Middle East
A number of analysts have called for humanitarian intervention of some kind in Libya — a no-fly-zone at least, as suggested by the International Crisis Group, with others implying something more.
While such an intervention might become morally essential, several factors should give us pause:
- The anti-imperialist card — Any military intervention would greatly enhance the “foreign conspiracy” narrative in the region. All protesters would be more readily tarred with the accusation that they are agents of Western plots, seeking to invite in foreign domination. Given that even Mubarak brought up the theme, it would certainly be used to the fullest in Iran or Syria.
- Secondary costs — Western forces operating anywhere in the Muslim world would be seen by at least some fraction of Muslim publics as engaged in part of the “war on Islam,” no matter what the facts are.
- Encouraging passivity — That Arab publics believe they themselves can change their countries for the better is a crucial aspect of recent events. It is a backstep if outside intervention comes to be seen as necessary.
- Moral quagmire — Remember Somalia in the 1990s: moral certainty can rapidly evaporate on the ground. An intervening force might simply find itself backing one side in a tribe-on-tribe civil war.
- Difficulty — It appears that interventionists think an intervention is doable at little cost. That might be true with a no-fly zone (which is not likely to be very effective), but sending in troops might not go well. A few million Sunni in Iraq fought the main effort of the US military to a standstill for years, and some fraction of the populace might remain loyal to the former regime, even forming majorities in some areas. Recall also that only a few years after Saddam was overthrown, a majority of Iraqis approved of attacks on US forces.
This is not a one-sided calculus. Other factors could overwhelm the considerations above:
- Human rights violations could reach the scale of a true mass-atrocity event.
- It could become clear that Libyan opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of intervention — there are already people calling for it on the streets.
- The Arab world could clearly and decisively endorse such an intervention.
With luck, this will all soon by moot, and the regime will disintegrate, with something less than civil war on the other side.
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Image copyright Futureatlas.com — usable with attribution and link
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are illustrating that the unrest spreading across the Middle East will not happen the same way in any two places, nor are all authoritarian countries equally susceptible.
Writing in the Washington Post, Scott Wilson offers a hint at why Saudi Arabia has remained largely quiet:
The aging monarchy of Saudi Arabia, home to roughly a fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves, governs a population where many are influenced by the most extreme interpretation of Islam, one hostile to Western culture. The cosmopolitan Saudi elite fear the majority and have accepted the Sauds as an alternative to a more severe Islamist government. How the octogenarian leadership would weather a popular uprising is unclear.
In other words, the kind of cosmopolitan, educated elite who were crucial to the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt may know that instability, and perhaps even democracy, would not bode well for them or their values. Wilson implies that they see the Saudi government as a force tamping down the retrograde inclinations of the country’s populace, and that a (post-)Saudi democracy might be even more repressive, because that is what the populace might want.
The Saudi rulers also have enough money that they can prevent the level of poverty that have helped bring people to the streets in many countries.
As for Bahrain, Vali Nasr tweeted today, “Bahrain protest is existential threat to Sunni monarchy and minority rule. Regime will react much more harshly than Mubarak.”
Nasr is identifying a key variable: whether a country is ruled by a minority — Syria with its Alawis is an example — that would have much to lose in a democracy.
Bahrain is dominated by a Sunni minority. Unlike in Egypt, where the ruling partly might plausibly win an election in a few years, democracy in Bahrain likely means defeat: the Sunnis could plausibly foresee being shut out of power for years, even decades. They might even be subjected to economic reprisal as the Shia majority use government to divert resources and opportunities to themselves.
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Image courtesy NASA
Some patterns are emerging from the Middle East unrest that began in Tunisia.
This chart combines three factors that seem relevant:
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen are highly similar when plotted against these variables.
- They all have a “5″ level of civil liberties, as assigned by Freedom House; this might be characterized as medium-bad.
- While their income levels vary, they have similar poor levels of economic freedom, characteristic of the state-heavy Arab approach. This chart reflects a multiplier effect for higher levels of economic freedom.
Is it predictive? Where countries end up on the plot may reflect these factors:
- Countries too far to the right on civil liberties — at 6/7 levels — may be too repressive for people power to succeed. Thus, Iran already had its Egypt moment (for now), but it was suppressed. This will be tested as people attempt to demonstrate in Syria.
- Countries too high on the chart may be purchasing stability with wealth (and economic openness). Poverty is absent as a driver, and more of the population is effectively middle class. (Though note Bahrain, which cannot be called truly stable.)
- Countries to the left on civil liberties may be offering enough room to prevent a buildup. Morocco — which is hardly free — may be the test of that.
This is a roundup of some of the fast-accumulating forecasts for Egypt and the Middle East, particularly those taking a longer view (including some of my own).
General
- Threats to US interests — “Were demonstrations to spread in a big way to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a catastrophe could be looming. A more enlightened, pro-American regime than the one now in Jordan is hard to imagine. As for the Saudi royal family, it is probably the worst possible form of government for that country except for any other that might credibly replace it. (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
- Relations with the US — “Any freely elected govt will want to distance itself from U.S policies.” (Shadi Hamid, The Atlantic, 1/25/11)
- The Gulf — The Gulf states are relatively safe from unrest. (Michael Binyon, Al Jazeera English, 1/28/11)
- Diversity of outcomes — Even if protesters were going into these protests intending the same outcomes (and they aren’t), the outcomes will be different. A relatively secular, middle-class nation like Tunisia will emerge drastically different from a crisis than a place like Yemen. Look to Eastern Europe in 1989, which yielded everything from rapid democratization in Czechoslovakia to a murky power transfer in Romania. (Future Atlas)
- “Normalized” politics — “Whatever the outcome of these uprisings, it seems clear that Arabs and their new leaders will be focused for years to come on the imperfections within their own societies — perhaps to a greater degree than on injustices committed by Israel and the West abroad. …. Politics may thus become normalized in the Arab world, rather than radicalized.” (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
Economics
- Jobs and poverty — The demands of so many protesters around the region — jobs and food — may be internally at odds. Statism in the Middle East suppresses growth and entrepreneurship, but also provides the region a lower level of abject poverty. Freeing up the economies of the region could provide opportunity but could cause poverty and inequality to spike. (Future Atlas)
- The Chinese model — For the portion of the protesters who are motivated by economic opportunity and prosperity above all, the “Chinese model” — authoritarianism with freewheeling capitalism — could look good. (Future Atlas)
Israeli-Arab issues
- Israel — Democratic Arab states will tend to be less friendly to Israel than many current regimes, as long as the peace process is frozen. While the occupation continues, peacemaking will tend to be viewed as collaboration. (Future Atlas)
- The peace process — “Prolonged crisis in Egypt will hurt Palestinian-Israel peace process, not clear what following Mubarak may mean for peace process either.” (Vali Nasr, 1/29/11)
Egypt
- Limited unity — “Once Mubarak goes, the open source movement will evaporate — after that, divergent motivations repeatedly fork the movement.” (John Robb, 1/30/11)
- Uncertain outcomes — “The ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power.” (Stratfor, 1/29/11)
- Islamists — “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt functions to a significant extent as a community self-help organization and may not necessarily try to hijack the uprising to the extent as happened in Iran.” (Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, 1/28/11)
- Getting the army to stand down — “Militaries don’t leave politics easily. Even after Mubarak goes there could still be a battle to get military to leave politics.” (Vali Nasr, 1/30/11) “If the military’s senior leaders decide that Mubarak’s ouster and a subsequent democratic transition would unacceptably risk reducing the military’s political and cultural power, they will be more likely to defend the regime.” (Michael Wahid Hanna, The Atlantic, 1/29/11)
- Military vested interests — The Egyptian military may not look favorably on a more open and equitable economic system, as it has its own business interests, established to help invest it in the status quo. (Future Atlas)
- End of Mubarak — “Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.” (Stratfor, 1/29/11) Mubarak will fall and the army will take over. (Mike Murphy, “Meet the Press,” 1/30/11)
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Image copyright FutureAtlas.com — usable with attribution and link. Fire background courtesy Dave Hogg (Flickr).
The Economist held a debate earlier this week about taking military action against Iran’s nuclear program.
In favor of military action was General Chuck F. Wald, a director at Deloitte. Dr. Emily Landau, a senior research associate at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, opposed the option.
For military action
General Wald offered these forecasts:
Getting rid of Ahmadinejad or the current regime may not greatly change the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program, as some seem to assume.
As Iran vacillates — or appears to — on the uranium stockpile deal, the opposition is accusing Ahmadinejad of giving away too much to the West.
The WaPo reports that
The strongest criticism has come from Mir Hossein Mousavi, the leading opposition presidential candidate in Iran’s June 12 election. Even though the two-term government of his political partner, former president Mohammad Khatami, tried several times to reach a compromise with the West over Iran’s nuclear program, Mousavi charged that the current proposal would lead to disaster. “The discussions in Geneva were really surprising, and if the promises given [to the West] are realized, then the hard work of thousands of scientists would be ruined.”
Iran’s approach to security is not just about Ahmadinejad, nor about “extremism.” It has structural drivers as well, and those will not change rapidly.
The US is preparing to push for new sanctions against Iran in light of its nuclear program, aiming to interfere with Iranian trade more broadly.
A comprehensive sanctions approach has more chance of success than efforts so far, and Iran might be more susceptible to pressure in the wake of the post-election political and societal divides that have opened up. But analysts note that sanctions may be weakened by Russian and Chinese resistance, and that sanctions may simply may not be enough to change Iran’s course. One problem is that Iran is fixing one vulnerability, building up its capacity to refine gasoline.
Some US politicians are talking about regime change in Iran in place of more gradual measures. Sanctions might bring this about, but the US lacks leverage, and pushing for it might delegitimize the very forces that might replace the current government. In any case, regime change would not guarantee an end to the nuclear program: support for aspects of it is widespread among Iranians, and Iran’s strategic situation will remain largely the same.
A military strike is also put forward as plausible, but most analysts see it as at best a delaying tactic. It also has severe potential downsides:
- It might well mean an angrier, more aggressive Iran, possibly more determined to pursue nuclear weapons.
- A strike might rally the populace around the regime and even around the nuclear program, reducing the impact of sanctions or regime change.
- Iran has substantial ways to retaliate against the US, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.
- If Israel carries out an attack, it runs the risk of turning the Iranian-Israeli struggle from a cold war to a hot one, increasing the danger to Israel in the medium- and long-term, especially when Iran acquires nuclear arms anyway.
Iran may now have enough nuclear fuel “to make a rapid, if risky, sprint for a nuclear weapon,” the New York Times reported this week.
However, design work on an actual nuclear weapon may have been halted in 2003, and “it is unclear how many months — or even years — it would take Iran to complete that final design work, and then build a warhead that could fit atop its long-range missiles.” This makes the US believe it would have ample warning if Iran actually began pursuing a nuclear weapon in earnest — the Times notes that the official estimate is that Iran could have a bomb between 2010 and 2015, with later dates in that range more likely.
It also remains unclear how much effect the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would have. NPR explored this issue late in August.
- Experts interviewed for that story suggest, as others have, that Iran is not ruled by a suicidal regime, and could likely be deterred, just as more radical regimes (such as Mao’s China) have been in the past.
- “If Iran gets the bomb, we’re going to have a period of experimentation in the beginning, where Iran is trying to figure out how much power this new capability has conferred,” says Gary Milhollin, the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, noting that this could lead to a confrontation stemming from miscalculation.
- Mike Shuster of NPR notes: “If Iran does eventually build nuclear weapons, its deterrent is unlikely to grow beyond a handful of bombs. Iran’s own supply of natural uranium is believed to be quite small and dwindling already. Acquiring uranium from other nations could be difficult if Iran sought to keep it secret.”
Iraq is planning to clamp down on the Internet, raising concerns that it will revert to a restrictive approach more typical of the region. Iraq currently has many Internet providers and hundreds of Internet cafes.
A government official told the Associated Press that “All Web sites that glorify terrorism and incite violence and sectarianism, or those that violate social morals with content such as pornography will be banned.”
An Iraqi press freedom group said that the plan was an “attempt to control the flow of free information on the Internet and limit the knowledge of the citizens,” the AP reports.
This can be taken as another sign that the overall durability of a democratic Iraq is still in question. As the US departs, there could easily be backsliding on human rights and democratic practices. The populace will not want to be oppressed, as they were in the Saddam years, but they may well be happy to limit the freedoms and rights of ethnic, political, and religious minorities.
(Image courtesy Mike Licht, Flickr)
Fareed Zakaria advocates doing nothing with Iran in this week’s Newsweek (”On Iran, Do Nothing. Yet,” August 3, 2009, p. 26).
In the short term, the US should not confer legitimacy on the post-election regime, and in any case has already made a serious offer of talks.
In the longer term, he suggests that passive measures — deterrence and containment — are better than active alternatives in confronting a nuclear-armed Iraq. He notes that that approach “worked against Stalin and Mao and works against North Korea, a far more unstable and bizarre regime.”
Zakaria also examines the trend others have noted: that Ahmadinejad represents not the ultimate expression of the religious regime, but its loss of power to secular and military forces. “The Islamic Republic of Iran is losing its distinctive religious basis and becoming another Middle Eastern dictatorship — except that it now hosts an opposition movement that does not seem ready to quiet down.”
It is unclear which Iranian elite is “better” from a Western perspective: the mullahs don’t have the “apocalyptic” mindset that some in the US and Israel ascribe to them, Zakaria notes, but they do have deep-seated beliefs that tend them toward anti-Western and anti-Israeli directions. Ahdmadinejad’s faction could conceivably end up more pragmatic; one of his recent disputes with the clerics was based on his appointment of a top deputy who said that Iranians were friends with everyone, “even Israelis,” contravening a central tenet of Iranian policy.