Published June 20th, 2006 by Future Atlas
Iran: 3 scenarios
Writing in the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Kenneth Pollack offers three scenarios for Iran, based on his view that the nuclear standoff will shape Iran’s internal evolution as well as its external relations.
Scenario 1: The Hardliners Ascendant
Pollack sees this as resulting from division and indecision on the part of the international community:
If the nuclear stand-off ends quickly in an Iranian victory, this is likely to tilt power heavily toward Iran’s hardliners who will be able to impose their preferred policy options on the Iranian government. In this case a “victory” would mean that the international community was unable to agree on an approach that either forced Iran to give up its nuclear program or else inflicted such heavy penalties on them for continued recalcitrance that the public would view a stubborn continuance of the program as worse than a pyrrhic victory.
The United States could also trigger this outcome directly:
If the United States were to launch military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program, it seems most likely that this would result in the same hardliner victory in Tehran. Obviously such an unprovoked act of war would throw a great many things up in the air, but it seems most likely that doing so would once again play into the arguments of the hardliners: They would be able to claim such attacks as proof that the United States sought to destroy the Islamic Republic and subjugate Iran; they would be able to argue that such an attack increased the importance of acquiring nuclear weapons to deter future American military operations, and many Iranians probably would be more willing to tolerate economic problems if they believed it necessary to make sacrifices to fight a war against the United States. It would simultaneously discredit the reformists and the pragmatists for having argued for better relations with the United States and might provide an excuse for the hardliners to crack down hard on even the mildest forms of dissent.
Scenario 2: The Pragmatic Solution
This would result from a united international community willing to impose stiff economic sanctions.
Faced with this, Supreme Leader Khamene’i would, in Pollack’s judgment, be more likely to give up the nuclear program if offered an end to sanctions, investment and trade, and nuclear energy and security guarantees.
This could result in positive internal change:
With the technocratic pragmatists firmly in charge and a new economic agreement reached with the West, Iran would have its best chance to reform and rejuvenate its economy. As many of the pragmatists have placed maintaining public support for the regime ahead of adherence to Khomeini’s ideology, many more social codes might fall by the wayside. There might also be an additional loosening of the political system because the pragmatists have typically been less willing (although not unwilling) to use force to deal with internal dissent.
Scenario 3: Prolonged Stalemate
Pollack judges this the most likely of the three scenarios:
The most likely outcome of the current nuclear stand-off may also be the most unstable for Iran’s medium-term future. The most likely result of this impasse is prolonged stalemate between Iran and the international community, which would prolong the stalemate among Iran’s competing political factions.