Iraq
In the Nov. 19th New Yorker, John Lee Anderson concludes that “Iraq’s future, for the moment, is in limbo. The best one can say, perhaps, is that the U.S. has bought or borrowed a little space to work with.”
This is partly because the cause of the current decline in violence is not at all clear:
- The surge in American troops seems to be working, but only in some areas.
- On the other hand, “analysts credit much of the recent drop in Iraqi civilian deaths not to the surge but to Sadr’s decision, in August, to order the Mahdi Army, which is believed to have been responsible for much of the Shiite-on-Sunni sectarian killing in and around Baghdad, to “freeze” its activities for six months.”
- Also crucial is the fact that “the surge also coincided with the so-called Sunni Awakening, the decision by some Anbar tribesmen to ally themselves with the Americans and to fight against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia—a shift that was not foreseen in Petraeus’s plan.”
In other words, at least two of the elements of recent gains are not under American control at all, and thus subject to reversal, whatever future policies the US pursues.
In a harbinger of future instability, Anderson writes that “Many of the players in Iraq seemed …. to be positioning themselves for the next battle.” A Sunni leader now working with the US says, “Once Anbar is settled, we must take control of Baghdad, and we will.”
A second ominous sign is that, while the American relationship to various Iraqi players has shifted, internal Iraqi reconciliation is not proceeding, despite that being the central goal of the surge. Shiites in the Iraqi government feel the new Sunni “allies” that the US has enlisted are the militias of the future. Meanwhile, efforts to create nonsectarian security forces–essential to a post-occupation Iraq’s stability–are still faltering. The national police, for instance, are “still part of the problem,” an American officer tells Anderson.
The Washington Post reported yesterday that there is a way for things to suddenly get much worse in Iraq: a giant dam could collapse, releasing a 143-square-mile reservoir on the Tigris River. This would destroy much of the city of Mosul, which lies downstream, and could drown as many as 500,000 people.
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No one interviewed for the article ventures an estimate of probabilities for the event. Some Iraqi engineers are skeptical about the level of danger, while some American officials are said to think that “the dam could collapse any day.”
Writing in the Washington Post earlier this month, Jackson Diehl argued that events in Iraq are pushing the country to a kind of solution:
This is a loose confederation of at least three self-governing regions, each with its own government, courts and security forces; and a weak federal government whose main function will be redistributing oil revenue so that each region gets a share based roughly on its proportion of the population.
He notes several drivers:
- The Kurds are proceeding with their projects in the long-autonomous north, and have passed their own oil and gas law.
- The south is organizing itself for autonomy as well, with SCIRI, the most powerful Shiite party, pushing the project.
- The ethnically mixed areas around Baghdad that were home to many Iraqis in favor of a stronger federal state are being cleared out (as noted by Future Atlas earlier).
- Iraqi opinion is shifting: as of March, 42% of Iraqis supported “regional” or independent states as a political solution to Iraq’s instability, more than double the 18% who favored that outcome in 2004.
Diehl also suggests that new anti-al Qaeda sentiment among Sunnis provides a future alternative to jihadist rule in Sunni areas even if Iraq fragments. (See this April Future Atlas post.)
There are downsides, Diehl writes: “It’s possible that one of the regional mini-states, in the oil-rich Shiite south, will become an Iranian client, while Sunnis in the West may be ruled by the same toxic Arab national socialism championed by Saddam Hussein.”
It is also clear that an oil-sharing agreement is crucial to any settlement between the regions, and any agreement could quickly unravel as the regions eyed each other with animosity. With the collapse of an agreement, the temptation to shift the new borders to secure oil fields could easily trigger new wars between the fragments of what was once Iraq.
The Iraqi Red Crescent relief organization and the UN have found that Iraqis continue to become internal refugees on a large scale–possibly 100,000 a month–and displacement may have accelerated since the US troop buildup began in February 2007, the International Herald Tribute reports.
For the moment, this vast movement of people is draining ethnically mixed areas in the center of the country, with Shiite refugees flowing toward the overwhelmingly Shiite areas to the south and Sunnis heading toward majority Sunni regions to the west and north. The demographic shifts could favor those who would like to see Iraq partitioned into three semi-autonomous regions: a Shiite south and a Kurdish north sandwiching a Sunni land in between.
This is another sign that scenarios of division are now more likely than those that include a unified Iraq.
Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress polled 108 foreign affairs experts across the political spectrum about terrorism and related issues.
Asked what country is likely to be the next al Qaeda stronghold, the experts said:
- Pakistan — 35%
- Iraq — 22%
- Somalia — 11%
- Sudan — 8%
- Afghanistan — 7%
The experts also put Pakistan at the head of the list most likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists by 2012:
- Pakistan — 74%
- North Korea — 42%
- Russia — 38%
- Iran — 31%
- United States — 5%
The experts were divided about how to change US policy toward Pakistan: about a third favored sanctions against the country, and a similar number advocated increasing US aid.
Pakistan likely tops both lists both because of ideological forces at work within the country, and because it is regularly cited as one of the states most likely to fall apart.
The Washington Post reported last week reported on wargames of Iraq’s future conducted for the American military.
The games suggested three outcomes:
Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations.
Other forecasts from the article:
- The games suggested that “partition would result” from a US pullout by a set date. “The games also predicted that Iran would intervene on one side of a Shiite civil war and would become bogged down in southern Iraq.”
- A retired Marine colonel “said that an extended Iranian presence in Iraq could lead to increased intervention by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states on the other side.” Iran might conclude that its best counterstrategy “‘would be to stimulate insurgency among the Shiites in Saudi Arabia.’”
- Most Middle East experts agree “that either an al-Qaeda or Iranian takeover [of Iraq] would be unlikely” in the aftermath of a US withdrawal; according to Anthony Cordesman of the CSIS in a recent report, al-Qaeda ‘does not dominate the Sunni insurgency.’
Two variables are central to future scenarios for Iraq: how unified or divided it is, and how the state or states are governed. These forecasts are another sign that the most likely future may be division along ethnic and sectarian lines.
Foreign Policy offers the odds on six new states achieving independence:
1. Kosovo
Odds — “strong”: driven by US and EU support, it has a good shot at full independence from Serbia
2. South Sudan
Odds — “not great”: a 2011 “referendum will probably happen; and it will probably come out in favor of independence; and Khartoum will almost certainly find a way around the results.”
3. Somaliland
Odds — “very good”: effectively independent from Somalia since 1991, it already has its own government, army, and currency; international organizations will attend to the disastrous state of the rest of Somalia first, however
4. Iraqi Kurdistan
Odds — “fair”: Turkey’s strong opposition may be overruled by facts on the ground if Iraq disintegrates
5. Palestine
Odds — “good”: “details” in the way of a two-state solution will eventually overcome the objections of “the extreme radical wings” on both sides
6. Taiwan
Odds — “poor”: China is getting stronger and stronger, and Taiwan “will accept autonomous status” under China
In the July Atlantic, 39 American foreign policy experts were polled about Saudi Arabia’s roll.
Q — “What will Saudi Arabia’s growing role as a regional leader mean for the Middle East?”
- 55% “Very little, the Sunni Arab states will prove ineffective as counterweights to Iran”
- 23% “The containment of Iranian influence throughout the Middle East”
- 16% “Increased sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shia, particularly in Iraq”
- 5% “A heightened possibility of conventional war between Iran and the Sunni Arab states”
- 2% “The containment of Iranian influence in Iraq”
One of the 23% foreseeing containment had this to say:
Saudi Arabia, even if it succeeds in increasing its regional influence, will have little impact on developments in Iraq. It should, however, be somewhat more effective in countering Shiite radicalism in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East.
Q — “How friendly to U.S. interests will Saudi Arabia be over the next five years?”
- 69% “Friendly enough”
- 31% “Not very friendly”
A respondent among the 31% said that “Saudi Arabia will be increasingly pressured by the Wahhabi clerics and jihadists to provide more financial and political support [to opponents of] Israel and the U.S.”
Source: “Saudi Arabia’s Rise?”, The Atlantic, July 2007, 34.
Senator Joseph Lieberman called today for consideration of US military action against Iran, including a ground attack:
“I think we’ve got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq,” Lieberman said. “And to me, that would include a strike over the border into Iran.”
Such a course of action would likely have substantial negative effects on the US position in Iraq:
- As discussed previously in this blog, Iran is in a better position than the US to escalate in a confrontation.
- This would not reduce killing of Americans; more likely would be the reverse, and Iran could greatly increase its support for insurgents.
- Iran and the US have had support for the Iraqi government in common; a US-Iranian confrontation could force the government to choose sides, and either choice would likely make its future, and the US project in Iraq, more precarious.
- An attack on Iran would tend to escalate toward a large-scale military confrontation, which Iran is more likely to “win” at the strategic level than the US.
Writing in the NYT, two supporters of the war, Peter W. Rodman and William Shawcross, offer these forecasts:
As in Indochina more than 30 years ago, millions of Iraqis today see the United States helping them defeat their murderous opponents as the only hope for their country. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have committed themselves to working with us and with their democratically elected government to enable their country to rejoin the world as a peaceful, moderate state that is a partner to its neighbors instead of a threat. If we accept defeat, these Iraqis will be at terrible risk. Thousands upon thousands of them will flee.
The new strategy of the coalition and the Iraqis, ably directed by Gen. David Petraeus, offers the best prospect of reversing the direction of events — provided that we show staying power.
American defeat in Iraq would embolden the extremists in the Muslim world, demoralize and perhaps destabilize many moderate friendly governments, and accelerate the radicalization of every conflict in the Middle East. Our conduct in Iraq is a crucial test of our credibility, especially with regard to the looming threat from revolutionary Iran.
Analysis
- Large numbers of Iraqis are already in danger, and millions have fled. Even more could be placed in danger if the US precipitously withdraws and fighting intensifies.
- The authors do not address the fact that by most accounts the “new strategy” is not working, and American “staying power” continues to drain away. That continuing a fight might be useful on some levels is not sufficient, if no plausible strategy or goal is in view.
- American defeat would indeed energize radicals. But the continued occupation of Iraq also has that effect, and could contribute to destabilization of governments in the region, as veterans of jihad return to their homelands.
- It should also be noted that these arguments were good reasons to have stayed out of Iraq in the first place: they are arguing for saving ourselves from the consequences of our own actions; prudent policymaking would have avoided these dangers entirely, and not placed American credibility in what is substantially a lose-lose position.