In this month’s Atlantic, 44 experts were polled about the trajectory of the extremist Taliban movement. Asked to evaluate the likelihood of the Taliban’s returning to power by 2012, they gave these responses:
- 45% — unlikely
- 27% — somewhat likely
- 18% — more and more likely
- 9% — nonexistent
Some specific forecasts by the experts:
- “The Taliban is likely to remain a force in the politics of Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, perhaps even establishing effective control over some parts of the country.”
- “The Taliban is riding back to power on the alienation of the Pashtuns. We risk collapse if we let [that] alienation get out of hand.”
- “NATO forces will need to remain for decades.”
(”Return of the Taliban,” June 2007, p. 38)
Senator Joseph Lieberman called today for consideration of US military action against Iran, including a ground attack:
“I think we’ve got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq,” Lieberman said. “And to me, that would include a strike over the border into Iran.”
Such a course of action would likely have substantial negative effects on the US position in Iraq:
- As discussed previously in this blog, Iran is in a better position than the US to escalate in a confrontation.
- This would not reduce killing of Americans; more likely would be the reverse, and Iran could greatly increase its support for insurgents.
- Iran and the US have had support for the Iraqi government in common; a US-Iranian confrontation could force the government to choose sides, and either choice would likely make its future, and the US project in Iraq, more precarious.
- An attack on Iran would tend to escalate toward a large-scale military confrontation, which Iran is more likely to “win” at the strategic level than the US.
Writing in the NYT, two supporters of the war, Peter W. Rodman and William Shawcross, offer these forecasts:
As in Indochina more than 30 years ago, millions of Iraqis today see the United States helping them defeat their murderous opponents as the only hope for their country. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have committed themselves to working with us and with their democratically elected government to enable their country to rejoin the world as a peaceful, moderate state that is a partner to its neighbors instead of a threat. If we accept defeat, these Iraqis will be at terrible risk. Thousands upon thousands of them will flee.
The new strategy of the coalition and the Iraqis, ably directed by Gen. David Petraeus, offers the best prospect of reversing the direction of events — provided that we show staying power.
American defeat in Iraq would embolden the extremists in the Muslim world, demoralize and perhaps destabilize many moderate friendly governments, and accelerate the radicalization of every conflict in the Middle East. Our conduct in Iraq is a crucial test of our credibility, especially with regard to the looming threat from revolutionary Iran.
Analysis
- Large numbers of Iraqis are already in danger, and millions have fled. Even more could be placed in danger if the US precipitously withdraws and fighting intensifies.
- The authors do not address the fact that by most accounts the “new strategy” is not working, and American “staying power” continues to drain away. That continuing a fight might be useful on some levels is not sufficient, if no plausible strategy or goal is in view.
- American defeat would indeed energize radicals. But the continued occupation of Iraq also has that effect, and could contribute to destabilization of governments in the region, as veterans of jihad return to their homelands.
- It should also be noted that these arguments were good reasons to have stayed out of Iraq in the first place: they are arguing for saving ourselves from the consequences of our own actions; prudent policymaking would have avoided these dangers entirely, and not placed American credibility in what is substantially a lose-lose position.
The Washington Post yesterday reported on another example of sub-national governmental action on climate change (seen also at the state/province level).
Some 522 mayors representing 65 million Americans have signed a climate change agreement in the face of federal foot-dragging on the issue.
One driver: a third of Americans in an April poll now say that climate change is the world’s most serious environmental problem, double the number from 2006, the Post reports.
City-level action is particularly striking given that climate change is a global issue, beyond the reach of even national governments to manage on their own.
A Washington Post piece notes some issues arising at the increasingly blurry boundary between virtual worlds and the real one:
- Police are looking into whether virtual crimes — such as simulated rape — may also be real.
- Some activities, such as simulated sex involving only real adults, may be legal in some countries by illegal in others, but virtual worlds transcend such boundaries.
- Real governments are making appearances in virtual spaces: both Sweden and Maldives have opened embassies in Second Life.
But virtual worlds may also diverge and separate from the real world:
Philip Rosedale, the founder and chief executive of Linden Labs, said in an interview that Second Life activities should be governed by real-life laws for the time being. … Rosedale said he hopes participants in Second Life eventually develop their own virtual legal code and justice system. “In the ideal case, the people who are in Second Life should think of themselves as citizens of this new place and not citizens of their countries,” he said.
The Bush administration has begun to discuss long-term basing of American troops in Iraq, along the lines of the 50-year garrisoning of South Korea, the NYT reports.
Secretary of Defense Gates described the concept as “more a model of a mutually agreed arrangement whereby we have a long and enduring presence but under the consent of both parties and under certain conditions.”
Administration officials and top military leaders declined to talk on the record about their long-term plans in Iraq. But when speaking on a not-for-attribution basis, they describe a fairly detailed concept. It calls for maintaining three or four major bases in the country, all well outside of the crowded urban areas where casualties have soared. They would include the base at Al Asad in Anbar Province, Balad Air Base about 50 miles north of Baghdad, and Tallil Air Base in the south.
Critics have found fault with the comparison.
“It’s not that Iraq isn’t vital,” said Leslie Gelb, the former president of the Council of Foreign Relations, and one of the many experts organized by groups opposing Mr. Bush’s Iraq strategy to shoot back in the analogy war. “It’s just that Korea bears no resemblance to Iraq. There’s no strategy that can create victory.”
The problems with the model are numerous:
- The American presence seems to be a dominant issue for various insurgent factions, and they may simply keep up their attacks until the US leaves.
- The guerrillas continue to grow stronger and more adept, while American enthusiasm for the war continues to decline; if the war continues until someone gives up, it will likely be the Americans, so war can’t be a condition of remaining.
- Iraqis overwhelmingly favor a US departure, if not an immediate one, and a popular Iraqi government will have difficulty saying yes to something that so many oppose.
Perhaps more plausible is a long-term presence in an essentially independent Kurdistan. But that also would create problems:
- It would inspire hostility from Arab Iraq, perhaps fully reversing relations to those of the Hussein years.
- It would alarm Turkey, not to mention Iran, straining the US-Turkish relationship.