S. position also reflects Bush’s deepening belief that Israel is central to the broader campaign against terrorists and represents a shift away from a more traditional view that the United States plays an ‘honest broker’s’ role in the Middle East.”
- “‘He thinks he is playing in a longer-term game than the tacticians,’” according to a “former senior administration official.”
Outcome analysis
- Root causes — Central root causes of Middle Eastern instability are support for Islamic extremists and Arab-Israeli enmity. Both are reinforced by Israel’s current course of action.
- Degrading Hezbollah — A military campaign is likely to have a marginal and temporary effect, while bolstering the organization’s prestige in the larger Middle East. This may start with Lebanon: Mideast experts “warned that the military campaign is turning mainstream Lebanese public opinion against Israel rather than against Hezbollah.”
- Building Lebanese democracy — This campaign is more likely to strain or collapse Lebanese democracy.
- Syria and Iran — They are not harmed by this campaign, and Israel is giving them the opportunity to burnish their images in the eyes of the Mideast public: when other Arab governments sit passively, they are at least indirectly supporting resistance to Israeli actions.
- Fighting terrorism — Making Israel more central to the US campaign only undermines that effort (and some want to blend Israeli and US policy thoroughly, as explained here). Apparent unconcern for innocents on one side of the conflict undercuts the central moral narrative of US opposition to terrorism; the next time the US decries the dealth of civilians in a terrorist act, millions of people will recall the hundreds of civilians who died in Lebanon while the US sped up shipments of bombs for use there.
- Longer-term strategy — The Bush administration appears to be attempting longer-term strategy based on gut feel, without an awareness of the actors, the stakes involved, or how the situation is perceived.
Two encouraging news items from the Middle East:
Israel is reportedly considering compromising on Jerusalem, divesting itself of almost all Arab neighborhoods, whose inhabitants consider themselves under occupation.
Ceasing to be an occupier is essential to Israel’s chances for peace, whether a cold peace of separation, or something better.
On the other side of the divide, a Hamas member tells NPR that Hamas is discussing indirect recognition of Israel.
Abandoning the savage fantasy of Israel’s destruction is the first and most basic step any Palestinian entity must take toward a viable future.
The Economist Intelligence Unit released its 2006 e-readiness rankings yesterday. The index is a measure of a country’s readiness for e-business, judged by Internet access, broadband penetration, innovation, information security, and other factors. More telling than the ranking is the country’s distance from a score of 10.
The ratings are a good indicator of general abilities in IT, and thus an important component of present and future competitiveness.
The top countries
Rank. Country — score out of 10 (2005 rank)
1. Denmark — 9.00 (1)
2. US — 8.88 (2)
3. Switzerland — 8.81 (4)
4. Sweden — 8.74 (3)
5. UK — 8.64 (5)
6. Netherlands — 8.60 (8)
7. Finland — 8.55 (6)
8. Australia — 8.50 (10)
9. Canada — 8.37 (12)
10. Hong Kong — 8.36 (6)
11. Norway — 8.35 (9)
12. Germany — 8.34 (12)
13. Singapore — 8.24 (11)
14. New Zealand — 8.19 (16)
14. Austria — 8.19 (14)
16. Ireland — 8.09 (15)
17. Belgium — 7.99 (17)
18. South Korea — 7.90 (18)
19. France — 7.86 (19)
Other countries of interest
Rank. Country — score out of 10 (2005 rank)
21. Japan — 7.77 (21)
22. Israel — 7.59 (20)
23. Taiwan — 7.51 (22)
25. Italy — 7.14 (24)
30. United Arab Emirates — 6.32 (X)
31. Chile — 6.19 (31)
35. South Africa — 5.74 (32)
37. Malaysia — 5.60 (35)
39. Mexico — 5.30 (36)
41. Brazil — 5.29 (38)
42. Argentina — 5.27 (39)
45. Turkey — 4.77 (43)
46. Saudi Arabia — 4.67 (46)
48. Venezuela — 4.47 (45)
49. Romania — 4.44 (47)
51. Colombia — 4.41 (48)
52. Russia — 4.30 (52)
53. India — 4.25 (49)
55. Egypt — 4.14 (53)
56. Philippines — 4.04 (51)
57. China — 4.02 (54)
60. Nigeria — 3.69 (58)
61. Ukraine — 3.62 (57)
62. Indonesia — 3.39 (60)
64. Kazakhstan — 3.22 (62)
65. Iran — 3.15 (59)
67. Pakistan — 3.03 (64)
Regional standouts in the developing world are Chile, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. The low scores of some countries, notably India, China, and Russia, disguise significant specialized capabilities in infotech.