Pakistan
In a Brookings article, Moeed Yusuf argues that “the possibility of a violent takeover reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan is out of the question.”
The reason, according to Yusuf, is that “for Pakistan to go down this route, Pakistani society at large will have to bite into the radical ideology” and “that trend so far is not evident.”
He writes that forecasts of a radical takeover misperceive a key driver:
Predictions of doom usually conflate religious conservatism with militant extremism. While in the case of the tribal belt we find the two strands linked up, they are distinct and different in the rest of Pakistani society. … Religious conservatism—as perceived by mainstream Pakistani society—has a lot to do with cultural attitudes and pietism, but little to do with militant extremism which has stark political overtones.
Yusuf identifies several indicators that Pakistan will not turn radical:
- Militants target the security forces, indicating that they do not view them as allies.
- Islamic political parties are electorally weak, and could not win a fair election.
- The “young urban elite” tend to receive secular educations that leave them more Western than traditional in their outlooks.
Instead, Yusuf suggest that “socio-economic polarization within the Pakistani society presents the only real threat to the state’s future,” as there are 30 million children in families surviving on less than $2 a day. Abandoned by the elite, the dysfunctional school system exposes these youth to virulently anti-Western attitudes.
He finds danger in this situation:
If this situation persists, Pakistan could in due course have a large population of underprivileged youth who could, potentially, begin to support a narrow radical vision of the state as an alternative to the failed experiment with secular regimes. If this segment of the population turns to extremism, then there will be a structural shift in Pakistan polity, for at the end of the day the military and civil service cadres are reflective of the society at large. This is a much larger threat than that posed by the extreme minority of madrassah cadres that can perpetrate violence, but have no potential to permeate the society.
Yusuf offers prescriptions for American policy:
The US current policy goal to focus on and reform madrassah education in Pakistan is myopic. It needs to emphasize mainstream public-education much more proactively to prevent radicalization among students in public-sector schools. This means more, not less engagement with Islamabad. Washington should continue to support Pakistan financially to ensure sustained economic growth and bring relief to these vulnerable young men and women.
Despite Yusuf’s blanket dismissal of a radical takeover, he seems in the end to provide a scenario by which it might come about. It might be “out of the question” now, but not, it appears, in a decade.
Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress polled 108 foreign affairs experts across the political spectrum about terrorism and related issues.
Asked what country is likely to be the next al Qaeda stronghold, the experts said:
- Pakistan — 35%
- Iraq — 22%
- Somalia — 11%
- Sudan — 8%
- Afghanistan — 7%
The experts also put Pakistan at the head of the list most likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists by 2012:
- Pakistan — 74%
- North Korea — 42%
- Russia — 38%
- Iran — 31%
- United States — 5%
The experts were divided about how to change US policy toward Pakistan: about a third favored sanctions against the country, and a similar number advocated increasing US aid.
Pakistan likely tops both lists both because of ideological forces at work within the country, and because it is regularly cited as one of the states most likely to fall apart.
Ralph Peters recently offered a map of how the Middle East might look if borders were redrawn to better reflect sectarian and ethnic divides. (Click on “Next” under the map, then click on the map to enlarge.)
Among the changes that would unfold in this scenario:
- Kurdistan becomes a large, independent state, at the expense of Turkey, Iraq, and other countries. Says Peters, “A free Kurdistan, stretching from Diyarbakir through Tabriz, would be the most pro-Western state between Bulgaria and Japan.”
- The remainder of Iraq divides into Sunni and Shia states, and the Shia portion unites with Shia areas of Saudi Arabia.
- Saudi Arabia also loses Mecca and Medina to an “Islamic sacred state.”
- Iran loses territory to the Kurds and Arab Shia, and to Baluchistan to the southeast.
- Pakistan is much-diminished, transferring lands to Baluchistan and Afghanistan.
- Afghanistan gains from Pakistan but loses to Baluchistan and Iran.
- “For Israel to have any hope of living in reasonable peace with its neighbors, it will have to return to its pre-1967 borders.”
Peters concludes:
Correcting borders to reflect the will of the people may be impossible. For now. But given time — and the inevitable attendant bloodshed — new and natural borders will emerge.
Der Spiegel examines Pakistan’s aspirations, saying that Musharraf
wants to fundamentally reposition Pakistan in South Asia and turn his country into a dominant regional power — a political and economic hub strategically positioned amongst India, China, Iran and the central Asian countries. To achieve his goals, Musharraf is looking for new allies. American priorities have essentially dominated Pakistan’s policies since the attacks of September 11, 2001. But instead of limiting himself to his current alliance with the United States and its “war on terror,” Musharraf is also reaching out to China, the superpower of the future.
But troubles in Baluchistan are potential obstacles:
Pakistan’s internal conflicts could soon attain international significance, if a plan to run South Asia’s two most important gas pipelines through Baluchistan in a few years comes to fruition. The agreement for the construction of the pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea, which would take it through both strife-torn Afghanistan and Pakistan, has already been signed. Negotiations are currently underway for a network linking Iran, India and Pakistan.
The Baluchi troubles directly interfere with the Gwadar port project:
The new Gwadar is already seen as strategically important today. At the site 80 kilometers (50 miles) east if the Iranian border, the Pakistanis are building a giant port which, unlike Karachi, would hardly be vulnerable to a naval blockade by archenemy India. The Chinese, for their part, want to use Gwadar as a base from which to keep an eye on the Americans in the Persian Gulf and the Indians in the Arabian Sea and, of course, to monitor both countries’ movements in the Indian Ocean. That’s why Washington and New Delhi view the cooperative venture between China and Pakistan as a serious provocation.
Foreign policy and the Fund for Peace have released their annual Failed States Index, a valuable tool for tracking potential instability.
Foreign Policy explains:
The category of “failed states” has become part of the strategic vernacular, and it has many definitions. For the purposes of this index, a failing state is one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force. A failing state may experience active violence or simply be vulnerable to violence. The great majority of the states listed in the index are not presently failed states. The index measures vulnerability to violent internal conflict. It is an index of country risk, not of countries that have already failed.
The 20 most endangered states are concentrated in Africa, and include many of the least-governed countries. Ranked from most in danger downwards, they are:
1. Sudan
2. Congo, Dem. Rep. of the
3. Ivory Coast
4. Iraq
5. Zimbabwe
6. Chad
6. Somalia
8. Haiti
9. Pakistan
10. Afghanistan
11. Guinea
11. Liberia
13. Central African Republic
14. North Korea
15. Burundi
16. Yemen
17. Sierra Leone
18. Burma
19. Bangladesh
20. Nepal
The status of all 148 rankings is mapped here.
Instability in Pakistan is potentially disastrous: it could be the first nuclear-armed state to fail, and some of the parties that might get hold of the country’s nuclear weapons have links to Islamic extremist groups.
Number 31 on the list is Egypt, a lynchpin state of the Middle East, and right behind it at 32 is Indonesia, one of the largest countries in the world.
The Economist Intelligence Unit released its 2006 e-readiness rankings yesterday. The index is a measure of a country’s readiness for e-business, judged by Internet access, broadband penetration, innovation, information security, and other factors. More telling than the ranking is the country’s distance from a score of 10.
The ratings are a good indicator of general abilities in IT, and thus an important component of present and future competitiveness.
The top countries
Rank. Country — score out of 10 (2005 rank)
1. Denmark — 9.00 (1)
2. US — 8.88 (2)
3. Switzerland — 8.81 (4)
4. Sweden — 8.74 (3)
5. UK — 8.64 (5)
6. Netherlands — 8.60 (8)
7. Finland — 8.55 (6)
8. Australia — 8.50 (10)
9. Canada — 8.37 (12)
10. Hong Kong — 8.36 (6)
11. Norway — 8.35 (9)
12. Germany — 8.34 (12)
13. Singapore — 8.24 (11)
14. New Zealand — 8.19 (16)
14. Austria — 8.19 (14)
16. Ireland — 8.09 (15)
17. Belgium — 7.99 (17)
18. South Korea — 7.90 (18)
19. France — 7.86 (19)
Other countries of interest
Rank. Country — score out of 10 (2005 rank)
21. Japan — 7.77 (21)
22. Israel — 7.59 (20)
23. Taiwan — 7.51 (22)
25. Italy — 7.14 (24)
30. United Arab Emirates — 6.32 (X)
31. Chile — 6.19 (31)
35. South Africa — 5.74 (32)
37. Malaysia — 5.60 (35)
39. Mexico — 5.30 (36)
41. Brazil — 5.29 (38)
42. Argentina — 5.27 (39)
45. Turkey — 4.77 (43)
46. Saudi Arabia — 4.67 (46)
48. Venezuela — 4.47 (45)
49. Romania — 4.44 (47)
51. Colombia — 4.41 (48)
52. Russia — 4.30 (52)
53. India — 4.25 (49)
55. Egypt — 4.14 (53)
56. Philippines — 4.04 (51)
57. China — 4.02 (54)
60. Nigeria — 3.69 (58)
61. Ukraine — 3.62 (57)
62. Indonesia — 3.39 (60)
64. Kazakhstan — 3.22 (62)
65. Iran — 3.15 (59)
67. Pakistan — 3.03 (64)
Regional standouts in the developing world are Chile, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. The low scores of some countries, notably India, China, and Russia, disguise significant specialized capabilities in infotech.
The issue of self-determination for Pakistan’s Baluchistan is heating up again, Radio Free Europe reports.
Baluchis accuse the government of militaritizing the conflict, and some have turned to talking about independence rather than just autonomy. According to journalist Ahmed Rashid, “the rebellion has the potential of becoming even bigger than it currently is.”
The Pakistani government accuses India, Afghanistan, and Iran of backing Baluchi separatism — another potential point of conflict between Islamabad and those states. (A separate Baluchistan would be a beacon for the million or more Iranian Baluchis. If Iran is backing separatism, it would seem it is not very worried about unrest on its side of the border.)
A former CIA analyst warns that the Pakistani regime’s efforts to assist the US “are stoking the fires of a potential civil war between Islamabad and the Pashtun tribes that dominate much of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.”
Pashtun tribal leaders have long dreamed of erasing the arbitrary, British-imposed border and uniting their tribes in a national entity called “Pashtunistan.” Their dream has been quiescent in recent decades…. Today, however, the tribals’ dream is being reinvigorated by Mr. Musharraf as he pursues U.S. demands in the border provinces.
Pakistan could end up reduced and weakened, he writes.
(Via Informed Comment)