Published August 27th, 2007 by Future Atlas
“The Prospects of a Talibanized Pakistan”
In a Brookings article, Moeed Yusuf argues that “the possibility of a violent takeover reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan is out of the question.”
The reason, according to Yusuf, is that “for Pakistan to go down this route, Pakistani society at large will have to bite into the radical ideology” and “that trend so far is not evident.”
He writes that forecasts of a radical takeover misperceive a key driver:
Predictions of doom usually conflate religious conservatism with militant extremism. While in the case of the tribal belt we find the two strands linked up, they are distinct and different in the rest of Pakistani society. … Religious conservatism—as perceived by mainstream Pakistani society—has a lot to do with cultural attitudes and pietism, but little to do with militant extremism which has stark political overtones.
Yusuf identifies several indicators that Pakistan will not turn radical:
- Militants target the security forces, indicating that they do not view them as allies.
- Islamic political parties are electorally weak, and could not win a fair election.
- The “young urban elite” tend to receive secular educations that leave them more Western than traditional in their outlooks.
Instead, Yusuf suggest that “socio-economic polarization within the Pakistani society presents the only real threat to the state’s future,” as there are 30 million children in families surviving on less than $2 a day. Abandoned by the elite, the dysfunctional school system exposes these youth to virulently anti-Western attitudes.
He finds danger in this situation:
If this situation persists, Pakistan could in due course have a large population of underprivileged youth who could, potentially, begin to support a narrow radical vision of the state as an alternative to the failed experiment with secular regimes. If this segment of the population turns to extremism, then there will be a structural shift in Pakistan polity, for at the end of the day the military and civil service cadres are reflective of the society at large. This is a much larger threat than that posed by the extreme minority of madrassah cadres that can perpetrate violence, but have no potential to permeate the society.
Yusuf offers prescriptions for American policy:
The US current policy goal to focus on and reform madrassah education in Pakistan is myopic. It needs to emphasize mainstream public-education much more proactively to prevent radicalization among students in public-sector schools. This means more, not less engagement with Islamabad. Washington should continue to support Pakistan financially to ensure sustained economic growth and bring relief to these vulnerable young men and women.
Despite Yusuf’s blanket dismissal of a radical takeover, he seems in the end to provide a scenario by which it might come about. It might be “out of the question” now, but not, it appears, in a decade.