Iran
A new analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security attempts to answer that question, the Washington Post reports.
A military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would probably only delay the country’s progress toward nuclear-weapons capability, according to a study that concludes that such an attack could backfire by strengthening Tehran’s resolve to acquire the bomb. The analysis by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security found that Iran’s uranium facilities are too widely dispersed and protected — and, in some cases, concealed too well — to be effectively destroyed by warplanes. And any damage to the country’s nuclear program could be quickly repaired.
Moreover, Albright told the Post, Iran would likely emerge more intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. He said that:
an Israeli or U.S. attack would result in broader popular support for Iran’s ruling clerics and could lead Tehran to sever ties with the U.N. nuclear watchdog. “Iran would likely launch a ‘crash’ program to quickly obtain nuclear weapons,” Albright said in an interview. “An attack would likely leave Iran angry, more nationalistic, fed up with international inspectors and nonproliferation treaties, and more determined than ever to obtain nuclear weapons.”
New polling in Iran offers mixed signals to those who hope for “moderation.”
A strong majority of Iranians favors allowing all reformist candidates to contest elections, and 86% say that all leaders of their country should be elected.
At the same time, a slim majority of Iranians says that Iran should develop nuclear weapons–51% are in favor of this, with only 39% opposed.
So Iran’s potential interest in nuclear weapons is not confined to a tiny ruling group, and even the advent of full democracy might not dispel it.
Writing in the Washington Post, Iranian dissident Akbar Ganji says that “The Bush administration may be striving to help Iranian democrats, but any Iranian who seeks American dollars will not be recognized as a democrat by his or her fellow citizens.”
What can the US do, if monetary aid to democratic forces is unconstructive? He writes that “The Iranian people, myself included, need freedom, democracy and peace — not war conditions and constant worries about a potential barrage of U.S. missiles.”
Ganji notes several reasons that US funds are not helpful:
- “Over the past two centuries, many Iranian politicians were paid or influenced by foreign powers. As a result, most Iranian intellectuals and democratic forces are deeply critical of external support.”
- “The Iranian people do not want their democratic movement to be dependent on or subservient to any foreign government.”
- “The Iranian regime uses American funding as an excuse to persecute opponents. Although its accusations are false, this has proved effective in poisoning the public against the regime’s opponents. Fear of foreign meddling is one reason for the regime’s staying power.”
Ultimately, he writes, “Iranians themselves must support the transition to democracy; it cannot be presented like a gift.”
Recent bellicose remarks by French officials underline that one of the more likely future wars for France (and most other Western military powers) is war with Iran.
It remains to be seen, however, whether there are any viable military options for those attempting to block a nuclear path by Iran.
The Washington Post reported last week reported on wargames of Iraq’s future conducted for the American military.
The games suggested three outcomes:
Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations.
Other forecasts from the article:
- The games suggested that “partition would result” from a US pullout by a set date. “The games also predicted that Iran would intervene on one side of a Shiite civil war and would become bogged down in southern Iraq.”
- A retired Marine colonel “said that an extended Iranian presence in Iraq could lead to increased intervention by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states on the other side.” Iran might conclude that its best counterstrategy “‘would be to stimulate insurgency among the Shiites in Saudi Arabia.’”
- Most Middle East experts agree “that either an al-Qaeda or Iranian takeover [of Iraq] would be unlikely” in the aftermath of a US withdrawal; according to Anthony Cordesman of the CSIS in a recent report, al-Qaeda ‘does not dominate the Sunni insurgency.’
Two variables are central to future scenarios for Iraq: how unified or divided it is, and how the state or states are governed. These forecasts are another sign that the most likely future may be division along ethnic and sectarian lines.
In the July Atlantic, 39 American foreign policy experts were polled about Saudi Arabia’s roll.
Q — “What will Saudi Arabia’s growing role as a regional leader mean for the Middle East?”
- 55% “Very little, the Sunni Arab states will prove ineffective as counterweights to Iran”
- 23% “The containment of Iranian influence throughout the Middle East”
- 16% “Increased sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shia, particularly in Iraq”
- 5% “A heightened possibility of conventional war between Iran and the Sunni Arab states”
- 2% “The containment of Iranian influence in Iraq”
One of the 23% foreseeing containment had this to say:
Saudi Arabia, even if it succeeds in increasing its regional influence, will have little impact on developments in Iraq. It should, however, be somewhat more effective in countering Shiite radicalism in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East.
Q — “How friendly to U.S. interests will Saudi Arabia be over the next five years?”
- 69% “Friendly enough”
- 31% “Not very friendly”
A respondent among the 31% said that “Saudi Arabia will be increasingly pressured by the Wahhabi clerics and jihadists to provide more financial and political support [to opponents of] Israel and the U.S.”
Source: “Saudi Arabia’s Rise?”, The Atlantic, July 2007, 34.
Senator Joseph Lieberman called today for consideration of US military action against Iran, including a ground attack:
“I think we’ve got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq,” Lieberman said. “And to me, that would include a strike over the border into Iran.”
Such a course of action would likely have substantial negative effects on the US position in Iraq:
- As discussed previously in this blog, Iran is in a better position than the US to escalate in a confrontation.
- This would not reduce killing of Americans; more likely would be the reverse, and Iran could greatly increase its support for insurgents.
- Iran and the US have had support for the Iraqi government in common; a US-Iranian confrontation could force the government to choose sides, and either choice would likely make its future, and the US project in Iraq, more precarious.
- An attack on Iran would tend to escalate toward a large-scale military confrontation, which Iran is more likely to “win” at the strategic level than the US.
Drawing on analogies in Soviet history, Thomas Friedman argues today that Iran’s high dependence on oil exports can be exploited:
In 2005, Bloomberg.com reported, Iran’s government earned $44.6 billion from oil and spent $25 billion on subsidies — for housing, jobs, food and 34-cents-a-gallon gasoline — to buy off interest groups. … So if oil prices fall sharply again, Iran’s regime will have to take away many benefits from many Iranians, as the Soviets had to do. For a regime already unpopular with many of its people, that could cause all kinds of problems and give rise to an Ayatollah Gorbachev. We know how that ends.
In short, the best tool we have for curbing Iran’s influence is not containment or engagement, but getting the price of oil down in the long term with conservation and an alternative-energy strategy.
Others go further down this road, suggesting that Iran may deprive itself of oil revenue by losing its ability to export.
Friedman might be correct that this is a strong long-term strategy, but it is indeed long-term. For the next 15 or 20 years, other measures will be needed. Engagement might work, but Iran might also acquire nuclear weapons during that time, in which case the mix would have to include containment and deterrence.
The US has indicated it will kill or capture Iranian operatives in Iraq.
The policy has at least two aims:
Several potential downsides to the policy are apparent:
- The policy appears to cross a line that Iran itself has stayed behind: direct targeting of each other’s operatives. US intelligence officials say that there is no evidence that Iran has done so in Iraq. Once the US crosses that line, Iran will feel justified in following suit.
- The US is much more vulnerable in Iraq than is Iran. The list of American targets is vast, and they could be struck from a variety of covert directions.
- Iran has more at stake in Iraq than does the US, and is unlikely to back away due to small retaliations.
- This may not further American aims in Iraq, and may not even be intended to do so. A senior intelligence officer says, “This has little to do with Iraq. It’s all about pushing Iran’s buttons. It is purely political.”
Iran may soon be unable to export oil due to declining production, a scholar writes in PNAS.
Economic geographer Roger Stern asserts that Iranian oil exports could fall rapidly in the next few years, possibly even coming to a halt by 2015, due to production difficulties brought on by lack of domestic and foreign investment.
Stern suggests two implications:
- Iran might actually need the nuclear energy program it is pursuing.
- In a few years, Iran will be much more vulnerable to sanctions.