Published November 16th, 2009 by Future Atlas
UK Had US; Who Does US Hand Off To?
In an attack on the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic reassurance,” Robert Kagan and Dan Blumenthal make an interesting point
“Strategic reassurance” seems to chart a different course. Senior officials liken the policy to the British accommodation of a rising United States at the end of the 19th century, which entailed ceding the Western Hemisphere to American hegemony. Lingering behind this concept is an assumption of America’s inevitable decline. Yet nothing would do more to hasten decline than to follow this path. The British accommodation of America’s rise was based on close ideological kinship. British leaders recognized the United States as a strategic ally in a dangerous world — as proved true throughout the 20th century. No serious person would imagine a similar grand alliance and “special relationship” between an autocratic China and a democratic United States.
Leaving aside that the writers are straining to detect how Obama differs from his predecessors — some see unusual continuity — it is true that the US lacks a natural protege. Brazil and India come much closer than China, as multicultural, democratic countries strongly shaped by Western culture, but real “kinship” is absent.
In any case, having a protege offers no guarantees: the US actively worked to deprive Britain of its chief global-power asset, its empire, even as the “special relationship” formed.
Given the strong odds that China and other countries will singly or collectively surpass the United States, the lack of proteges reinforces the value of the embedding the rising powers in an international system that Americans find amenable. It also argues for vigorous pursuit of soft power, converting rising powers to think more like us. Both of these tools were battered by the Bush administration, but Obama is pursuing them.
It should also be noted that an “autocratic China” is not forever. In many respects China is already less oppressive than South Korea and Taiwan were 50 years ago, when they were bastions of “the free world.” China may follow a similar course, and Kagan and Blumenthal imply that that matters. (Pure realists might object. After all, the US and Britain spent the first 100 years of their relationship warring or talking about warring with each other.)
Decline can be gradual: Britain remains a great power, 120 years after losing its place as the world’s largest economy. By that math, America will still matter in 2150.
(Image copyright FutureAtlas.com — usable with link and permission)
kurt9 Says
I think China will liberalize politically in their own way over the coming decades. Westerners have a certain bias that representative democracy is the only form of political liberalization. However, other parts of the world do it differently. Another way to liberalize is for a one-party system to encourage people from all areas of life to join it. This is what Singapore did and is what China is doing now. The single party evolves towards a “big tent” party. However, the development of “western style” multi-party systems may still be China’s future. Both Taiwan and South Korea had single-party, autocratic governments until the late 80’s. Both countries experienced protests (South Korea being worse) in the late 80’s, which went away once the government allowed multiple party politics.
Of course, the CCP would rather follow the Singapore route than that of S. Korea and Taiwan. However, what works for a city-state of 4 million may not work for a regional-sized country of 45 million people, let alone a continental nation-state of 1.5 billion people.
Nov 23rd, 2009 at 9:05 pm
ende Says
kurt9’s comments nicely provide a backdrop for my own thoughts. The price of the Chinese governments’s desire for economic prosperity is an increase in demand for economic freedom. As an educated middle class continues to develop and grow in China, an increase in demand for political freedom follows. Whether it be Western style political plurality or a more accommodating single party, the PRC is likely going to have to tolerate some competition, albeit in its own terms. Furthermore, it is likely to see its own brand diluted and increasingly heterogeneous.
What are the implications of this? More precisely, where will these fault lines emerge? China is likely to experience an increasing dichotomy between its poorer rural inland and (increasingly capitalistic) wealthy coastal regions. These coastal regions are growing accustomed to their prosperity and are going to become increasingly defiant towards any attempts to ’sacrifice for the common good’ (inner-China). As the coastal provinces continue to integrate their economies with the surrounding region (South Korea, Japan… Taiwan), we could very well see an exchange of political ideology following the same vertices.
The Taiwanese government, the ROC, doesn’t need to split from China. It needs to infect China, by further integrating itself with coastal China; like Hong Kong. The PRC’s Communists and ROC’s Nationalists could conceivably compete politically as does America’s Democrats and Republicans.
The PRC and the US are already enjoying a considerably stable partnership, even with its areas of tension and mistrust. If the ROC, a close ally of the US already, were to become a very real political force within China, and Taiwan the de facto capital of the Chinese littoral, then I believe China could come to more closely resemble America’s protege.
With that said, I don’t believe that the US is close to handing off the baton quite yet. Still, the foundation is being set.
Dec 4th, 2009 at 11:20 am