Governance
In terms of governance, former Soviet Georgia is one of the holes in the world.
What this can mean in practical terms is revealed in this WP article: counterfeit money from the renegade region of South Ossetia is showing up in the United States.
By one measure of government reach compiled by Future Atlas, Georgia scores only a 22 out of 100, placing it 164th out of 202 countries rated.
President Hu reiterated the danger of widespread corruption to the Communist Party “with a stern warning that rampant corruption could erode the party’s popular legitimacy and undermine its hold on power,” according to the Washington Post.
Corruption is a primary driver of China’s evolution because it threatens continued economic growth and undermines the deal that the Party has struck with population: that people acquiesce in Party rule in return for some kind of shot at prosperity.
The Ford Foundation is attempting to address Africa’s preeminent problem, governance.
As reported by the NYT, it is funding a new Group, Trust Africa, that will support “an expanding network of nonprofit groups across the continent that seek to hold governments accountable.”
Thomas O. Melia, deputy director of Freedom House, [...] said efforts like those of Trust Africa represent the next frontier in deepening democracy in Africa and elsewhere. “What has been missing, even in places establishing electoral democracy, is independent voices — think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, university centers — able to monitor government performance.”
The Senegal-based group will also seek support from African emigrants abroad, hoping that their interest in their homelands will translate to engagement in pan-African issues.
Writing in America Abroad, Ivo Daalder points out the problems with the new UN Human Rights Commission.
The central problem is a perennial one: human rights abusers end up on the commission. New members include Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Cuba.
The ideal solution would some criteria for membership could be applied. Consider, for instance, the political rights rating from Freedom House. The problematic countries above are rated thus:
- Saudi Arabia — 7 (not free)
- Cuba — 7 (not free)
- China — 7 (not free)
- Pakistan — 6 (not free)
- Russia — 6 (not free)
If the countries with free and high partly free ratings (4 or less) were allowed to serve on a human rights body, they would still constitute a majority of countries, and would not include any of the worst violators.
It won’t happen of course, for any number of reasons:
- China and Russia would use their positions on the Security Council to block such a reform.
- Excluded countries and their friends would decry “cultural imperialism.”
- Many regions would be left with rather few representatives. For instance, the Middle East has only one “free” country — Israel — but it gets a “not free” rating (6, the same as Iran) in the areas it occupies, and would seemingly be excluded on that basis, leaving “partly free” Kuwait to represent everything from Morocco to Iran.
Imperfect mechanisms will have to do for now. Daalder concludes:
It may well be that the new requirement that the human rights activities of all UN members, starting with those elected to the council, be carefully examined provides an opportunity to prove this skeptic wrong. But first indications are hardly encouraging.
Foreign policy and the Fund for Peace have released their annual Failed States Index, a valuable tool for tracking potential instability.
Foreign Policy explains:
The category of “failed states” has become part of the strategic vernacular, and it has many definitions. For the purposes of this index, a failing state is one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force. A failing state may experience active violence or simply be vulnerable to violence. The great majority of the states listed in the index are not presently failed states. The index measures vulnerability to violent internal conflict. It is an index of country risk, not of countries that have already failed.
The 20 most endangered states are concentrated in Africa, and include many of the least-governed countries. Ranked from most in danger downwards, they are:
1. Sudan
2. Congo, Dem. Rep. of the
3. Ivory Coast
4. Iraq
5. Zimbabwe
6. Chad
6. Somalia
8. Haiti
9. Pakistan
10. Afghanistan
11. Guinea
11. Liberia
13. Central African Republic
14. North Korea
15. Burundi
16. Yemen
17. Sierra Leone
18. Burma
19. Bangladesh
20. Nepal
The status of all 148 rankings is mapped here.
Instability in Pakistan is potentially disastrous: it could be the first nuclear-armed state to fail, and some of the parties that might get hold of the country’s nuclear weapons have links to Islamic extremist groups.
Number 31 on the list is Egypt, a lynchpin state of the Middle East, and right behind it at 32 is Indonesia, one of the largest countries in the world.
Impunity for Africa’s leaders shows signs of ending, suggests the CSM, citing the arrest of former Liberian president Charles Taylor and the corruption trial of the ex-president of Zambia.
Efforts to hold African leaders to account are the result of both external pressure and internal African initiatives.
Poor governance is the single largest obstacle to African peace and development. A remark by a citizen of the Congo a couple of years ago can be applied across the continent:
“The most sorrowful thing I have to live with is that we are incapable of coming up with an elite that can run things with Congolese interests in mind.” — Congolese in Blaine Harden, “The Dirt in the New Machine,” New York Times, August 12, 2001.
These are only the first signs of what would have to be a protracted process.
(The CSM article also suggests that the US role in Taylor’s capture “implicitly binds the US to helping keep the peace in Liberia, should the trial of the still-popular” leader cause instability.)
Future Atlas content appears in the current (April 2006) issue of Wired.
“States of Confusion” is the “atlas” feature on pp. 46-47. It uses Future Atlas data to map effective government presence in every country.
Basically, it depicts whether the government can carry out its intended functions effectively. It is not a model of good government, measured by human rights or human welfare, for instance. That is, it does not differentiate between malign state purposes, such as totalitarian control, and more positive ones, such as delivering effective healthcare.
The model itself is quite simple. Each state starts with a score of 100, and this is then depreciated by its levels of wealth, corruption, and crime, and by the presence and scope of rebellion. The score is also raised or lowered according to state philosophy, from totalitarian to laissez faire. (This might appear to “reward” authoritarians, but the government philosophy factor is always overwhelmed by other factors: authoritarism is associated with poverty, corruption, and unrest.)
The Washington Post reports that US warships opened fire on suspected pirates in international waters off the coast of Somalia. A US naval officer notes that waters around Somalia ‘are infested with pirates, seaborne armed robbers who board any boat or ship they can approach and rob the crew at gunpoint.’
Somalia is the least-governed country on the planet. That it is harboring pirates suggests why these holes in international order can matter. It is also thought to be a potential al Qaeda refuge, and is prime breeding ground for diseases such as avian flu, as there is no healthcare system in place.
It would be ripe for the kind of international trusteeship applied in Bosnia and Kosovo, but is so disordered and violent that it would take more will to enforce such an arrangement than international actors have.
The Washington Post writes that Guatemala is under increasing pressure from drug traffickers, who have compromised even the highest levels of law enforcement. Great wealth allows narcotraffickers to challenge the state directly:
Drug traffickers seeking to solidify their foothold in the Peten have bought up large tracts of land and paid for medical care, power generators and soccer teams in a bid to win the loyalty of impoverished locals who were long neglected by the central government.
Where governance is weak, globalized crime can hollow out or coopt entire nations, and the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean are prime targets.
Guatemala’s situation also illustrates how corruption undermines every state function, debilitating many of the world’s governments.