Writing in the WP, Steve Clemons of the New America Foundation warns of a “campaign of right-wing intimidation of public figures that is squelching free speech and threatening to roll back civil society.”
Emboldened by the recent rise in nationalism, an increasingly militant group of extreme right-wing activists who yearn for a return to 1930s-style militarism, emperor-worship and “thought control” have begun to move into more mainstream circles — and to attack those who don’t see things their way.
This raises two sets of questions:
- Is something about this new, given that Japan has had a sometimes-violent rightist fringe for half a century? Is the more-nationalist climate such that now it means something different?
- Can Japan really swing in the direction the far right desires? Is it a liberal democratic nation well-integrated into the international system, or is this is a veneer that could fall away in the event of a true crisis?
Pollack and Byman’s examination of the consequences of a possible disintegration of Iraq includes the effects of refugee flows on Iraq’s neighbors.
Even wealthy Kuwait might not be immune:
Kuwait …. has just over 1 million citizens, one-third of whom are Shiite. The influx of several hundred thousand Iraqi Shiites across the border could change the religious balance in the country overnight. Both these Iraqi refugees and the Kuwaiti Shiites could turn against the Sunni-dominated Kuwaiti government, seeing violence as a means to end the centuries of discrimination they have faced at the hands of Kuwait’s Sunnis.
A recent poll indicates that Canada is unusually receptive to immigration.
Three-quarters of Canadians see immigration as having a positive effect on their country. This is far more positive than the nearly equal split seen in the United States and Western Europe on the issue.
A continued influx of immigrants will aid Canada in staving off demographic aging.
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack offer a useful overview of the possible consequences of Iraq’s continued unravelling.
They note that, while there is a civil war underway, it could be much worse:
The consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq could be dire. Considering the experiences of recent such conflicts, hundreds of thousands of people may die. Refugees and displaced people could number in the millions. And with Iraqi insurgents, militias and organized crime rings wreaking havoc on Iraq’s oil infrastructure, a full-scale civil war could send global oil prices soaring even higher.
From a security perspective, that would not be the worst of it:
The greatest threat that the United States would face from civil war in Iraq is from the spillover — the burdens, the instability, the copycat secession attempts and even the follow-on wars that could emerge in neighboring countries. Welcome to the new “new Middle East” — a region where civil wars could follow one after another, like so many Cold War dominoes.
Iraq displays many of the conditions most conducive to spillover. The country’s ethnic, tribal and religious groups are also found in neighboring states, and they share many of the same grievances. Iraq has a history of violence with its neighbors, which has fostered desires for vengeance and fomented constant clashes. Iraq also possesses resources that its neighbors covet — oil being the most obvious, but important religious shrines also figure in the mix — and its borders are porous.
The war in Iraq is having serious consequences for the struggle against Islamic terror.
Fighters there are receiving training, building networks and becoming further radicalized — and the U.S. occupation is proving a dream recruiting tool for young Muslims worldwide. As bad as this is, a wide-scale civil war in Iraq could make the terrorism problem even worse…. Should Iraq descend into a deeper civil war, the country could become a sanctuary for both Shiite and Sunni terrorists, possibly even exceeding the problems of Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan under the Taliban.
This will destabilize neighboring states, as will the example of successful succession: “Iraq’s neighbors are just as fractured as Iraq itself. Should Iraq fragment, voices for secession elsewhere will gain strength.”
This will tempt neighbors to intervene, as will fears of hostile forces winning a civil war:
None of Iraq’s neighbors thinks that it can afford to have the country fall into the hands of the other side. An Iranian “victory” would put the nation’s forces in the heartland of the Arab world, bordering Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria…. Similarly, a Sunni Arab victory (backed by the Jordanians, Kuwaitis and Saudis) would put radical Sunni fundamentalists on Iran’s doorstep — a nightmare scenario for Tehran.
They are not sanguine about preventing these outcomes, stating that “even a serious course correction in Washington and Baghdad may only postpone the inevitable.”
Pronouncements from Hamas officials indicate that some in the movement hold a potential moderate position that could be conducive to peace. Said Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, “We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm.” Another official stated that “We believe in two states living side by side.”
Of course, this offers no guarantees. Moderates would have to win out in Palestinian politics, and the performance of Hezbollah against the recent Israeli offensive may strengthen the hand of rejectionists. Israel too would have to find the political will to meet the moderates half way.
Still, the components of the two-state solution remain in view, if at a distance.
China continues to present a paradox: it is an authoritarian state in which freedom is steadily growing.
The Washington Post here reveals a specialized aspect of the expansion of Chinese freedom, the Chinese punk rock scene.
Social “deviance” and kinds of dissent that were imprisonable offenses a couple of decades ago are now outside the interest of the state. Complains a rocker, “We want to be a dangerous band, like Fugazi or The Clash or Bob Dylan. But because the government doesn’t care about us, we are not forbidden from playing. Maybe we are not dangerous. It’s sad.”
The boundary of permissible freedom continues to move. The question will be whether that boundary will shift organically, regardless of the wishes of the Party and the government it controls, or whether a breaking point will be reached when the Party attempts to hold the line.
It does seem significant that the closest analogues to China, Taiwan and South Korea, took about 50 years to achieve democracy, and at time during that process both were in some respects more socially repressive than China is now.
With Fidel Castro seriously ill, it is worth considering the diverse scenarios that could unfold for a post-Castro Cuba.
FIDELISMO WITHOUT FIDEL
Cuba’s current communist system persists.
Trajectory – Without Castro, would tend to transition toward the China Option or Normal Cuba scenarios.
- Cuba’s system is pervasive and generally competent.
- US antagonism makes the defiance of the current regime necessary in the eyes of many Cubans.
- Venezuelan aid and possible Cuban oil finds could keep the existing system afloat.
Counterforces:
- Castro has always been central to the Cuban Revolution, and its durability in his absence is uncertain.
- There is substantial desire for change of some kind on the island.
- The Cuban government is probably disinclined to use large-scale force to maintain its rule if opposition builds.
THE CHINA OPTION
The Communist Party takes the China route: abandoning socialism but maintaining authoritarian rule.
Trajectory – Would tend to transition to Normal Cuba scenario.
- This would alleviate Cubans’ most common complaint, that they suffer from material deprivation.
- Raul Castro, Fidel’s younger brother and likely successor, is said be less ideologically rigid than the older Castro.
Counterforces:
- Cuba’s past experiences, and the low danger of violent upheaval, are likely to make full democracy preferable to large numbers of Cubans.
- As revolutionary movements go, Cuba’s has been relatively sincere in its approach.
NORMAL CUBA
Cuba becomes a normal Latin American democracy. The Communist Party transitions to one among many parties, and retains a substantial following.
Trajectory – Likely to persist, with slight danger of slipping into the Neo-Batista right-wing authoritarianism scenario or one of the left-wing authoritarian scenarios.
- High levels of education and an ideology of citizenship may have prepared Cuba well for democracy.
- The US will likely offer substantial incentives to promote this outcome.
Counterforces:
- Like any ruling elite, the Communist Party will have elements that wish to retain power.
- Cuban-Americans might push the US to maintain its hard-line stance, impeding a transition.
NEO-BATISTA
Cuban-Americans achieve power and impose a right-wing dictatorship.
Trajectory – Would likely evolve toward a Normal Cuba scenario, but could revert via revolt to a Fidelismo scenario.
- Significant elements of the Cuban-American leadership remain extremist and might not accept the compromises that most transition scenarios are likely to entail.
Counterforces:
- The Cuban population would strongly resist a new right-wing dictatorship.
- US and world expectations for democracy would be high.
- Much of the Cuban-American population expects and favors democracy.
COLLAPSE
Contending forces tear the government apart and prevent an organized transition, creating chaos and violence.
Trajectory – Would gradually coalesce into Normal Cuba or one of the authoritarian scenarios.
- Castro might prove to be the crucial structural element in Cuba’s political system.
- The existing system is all most Cubans have known, and has been in place nearly half a century.
Counterforces:
- The current system is pervasive and competent.
- Internal divisions in Cuba don’t seem to be sharp.
- The US has strong incentives not to create a refugee-generating failed state 90 miles off its shores.
- Many Cubans would wish to prevent the opening for direct intervention by the US that this would open up.
BAY OF PIGS II
The US launches a military invasion to hasten a transition of its liking. It is met with substantial resistance.
Trajectory – Would likely result in an eventual compromise that evolved toward a Normal Cuba scenario. Less likely would be such sharp resistance that the US loses heart and retreated, leaving Cuba to the Fidelismo outcome.
- The impatience of Cuban-American extremists could lead them to push for military intervention.
- Americans tend to have a black-and-white view of Cuba that does not reflect reality.
Counterforces:
[Cuba’s future / Cuban scenarios / Cuba scenarios / future of Cuba]