A Pew report released yesterday suggests that concerns about an end to assimilation are still misplaced.
The central fact:
The surveys show that fewer than one-in-four (23%) Latino immigrants report being able to speak English very well. However, fully 88% of their U.S.-born adult children report that they speak English very well. Among later generations of Hispanic adults, the figure rises to 94%.
Last month The Atlantic examined Pakistan’s direction in light of ongoing political turmoil.
Author Joshua Hammer mentions the “nightmare scenario”–which Pakistan seems to inspire regularly:
an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. A tide of anti-American sentiment, some analysts fear, could bring to power Islamists, who would give free rein to the Taliban, spread nuclear technology to rogue states and terrorist groups, and support the mujahideen in Kashmir.
Hammer sheds light on various drivers of the scenario:
- The Islamist political parties simply aren’t very popular, even in their strongholds.
- Senior military officers are seen as pro-Western, but the views of the ranks who will succeed them in a few years are unknown.
- The Pakistani military is “deeply ambivalent” about fighting the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their Islamist Pakistani allies, not truly seeing them as a threat to the country.
- “While the military aims to do the opposite, it is slowly destabilizing Pakistan.”
Hammer also notes that the military has now deeply entrenched itself in the Pakistani economy, enriching its officers in the process, and this process may make it even less willing to truly relinquish power.
Hammer concludes that
The threat of an outright Islamist revolution—by gun or ballot—is low today, and so too is the threat that nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands. The army is not dominated by jihadists, and its controls on its missiles are strong.
However, he writes, “If the political process remains stunted, the Islamists may continue to gather strength until the country reaches a tipping point.”
The Post reported last week that American intelligence analysts are worried about a “looming strategic failure.”
Intelligence analysts acknowledge the battlefield victories, but they highlight the Taliban’s unchallenged expansion into new territory, an increase in opium poppy cultivation and the weakness of the government of President Hamid Karzai as signs that the war effort is deteriorating.
US and NATO forces are not retaining control of the countryside, where three-fourths of Afghans live, and the Taliban is operating in new areas:
the Taliban’s control has extended beyond the group’s traditional southern territory, with extremists making substantial inroads this year into the western provinces of Farah, Herat and others along the Iranian border even as they regularly challenge eastern-based U.S. forces.
Pakistan’s role is also an issue:
Several experts believe that the United States can no longer afford to leave the Pakistani military to clean up its side of the border. “Unless we resolve the safe-haven issue, this is not going to succeed,” said Henry A. Crumpton, a CIA veteran
In the Nov. 19th New Yorker, John Lee Anderson concludes that “Iraq’s future, for the moment, is in limbo. The best one can say, perhaps, is that the U.S. has bought or borrowed a little space to work with.”
This is partly because the cause of the current decline in violence is not at all clear:
- The surge in American troops seems to be working, but only in some areas.
- On the other hand, “analysts credit much of the recent drop in Iraqi civilian deaths not to the surge but to Sadr’s decision, in August, to order the Mahdi Army, which is believed to have been responsible for much of the Shiite-on-Sunni sectarian killing in and around Baghdad, to “freeze” its activities for six months.”
- Also crucial is the fact that “the surge also coincided with the so-called Sunni Awakening, the decision by some Anbar tribesmen to ally themselves with the Americans and to fight against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia—a shift that was not foreseen in Petraeus’s plan.”
In other words, at least two of the elements of recent gains are not under American control at all, and thus subject to reversal, whatever future policies the US pursues.
In a harbinger of future instability, Anderson writes that “Many of the players in Iraq seemed …. to be positioning themselves for the next battle.” A Sunni leader now working with the US says, “Once Anbar is settled, we must take control of Baghdad, and we will.”
A second ominous sign is that, while the American relationship to various Iraqi players has shifted, internal Iraqi reconciliation is not proceeding, despite that being the central goal of the surge. Shiites in the Iraqi government feel the new Sunni “allies” that the US has enlisted are the militias of the future. Meanwhile, efforts to create nonsectarian security forces–essential to a post-occupation Iraq’s stability–are still faltering. The national police, for instance, are “still part of the problem,” an American officer tells Anderson.