Iraq



Published February 12th, 2007 by Future Atlas

Times up: commentary — 10 Reasons Not to Invade Iraq

Written four years ago today, on February 12, 2003, the month before the invasion.

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My job as a strategic analyst is to think about the future. I have never been more worried for America.

Colin Powell’s recent speech to the UN rehashed the reasons to invade Iraq, but ignored all the reasons not to.

Here are 10 of them.

1. Invading Iraq helps our terrorist enemies.

Terrorism requires only people and money; September 11 was carried out with 19 men, $500,000, and boxcutters. Al Qaeda will receive a huge boost in recruits and funds if America invades Iraq. As military analyst Anthony Cordesman said, “If you get the reputation as an international bully, you create a new underpinning for every extremist organization, terrorist movement and anti-U.S. group that is out there.” [note 1]

Invading Iraq means less attention to defending America against terrorists. CIA officers fighting al Qaeda “don’t want to do this war,” a former CIA official told the Washington Post. [2]

Iraq itself will be a better environment for al Qaeda after an invasion, no matter how it turns out. Saddam’s police state oppresses Muslim fundamentalists. Al Qaeda is no friend to Saddam: an al Qaeda video found in Afghanistan explained why Saddam is their enemy. In his address released in February 2003, Osama bin Laden refers to Saddam Hussein and his regime as “infidels.” [3]

The Bush administration has continued to claim ties between al Qaeda and Iraq, for obvious reasons, but the New York Times reports that some CIA analysts remain skeptical of the evidence. [4]

2. An invasion increases the chance that terrorists will gain weapons of mass destruction.

Powell suggested that Iraq might provide chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons to terrorists. The official assessment of our own intelligence agencies is that this is unlikely unless the United States attacks Iraq. [5] In other words, Bush’s plans are the most plausible way that our terrorist enemies will acquire Iraqi weapons. “Saddam is … unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists,” said President George H.W. Bush’s national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. [6]

Making many chemical and biological weapons is easy. All it takes is a little money. The more people who hate us, the more likely we will be targeted with such deadly weapons.

3. An invasion solves none of our problems.

Even if we kill Saddam, Iraq will still be an oil-endowed nation with large numbers of skilled scientists. Many Iraqis will still feel threatened by Israel and Iran, and may feel that their country needs weapons of mass destruction. Said one exiled Iraqi scientist, “I felt that as an Arab, it was right that an Arab country have the bomb. Israel has one. So should we.” [7]

Even if Iraq should somehow turn out democratic, it may still opt to pursue weapons of mass destruction, as many democratic nations have.

American troops cannot remain in the country for long enough to prevent this. The longer American troops remain, the greater the danger of a Chechnya-style guerrilla war, and the more damage to American interests in the Arab world and beyond. “I am viscerally opposed to the prolonged occupation of a Muslim country at the heart of the Muslim world by Western nations who proclaim the right to re-educate that country,” former secretary of state Henry Kissinger said in 2002. [8]

4. The inspections can be effective.

The UN inspectors now have unprecedented access to Iraq. They can look in any building, closet, or filing cabinet in the country. They can set up electronic monitoring equipment, send spy planes to observe sites, and swoop in by helicopter. If they want to look for mobile labs, they can set up roadblocks and search trucks.

For a tiny fraction of what war will cost, the monitoring mission could be vastly expanded, with the resources to swarm over the country. Monitoring could be made permanent, until the international community decides otherwise.

Monitoring cannot preclude all attempts at cheating, but neither can an American invasion. An inspection program may be able to deter Iraqi violations, and it would in any case keep any programs small and on the run, as the risk of discovery would be great.

5. Iraq can be contained.

Even without inspections, Iraq can be contained. This is the judgement of many conservative and centrist foreign policy experts and ex-military officers, including Brent Scowcroft and Generals Schwarzkopf and Zinni. [9] Military and intelligence officials, the professionals charged with protecting this country, have been skeptics of an invasion. “Many senior military officers contend that Saddam Hussein poses no immediate threat and that the United States should continue its policy of containment rather than invade,” the Washington Post reported in 2002. [10]

There is no plausible scenario for Iraq “dominating the region,” even if it had nuclear weapons. If Iraqi troops set foot outside their country, Saddam’s regime would be destroyed.

Iraq had chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf War in 1991, but was deterred from using them by the threat of massive retaliation, as U.S. intelligence confirmed after the war. [11] Such deterrence can continue.

6. The Bush administration has no plausible long-term plan.

Even if many Iraqis welcome American troops, they will soon resent American rule. The largest Iraqi opposition group has already said that it won’t accept an American puppet government in place of Saddam. [12] A New York Times columnist who talked to large numbers of Iraqis wrote, “While I found few people willing to fight for Saddam, I encountered plenty of nationalists willing to defend Iraq against Yankee invaders.” [13]

It is worth noting that the United States has already liberated a nation from Hussein–Kuwait–and Kuwaitis don’t seem very grateful. Polling in 2002 found that only about a quarter of Kuwaitis have a favorable view of the United States. A larger percentage, 36%, thought the September 11th attacks on the United States were morally justified. [14] Will Iraqis be friendlier?

According to James Webb, Reagan’s secretary of the Navy, “Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay.” [15]

7. An invasion will damage our relationships with our allies and the world.

A majority of people in most of the world’s countries, including every one of our Western allies, are against an attack. This includes allies such as Britain, Australia, and Italy, whose leaders have supported Bush. Going through with an invasion will further damage our image virtually everywhere.

We need friends in the war on terror. Thousands of suspects have been rounded up in over 100 countries. Alienating the world will erode support in this fight.

The Bush administration’s obsession with Iraq has triggered the worst crisis in the NATO alliance’s 54-year history. Bush appears willing to turn against old and powerful friends to pursue what Colin Powell called a “fixation” on Iraq. [16]

8. The threat of war in Iraq is damaging the economy.

Millions are out of work, but the Bush administration has ignored the link between Iraq and the economy. Fears of war have driven stock prices down and oil prices up, taking billions of dollars out of the pockets of American consumers. In February 2003, Alan Greenspan told Congress that the possibility of war with Iraq is impeding economic recovery. [17]

The war could cost hundreds of billions, with billions more each year to pay for occupation. This is money that could go for American needs. American states are now in their worst financial crisis of the last 50 years, and Bush is choosing to spend the money on Iraq.

9. War is terrible.

It was sad to lose the seven Columbia astronauts. How many multiples of seven will we lose in Iraq? No one knows, but do we want 700 body bags coming home? Seven thousand?

It takes one bullet to end an American life. Saddam’s regime has given out hundreds of thousands of automatic rifles, and many Iraqi families have weapons at home. [18] Many Iraqis will want to use them on Americans. “I want to defend my country and teach the Americans a lesson,” an Iraqi in Jordan told an American reporter. [19]

Thousands of innocent Iraqis will die as well. Because we will have chosen this war, their deaths will be held against us in world opinion. Many Muslims will feel we have no right to object to terrorists killing innocents when we choose to do so ourselves.

10. We are better than that.

In 1963, President Kennedy said, “The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war.” It will be tragic if Bush makes him a liar. We are the most powerful country on the planet. Iraq is tiny and impoverished. We don’t have to act like a frightened bully. We can choose instead to be true to what we are.

Notes:

[1] Michael Dobbs, “Concern Grows Over U.S. Need for Allies,” Washington Post, January 27, 2003, A13.

[2] David Ignatius, “Doubt in the Ranks,” Washington Post, November 1, 2002, A35.

[3] “Osama bin Laden Urges Attacks on the U.S.,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58869-2003Feb11.html

[4] David Johnston, “Senior U.S. Officials Tell Lawmakers of Iraq-Qaeda Ties,” New York Times, February 12, 2003

[5] Alison Mitchell and Carl Hulse, “C.I.A. Warns That a U.S. Attack May Ignite Terror,” New York Times, October 9, 2002.

[6] David Von Drehle, “Debate Over Iraq Focuses on Outcome,” Washington Post, October 7, 2002, A4.

[7] Daniel Williams, “Ex-Iraq Worker Tells of Fooling the Inspectors,” Washington Post, December 17, 2002, A22.

[8] David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq,” New York Times, October 11, 2002.

[9] David Von Drehle, “Debate Over Iraq Focuses on Outcome,” Washington Post, October 7, 2002, A4; Thomas E. Ricks, “Desert Caution,” Washington Post, January 28, 2003.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52450-2003Jan27.html

[10] Thomas E. Ricks, “Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq,” Washington Post, July 28, 2002, A1.

[11] Walter Pincus, “U.S. Plans Appeal To Iraqi Officers,” Washington Post, September 18, 2002, A11.

[12] Associated Press, “Group Welcomes Aid to Depose Hussein,” Washington Post, October 22, 2002, A24.

[13] Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Stones of Baghdad,” New York Times, October 4, 2002.

[14] Andrea Stone, “Many in Islamic World Doubt Arabs Behind 9/11,” USA Today, February 27, 2002.

[15] James Webb, “Heading for Trouble,” Washington Post, September 4, 2002, A21.

[16] Powell’s “fixation” remark: Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003, A20.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43909-2003Jan11?language=printer

[17] John M. Berry and Jonathan Weisman, “Greenspan Says Tax Cuts Are Premature,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003, A10.

[18] Vivienne Walt, “In Baghdad, Residents Prepare for New Travails as Battle Looms,” USA Today, October 2, 2002; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraq Arms Civilians As Second Line of Defense Against U.S.,” Washington Post, February 5, 2003, A19.

[19] Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Forsaking Life in Exile, Iraqis Line Up to Go Home,” Washington Post, November 18, 2002, A14.

Published February 10th, 2007 by Future Atlas

Time’s up: being right on Iraq

The WP discusses some of the people who have proved correct about what was to come in Iraq.

The what-next question is not pursued–though people voice misgivings about the direction of US Iran policy–except in two cases.

Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni is said to feel that an American withdrawal would destabilize the region, but the article does not explore his alternative ideas.

Former NSA head Lt. General William Odom takes the opposite tact, and “advocates troop withdrawal coupled with a diplomatic engagement with Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran, with whom the United States actually has common interests”– an argument he elaborates on in tomorrow’s Washington Post.

Jessica Mathews of the Carnegie Endowment notes that “So many of the people who were wrong have gone on to being very visible pundits without ever admitting how wrong they were.”

That idea is pursued further in this examination of the contrasting fates of advocates and skeptics of the Iraq invasion.

Published January 29th, 2007 by Future Atlas

Countering Iran in Iraq?

The US has indicated it will kill or capture Iranian operatives in Iraq.

The policy has at least two aims:

Several potential downsides to the policy are apparent:

  • The policy appears to cross a line that Iran itself has stayed behind: direct targeting of each other’s operatives.  US intelligence officials say that there is no evidence that Iran has done so in Iraq.  Once the US crosses that line, Iran will feel justified in following suit.
  • The US is much more vulnerable in Iraq than is Iran.  The list of American targets is vast, and they could be struck from a variety of covert directions.
  • Iran has more at stake in Iraq than does the US, and is unlikely to back away due to small retaliations.
  • This may not further American aims in Iraq, and may not even be intended to do so.  A senior intelligence officer says, “This has little to do with Iraq. It’s all about pushing Iran’s buttons. It is purely political.”

Published December 8th, 2006 by Future Atlas

Revisiting Iraq forecasts

Paul Krugman reviews some forecasts by people who got Iraq right:

Former President George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, explaining in 1998 why they didn’t go on to Baghdad in 1991: “Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land.”

Representative Ike Skelton, September 2002: “I have no doubt that our military would decisively defeat Iraq’s forces and remove Saddam. But like the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must consider what we would do after we caught it.”

Al Gore, September 2002: “I am deeply concerned that the course of action that we are presently embarking upon with respect to Iraq has the potential to seriously damage our ability to win the war against terrorism and to weaken our ability to lead the world in this new century.”

Barack Obama, now a United States senator, September 2002: “I don’t oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war. What I am opposed to is the cynical attempt by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and other armchair, weekend warriors in this administration to shove their own ideological agendas down our throats, irrespective of the costs in lives lost and in hardships borne.”

Representative John Spratt, October 2002: “The outcome after the conflict is actually going to be the hardest part, and it is far less certain.”

Representative Nancy Pelosi, now the House speaker-elect, October 2002: “When we go in, the occupation, which is now being called the liberation, could be interminable and the amount of money it costs could be unlimited.”

Senator Russ Feingold, October 2002: “I am increasingly troubled by the seemingly shifting justifications for an invasion at this time. … When the administration moves back and forth from one argument to another, I think it undercuts the credibility of the case and the belief in its urgency. I believe that this practice of shifting justifications has much to do with the troubling phenomenon of many Americans questioning the administration’s motives.”

Howard Dean, then a candidate for president and now the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, February 2003: “I firmly believe that the president is focusing our diplomats, our military, our intelligence agencies, and even our people on the wrong war, at the wrong time. … Iraq is a divided country, with Sunni, Shia and Kurdish factions that share both bitter rivalries and access to large quantities of arms.”

Krugman concludes:

We should honor these people for their wisdom and courage. We should also ask why anyone who didn’t raise questions about the war — or, at any rate, anyone who acted as a cheerleader for this march of folly — should be taken seriously when he or she talks about matters of national security.

Published December 3rd, 2006 by Future Atlas

Future views of the Iraq war

Michael Lind of the New America Foundation predicts that President Bush and the war in Iraq will be remembered harshly:

He will be remembered for the Iraq conflict for generations, long after tax-cut-driven deficits, No Child Left Behind and comprehensive immigration reform are forgotten. The fact that Bush followed the invasion of Afghanistan, which had sheltered al-Qaeda, with the toppling of Saddam Hussein, will puzzle historians for centuries. It is as though, after Japan had bombed Pearl Harbor, FDR had asked Congress to declare war on Argentina.

Why did Bush do it? Did he really believe that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction? Was it about oil? Israel? Revenge for Hussein’s alleged attempt on Bush’s father’s life? The war will join the sinking of the USS Maine and the grassy knoll among the topics to exercise conspiracy theorists for generations, and the photos of torture at Abu Ghraib will join images of the napalmed Vietnamese girl and executed Filipino rebels in the gallery of U.S. atrocities.

Published October 16th, 2006 by Future Atlas

The Middle East remapped

Ralph Peters recently offered a map of how the Middle East might look if borders were redrawn to better reflect sectarian and ethnic divides.  (Click on “Next” under the map, then click on the map to enlarge.)

Among the changes that would unfold in this scenario:

  • Kurdistan becomes a large, independent state, at the expense of Turkey, Iraq, and other countries.  Says Peters, “A free Kurdistan, stretching from Diyarbakir through Tabriz, would be the most pro-Western state between Bulgaria and Japan.”
  • The remainder of Iraq divides into Sunni and Shia states, and the Shia portion unites with Shia areas of Saudi Arabia.
  • Saudi Arabia also loses Mecca and Medina to an “Islamic sacred state.”
  • Iran loses territory to the Kurds and Arab Shia, and to Baluchistan to the southeast.
  • Pakistan is much-diminished, transferring lands to Baluchistan and Afghanistan.
  • Afghanistan gains from Pakistan but loses to Baluchistan and Iran.
  • “For Israel to have any hope of living in reasonable peace with its neighbors, it will have to return to its pre-1967 borders.”

Peters concludes:

Correcting borders to reflect the will of the people may be impossible. For now. But given time — and the inevitable attendant bloodshed — new and natural borders will emerge. 

Published August 20th, 2006 by Future Atlas

Iraq: possible consequences

Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack offer a useful overview of the possible consequences of Iraq’s continued unravelling.

They note that, while there is a civil war underway, it could be much worse:

The consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq could be dire. Considering the experiences of recent such conflicts, hundreds of thousands of people may die. Refugees and displaced people could number in the millions. And with Iraqi insurgents, militias and organized crime rings wreaking havoc on Iraq’s oil infrastructure, a full-scale civil war could send global oil prices soaring even higher.

From a security perspective, that would not be the worst of it:

The greatest threat that the United States would face from civil war in Iraq is from the spillover — the burdens, the instability, the copycat secession attempts and even the follow-on wars that could emerge in neighboring countries. Welcome to the new “new Middle East” — a region where civil wars could follow one after another, like so many Cold War dominoes.

Iraq displays many of the conditions most conducive to spillover. The country’s ethnic, tribal and religious groups are also found in neighboring states, and they share many of the same grievances. Iraq has a history of violence with its neighbors, which has fostered desires for vengeance and fomented constant clashes. Iraq also possesses resources that its neighbors covet — oil being the most obvious, but important religious shrines also figure in the mix — and its borders are porous.

The war in Iraq is having serious consequences for the struggle against Islamic terror.

Fighters there are receiving training, building networks and becoming further radicalized — and the U.S. occupation is proving a dream recruiting tool for young Muslims worldwide. As bad as this is, a wide-scale civil war in Iraq could make the terrorism problem even worse….  Should Iraq descend into a deeper civil war, the country could become a sanctuary for both Shiite and Sunni terrorists, possibly even exceeding the problems of Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan under the Taliban.

This will destabilize neighboring states, as will the example of successful succession: “Iraq’s neighbors are just as fractured as Iraq itself. Should Iraq fragment, voices for secession elsewhere will gain strength.”

This will tempt neighbors to intervene, as will fears of hostile forces winning a civil war:

None of Iraq’s neighbors thinks that it can afford to have the country fall into the hands of the other side. An Iranian “victory” would put the nation’s forces in the heartland of the Arab world, bordering Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria…. Similarly, a Sunni Arab victory (backed by the Jordanians, Kuwaitis and Saudis) would put radical Sunni fundamentalists on Iran’s doorstep — a nightmare scenario for Tehran.

They are not sanguine about preventing these outcomes, stating that “even a serious course correction in Washington and Baghdad may only postpone the inevitable.”

Published July 23rd, 2006 by Future Atlas

Iraqis on Israel

Future Atlas noted in March that “a democratic or at least popularly supported Iraqi government could emerge as a harsh and more effective critic of Israel,” making prospects poor for an Israel-friendly Iraq that some invasion advocates imagined before the war.

That was illustrated this week when Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki strongly condemned Israel’s actions in Lebanon, and called them “aggression.”

The NYT noted that:

The resentment of the Iraqi government toward Israel calls into question one of the rationales among some conservatives for the American invasion of Iraq — that an American-backed democratic state here would inevitably become an ally of Israel and, by doing so, catalyze a change of attitude across the rest of the Arab world.

Israel’s advocates seem to attribute Arab and Muslim views of Israel to propaganda and misinformation; though both influence these views, at the heart of enmity for the Jewish state is how it actually treats the Arabs under its rule and beyond.

Views of Israel could also undo another American goal for the invasion: faced with Israeli military dominance, future Iraqi leaders — even democratically elected ones — may renew their interest in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Published June 17th, 2006 by Future Atlas

Iraq: redeploying or bugging out?

Amidst real costs and fantasies of defeat (and some fantasies of victory), a movement is growing among American liberals to “redeploy” American troops out of Iraq.

There are a number of reasons that the idea is worth considering:

  • The Iraq war has undermined the war on terror87% of top foreign policy experts agreed that it has had a negative impact.
  • Iraqis think we should leave — 70% of Iraqis say the US should leave, with half of these saying in 6 months, the other half in 2 years (as of 1/06; see p. 6 of this report).
  • The US military is strained — resources for dealing with other contingencies are limited.
  • The US presence drives the war — a large portion of insurgents appear to be motivated by the fact of occupation.

However, setting a fixed, short-term timetable for leaving Iraq would appear to make a number of outcomes more likely:

  • Iraqi government collapse — The government remains weak and riddled with factions. With no American referee, it is not clear that the government would hold together.
  • Full-scale civil war — While the US remains, the worst levels of civil war can be averted. A civil war is underway, but it so far does not involve large-scale sectarian conflict over territory, with the mass killings and population transfers that is likely to involve.
  • A victory for terrorism — Iraq had nothing to do with the war on terror, but the Bush administration made it part of it, by creating the conditions in which al-Qaeda could prosper. A precipitous withdrawal (such as the end of 2006) would be seen by global jihadists and the Muslim world as a victory for terror, with future consequences for the US and for the people of other possible jihadist battlegrounds. (This Vietnam-style “credibility” argument has its limits: our presence in Iraq also helps global terrorists, and so one might have to choose between the two downsides.)
  • Disaster for the Iraqi people — Iraqis have suffered terribly because of the invasion, and things could get much worse. Legally and morally, the US has a responsibility for the situation that cannot lightly be set aside. In the next couple of years, that responsibility will only have been discharged when the Iraqi government says that it is time for the US to set a schedule for departure.

Juan Cole advocates reducing and reconfiguring US forces for genuine anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, but that is rather different than simply leaving.

Colin Powell opposed the Iraq war (while facilitating it) partly because of the “you break it, you own it” principle. By this reasoning, the US broke Iraq, it now owns the situation, and redeploying quietly out of the store doesn’t change this.

Published June 11th, 2006 by Future Atlas

Zarqawi and al-Qaeda’s evolution

The death of Zarqawi could have mixed results for al-Qaeda, the WP reports.

His ruthless targeting of civilians was opposed by the global al-Qaeda leadership, as it alienated both Arab public opinion and the larger Iraqi insurgency; Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq was becoming increasingly isolated.

Analysts argue that Zarqawi’s death could undercut his group’s recruitment of foreign fighters, and other foreign jihadis might turn away from al-Qaeda in Iraq.

They also argue that the Zarqawi group is less militarily important than several other foreign insurgent units, including some led by Egyptians, Saudis, and Algerians.

Al-Qaeda has a chance to assert greater control over its Iraqi franchise, but faces problems if that franchise loses too much “market share” of the insurgency.  According to a German counterterrorism expert, “By losing Zarqawi, they run the danger of losing Iraq as a battlefield to the nationalist insurgents and others who aren’t interested in bin Laden or the global jihad.”

This presents broader problems for al-Qaeda:

If al-Qaeda fails to maintain a high-profile stake in the conflict with U.S. forces in the region, the analysts said, its relevance in the jihadist movement will quickly diminish. ….  Others said Zarqawi’s death is likely to widen the factional splits that have been developing for years within the global movement. More and more, Islamic radical groups are becoming splintered and are only loosely affiliated. While they may be united in a broader struggle against the United States and the West, they often have different aims and tactics.