Writing in Foreign Policy, Paul Quinn-Judge outlines a scenario in which “the fighters of the Caucasus Emirate link up with their jihadi allies in Central Asia, turning much of the southern rim of the former Soviet Union into a zone of low-intensity warfare.”
He writes that “The absolute worst-case scenario — a gradual linking-up of insurgents in Central Asia with the North Caucasus’ young Islamist fighters — might be remote, but it is now possible. Such a link-up would require at least three factors.”
- “Russia’s policy of blind brutality in the North Caucasus would have to continue, ensuring a steady stream of recruits to the Islamist cause.”
- “The Taliban would have to consolidate along Afghanistan’s frontiers with Central Asian countries such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Tajikistan, turning the borderlands into safe havens and creating a series of conduits allowing fighters to move from Afghanistan into Central Asia and beyond.”
- “Central Asian jihadists from countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan would have to emerge as a fighting force large enough to exert serious regional pressure.”
As to their likelihood, Quinn-Judge suggests that
- “The first is already happening.”
- “The second is a matter of time.”
- “The third cannot be ruled out.”
The gathering conflict between Georgia and Russia suggests a couple of larger issues:
- Self-determination: South Ossetia illustrates the fact that there simply are no rules for self-determination–when and how one place is allowed to separate from another. And no country consistently advocates a particular set of rules: as is the case with Abkhazia, South Ossetia would appear to have as much right as Kosovo to leave its parent state, and has been separate for years longer than Kosovo, but countries take opposite approaches to the two issues.
- NATO: The US wishes to extend NATO membership to Georgia. That Georgia could end up at war with Russia over a strategically trivial and morally muddy issue suggests some of the potential problems with that course. It would potentially subject the alliance to a clash with Russia without any key interests at stake (at least for NATO). Alternately, and more likely, it would extend NATO promises that would not ultimately be kept, as members would likely (and sensibly) balk at aiding Georgia in many scenarios, risking turning NATO into another hollow CENTO or SEATO.
NPR today offered a rare focus on Abkhazia, the region that broke away from Georgia in the 1990s.
It is a curious mirror image of Kosovo: Russia, adamantly opposed to independence for Kosovo, supports Abkhazia’s freedom (at least from Georgia), while the US favors subjecting the Abkhaz to Georgian rule, though they appear to have much the same case as the Kosovars for independence.
The parallel is not lost on the Abkhaz, who have poor relations with the Georgians:
Abkhazia’s leaders say the West has so far refused to listen to their arguments, but they cite the precedent set by Kosovo. One day, they say, the international community will have to realize the only way to avert war over Abkhazia is to recognize its independence.
In terms of governance, former Soviet Georgia is one of the holes in the world.
What this can mean in practical terms is revealed in this WP article: counterfeit money from the renegade region of South Ossetia is showing up in the United States.
By one measure of government reach compiled by Future Atlas, Georgia scores only a 22 out of 100, placing it 164th out of 202 countries rated.