Recent bellicose remarks by French officials underline that one of the more likely future wars for France (and most other Western military powers) is war with Iran.
It remains to be seen, however, whether there are any viable military options for those attempting to block a nuclear path by Iran.
In “The Politically Incorrect Reforms of France’s New President” (Knowledge@Wharton, 5/16/07), analysts offer a number of prognostications:
- France must restructure the labor market, making unemployment less easy; France is the lone European holdout in labor restructuring.
- Newly elected president Sarkozy will have only a 2-3-year window to accomplish this reform, in the face of potentially disabling labor opposition.
- A French “return to economic liberalism” under Sarkozy could help revitalize the EU economies.
The Post paints a picture of a confused, hesitant, and unrealistic electorate in France as voters select a president. A French analysist summed up voters as wanting “the myth of a job that’s secure for life with full, massive protections, and by some miracle the creation of new jobs.”
The recurrent theme is fear of the future, and “a growing sense of malaise so pronounced that analysts gave it a name: ‘declinism.’”
Some of the problems:
near-record budget and trade deficits, its highest debt in history (65 percent of GDP), and anemic economic growth and employment rates that are among the lowest in the industrialized world. Public spending accounts for about 55 percent of the national income; unemployment has not fallen below 8 percent in 25 years.
On the other hand, writing in the NYT, historian Tony Judt points out that there are reasons for France to be less glum:
French infants have a better chance of survival than American ones. The French live longer than Americans and they live healthier (at far lower cost). They are better educated and have first-rate public transportation. The gap between rich and poor is narrower than in the United States or Britain, and there are fewer poor people.
But France seems more inclined to worry about losing what they have than making changes that allow it to retain what they value.
In 2006, French teens and tweens were asked about the future. Only 42% thought there lives would be more enjoyable in the future, and only 32% believed they would earn more than their parents. The attitudes of France’s voters seem to suggest that the kids are right to worry.
As the war in Iraq begins its fourth year, it is worth revisiting some of the views of France, which was one of the more vocal skeptics in the runup to the US invasion.
In this Washington Post article from February 11, 2003, Jacques Beltran, a French foreign policy expert, suggested that French President Jacques Chirac “believes a war is extremely dangerous. There’s a risk of destabilizing Iraq and the whole region, as well as Israel.”
A French official noted that “We are not pacifists. But we honestly think it is a mistake to go to war … You will pay the price in terms of terrorism, in terms of the Arab world versus the Western world.”
The Economist Intelligence Unit released its 2006 e-readiness rankings yesterday. The index is a measure of a country’s readiness for e-business, judged by Internet access, broadband penetration, innovation, information security, and other factors. More telling than the ranking is the country’s distance from a score of 10.
The ratings are a good indicator of general abilities in IT, and thus an important component of present and future competitiveness.
The top countries
Rank. Country — score out of 10 (2005 rank)
1. Denmark — 9.00 (1)
2. US — 8.88 (2)
3. Switzerland — 8.81 (4)
4. Sweden — 8.74 (3)
5. UK — 8.64 (5)
6. Netherlands — 8.60 (8)
7. Finland — 8.55 (6)
8. Australia — 8.50 (10)
9. Canada — 8.37 (12)
10. Hong Kong — 8.36 (6)
11. Norway — 8.35 (9)
12. Germany — 8.34 (12)
13. Singapore — 8.24 (11)
14. New Zealand — 8.19 (16)
14. Austria — 8.19 (14)
16. Ireland — 8.09 (15)
17. Belgium — 7.99 (17)
18. South Korea — 7.90 (18)
19. France — 7.86 (19)
Other countries of interest
Rank. Country — score out of 10 (2005 rank)
21. Japan — 7.77 (21)
22. Israel — 7.59 (20)
23. Taiwan — 7.51 (22)
25. Italy — 7.14 (24)
30. United Arab Emirates — 6.32 (X)
31. Chile — 6.19 (31)
35. South Africa — 5.74 (32)
37. Malaysia — 5.60 (35)
39. Mexico — 5.30 (36)
41. Brazil — 5.29 (38)
42. Argentina — 5.27 (39)
45. Turkey — 4.77 (43)
46. Saudi Arabia — 4.67 (46)
48. Venezuela — 4.47 (45)
49. Romania — 4.44 (47)
51. Colombia — 4.41 (48)
52. Russia — 4.30 (52)
53. India — 4.25 (49)
55. Egypt — 4.14 (53)
56. Philippines — 4.04 (51)
57. China — 4.02 (54)
60. Nigeria — 3.69 (58)
61. Ukraine — 3.62 (57)
62. Indonesia — 3.39 (60)
64. Kazakhstan — 3.22 (62)
65. Iran — 3.15 (59)
67. Pakistan — 3.03 (64)
Regional standouts in the developing world are Chile, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. The low scores of some countries, notably India, China, and Russia, disguise significant specialized capabilities in infotech.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers has released a study of potential growth in the world’s 17 largest economies out to the year 2050.
The study forecasts the eclipse of the current developed economies. The E7, largest emerging market economies (China, India, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey), were only 20% of the size of the G7 economies at market exchange rates in 2005, but would be 25% larger than the G7 by 2050. By purchasing power, the E7 economies were only 75% as large as the G7 in 2005, but would be 75% larger by 2050.
In purchasing power terms, the shifts in relative GDP would be stark:
COUNTRY — relative econ size 2005 / 2050
US — 100 / 100
Japan — 32 / 23
Germany — 20 / 15
China — 76 / 143
UK — 16 / 15
France — 15 / 13
Italy — 14 / 10
Spain — 9 / 8
Canada — 9 / 9
India — 30 / 100
South Korea — 9 / 8
Mexico — 9 / 17
Australia — 5 / 6
Brazil — 13 / 25
Russia — 12 / 14
Turkey — 5 / 10
Indonesia — 7 / 19
Note that the values are relative within their respective years, but not across them; all economies are projected to be larger in 2050 than at present.
Purchasing power suggests, among other things, the military power the economy can afford to buy, suggesting that the realignment of power toward Asia will have substantially occurred. It will no longer be possible for the US to massively outspend all potential rivals.
The study also offers some startling numbers for per capita income. The figures suggest that the developed countries could have universal prosperity, and the emerging markets could achieve levels of wealth like those of developed countries today, eliminating dire poverty.
COUNTRY — 2005 / 2050 purchasing power GDP per capita (constant 2004 dollars)
US — $40,339 / $88,443
Japan — $30,081 / $70,646
Germany — $28,770 / $68,261
China — $6,949 / $35,851
UK — $31,489 / $75,855
France — $29,674 / $74,685
Italy — $28,576 / $66,165
Spain — $25,283 / $66,552
Canada — $31,874 / $75,425
India — $3,224 / $21,872
South Korea — $21,434 / $66,489
Mexico — $9,939 / $42,879
Australia — $31,109 / $74,000
Brazil — $8,311 / $34,448
Russia — $10,358 / $43,586
Turkey — $7,920 / $35,861
Indonesia — $3,702 / $23,686
These numbers suggest massive value shifts: countries reaching these wealth levels have shifted toward democracy, social freedom, and humane governance.
There is an underlying problem in these hopeful figures: sustainability will be strained with far more of the planet living at developed levels of wealth.
The Washington Post reports on French worries about the future.
In a poll, young people in their 20s were asked what globalization meant to them. Forty-eight percent answered “fear.”
The article does not outline the nature of French angst precisely, but offers several indicators:
- In a poll, young people in their 20s were asked what globalization meant to them. Forty-eight percent answered “fear.”
- Reportedly, “increasing numbers of companies [are] deserting France because of inflexible labor laws and high costs.”
- “France’s share of international auctions of contemporary art is a third of what it was a decade ago,” hinting at declining cultural power.
- People “feel increasingly isolated from the European Union.”
The French seem to fear two scenarios that might be called Sénilité and Anglo-Saxonisme:
- Sénilité: An aging population and uncompetitive economy erode France’s wealth and relevance, reducing quality of life. The 21st century for France is like the 20th for Argentina: a long fall from former prosperity and promise.
- Anglo-Saxonisme: France is forced to adapt to the changing world, but loses much of what it values in the process, from the culture of food to generous social protection systems.
Both — along with more positive scenarios — are possible.