Archive for June, 2006
The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate.
On NPR today Ahmed Rashid suggested that the Taliban insurgents are finding rising “sympathy,” if not full support, among segments of the population. They now enlist thousands of fighters, far more than they did a few years ago.
They also seem to be broadening their areas of operations. Rashid writes on ReliefWeb:
Taliban attacks have taken place in the north near the border with Central Asia and in the west near Iran, hundreds of miles from the main battleground in the south. Every day a school is burnt down or a teacher killed by the Taliban.
The Taliban’s resurgence raises the likelihood of negative scenarios, including full-scale war, partition, or even the extremist group someday regaining power.
Writing in the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Kenneth Pollack offers three scenarios for Iran, based on his view that the nuclear standoff will shape Iran’s internal evolution as well as its external relations.
Scenario 1: The Hardliners Ascendant
Pollack sees this as resulting from division and indecision on the part of the international community:
If the nuclear stand-off ends quickly in an Iranian victory, this is likely to tilt power heavily toward Iran’s hardliners who will be able to impose their preferred policy options on the Iranian government. In this case a “victory” would mean that the international community was unable to agree on an approach that either forced Iran to give up its nuclear program or else inflicted such heavy penalties on them for continued recalcitrance that the public would view a stubborn continuance of the program as worse than a pyrrhic victory.
The United States could also trigger this outcome directly:
If the United States were to launch military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program, it seems most likely that this would result in the same hardliner victory in Tehran. Obviously such an unprovoked act of war would throw a great many things up in the air, but it seems most likely that doing so would once again play into the arguments of the hardliners: They would be able to claim such attacks as proof that the United States sought to destroy the Islamic Republic and subjugate Iran; they would be able to argue that such an attack increased the importance of acquiring nuclear weapons to deter future American military operations, and many Iranians probably would be more willing to tolerate economic problems if they believed it necessary to make sacrifices to fight a war against the United States. It would simultaneously discredit the reformists and the pragmatists for having argued for better relations with the United States and might provide an excuse for the hardliners to crack down hard on even the mildest forms of dissent.
Scenario 2: The Pragmatic Solution
This would result from a united international community willing to impose stiff economic sanctions.
Faced with this, Supreme Leader Khamene’i would, in Pollack’s judgment, be more likely to give up the nuclear program if offered an end to sanctions, investment and trade, and nuclear energy and security guarantees.
This could result in positive internal change:
With the technocratic pragmatists firmly in charge and a new economic agreement reached with the West, Iran would have its best chance to reform and rejuvenate its economy. As many of the pragmatists have placed maintaining public support for the regime ahead of adherence to Khomeini’s ideology, many more social codes might fall by the wayside. There might also be an additional loosening of the political system because the pragmatists have typically been less willing (although not unwilling) to use force to deal with internal dissent.
Scenario 3: Prolonged Stalemate
Pollack judges this the most likely of the three scenarios:
The most likely outcome of the current nuclear stand-off may also be the most unstable for Iran’s medium-term future. The most likely result of this impasse is prolonged stalemate between Iran and the international community, which would prolong the stalemate among Iran’s competing political factions.
Amidst real costs and fantasies of defeat (and some fantasies of victory), a movement is growing among American liberals to “redeploy” American troops out of Iraq.
There are a number of reasons that the idea is worth considering:
- The Iraq war has undermined the war on terror — 87% of top foreign policy experts agreed that it has had a negative impact.
- Iraqis think we should leave — 70% of Iraqis say the US should leave, with half of these saying in 6 months, the other half in 2 years (as of 1/06; see p. 6 of this report).
- The US military is strained — resources for dealing with other contingencies are limited.
- The US presence drives the war — a large portion of insurgents appear to be motivated by the fact of occupation.
However, setting a fixed, short-term timetable for leaving Iraq would appear to make a number of outcomes more likely:
- Iraqi government collapse — The government remains weak and riddled with factions. With no American referee, it is not clear that the government would hold together.
- Full-scale civil war — While the US remains, the worst levels of civil war can be averted. A civil war is underway, but it so far does not involve large-scale sectarian conflict over territory, with the mass killings and population transfers that is likely to involve.
- A victory for terrorism — Iraq had nothing to do with the war on terror, but the Bush administration made it part of it, by creating the conditions in which al-Qaeda could prosper. A precipitous withdrawal (such as the end of 2006) would be seen by global jihadists and the Muslim world as a victory for terror, with future consequences for the US and for the people of other possible jihadist battlegrounds. (This Vietnam-style “credibility” argument has its limits: our presence in Iraq also helps global terrorists, and so one might have to choose between the two downsides.)
- Disaster for the Iraqi people — Iraqis have suffered terribly because of the invasion, and things could get much worse. Legally and morally, the US has a responsibility for the situation that cannot lightly be set aside. In the next couple of years, that responsibility will only have been discharged when the Iraqi government says that it is time for the US to set a schedule for departure.
Juan Cole advocates reducing and reconfiguring US forces for genuine anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, but that is rather different than simply leaving.
Colin Powell opposed the Iraq war (while facilitating it) partly because of the “you break it, you own it” principle. By this reasoning, the US broke Iraq, it now owns the situation, and redeploying quietly out of the store doesn’t change this.
After 15 years without a central government, Somalia is showing signs of movement. It is not clear where it is going, however.
Two new forces are at work: a weak internationally-supported transitional government has been formed, and last week Islamic militias seized the capital, driving out warlords apparently backed by the US.
Several possible scenarios could arise:
1. Continued chaos
No group predominates, and the Islamic militias and new government simply become additional factions in the mix.
Behind this scenario is something basic to the Somali character. As an International Crisis Group analyst put it in the WP, “The Somali allegiance to any authority is as fickle as it gets. This is very tricky terrain.”
2. Taliban on the Horn
The Islamic militias could seize control, and institute Islamic totalitarianism. They also prove willing to harbor al-Qaeda members, offering a rare sanctuary for the group.
There are signs that this is becoming more plausible:
Moderates among the supporters of the Islamic militias acknowledge a rising extremism within the country. More women than before cover their faces rather than just their hair. Strict Islamic justice is popular. City leaders warn that without massive and rapid rebuilding, anti-Western forces such as al-Qaeda are certain to grow in their appeal.
There also was a palpable unease about the plans of the Islamic militias, which are by all accounts a fractured group split between moderates and extremists. The militias, the residents said, attempted to shut down a company that dubbed Indian movies into Somali, apparently because they were regarded as too risque.
It may be this scenario that caused the US to support the Islamists’ warlord enemies, possibly making future hostility more likely.
3. Islamic peace
Islamic forces could take over the country and prove relatively competent administrators, avoiding Taliban-like excesses.
Ignoring the transitional government has dangers, however as it
is supported by Somalia’s neighbors, the United Nations, the United States and the European Union, so opposing it could mean regional and international isolation and possibly crippling sanctions for any administration the Islamic forces try to build.
4. A peace of unity
The transitional government, the Islamic militias, and others could find sufficient common ground to form a real national government — leaving aside, for the moment, the quasi-independent regions of Puntland and Somaliland in the north.
This is currrently the stated intention of the militias.
The BBC has created an interactive map of world urbanization from 1955 to 2015, including all megacities of 5 million or more.
The 2005 map reveals that we are approaching the tipping point at which, for the first time ever, more people will live in cities than in rural areas.
By 2015, 52% of the world’s population (3.8 billion people) is projected to be living in cities.
Effects will be profound and numerous. For instance:
- Cultural flows will speed up as more people are exposed to cosmopolitan urban culture.
- Information will speed up, as cities tend to be far more wired.
- In future conflicts, controlling contries will mean controlling megacities, a difficult challenge that tends to nullify the high-tech advantages enjoyed by the US and a few other countries.
[Via Social Technologies]
A reader asks:
I’m wondering if perhaps the key to a turnaround in the Middle East would be for some sort of massive joint action — like a Saudi/Egypt/U.S./Iraq anti-Iranian ground war or something? I’m certainly not recommending this, but if Iran does become only a military option…?
In anything like the present situation, no one but the US would join military action, particularly a ground invasion. That should deter us, which would be a very good thing: a ground invasion would end in defeat for the US.
Iran could not destroy any American unit, and we could occupy any chosen square mile of the country, but we would not have the stomach to outlast the virtually united resistance of the 70-million strong Iranian nation. Consider the fact that the Sunnis of Iraq are straining US military capabilities, and basically fighting us to a draw, despite essentially being a nation of only 5 million. Iran has 24 million males of military age.
As to the larger situation, if “turnaround” refers to reducing terrorism and instability, an effective course should diminish the forces that stoke those things.
Invading Iran would drive up both, creating far more of their basic ingredient: angry people who believe that the West is cruel and violent and thus deserves violence.
Writing in Prospect Online, Philip Gordon of Brookings is skeptical that an American attack on Iran is likely.
His argument hinges on a clear difference he sees between the Iran and Iraq situations:
In the case of Iraq, as was already clear at the time, many influential Americans were certain that an invasion would be easy, successful, and a step toward a safer world, and thus actually preferred the use of force to a diplomatic “success.” On Iran, I know of almost no one who denies that an attack would have serious negative consequences and who sees it as anything other than a last resort.
He suggests that President Bush would receive advice that would deter him from military action from all quarters; this is worth reproducing at length:
From the CIA: “Mr President, we cannot tell you with certainty how far along the Iranians are towards a bomb, nor can we tell you where all the key nuclear facilities are. We know they convert uranium ore to nuclear fuel at Esfahan, that they enrich uranium at Natanz and that they are building a heavy-water research reactor at Arak. But there may well be dozens of other secret facilities scattered around the country we don’t know about. We don’t have good sources in Iran, and we didn’t even know about these sites until Iranian dissidents told us about them in 2002. Our best estimate, in any case, is that Iran will not be able to produce a bomb for at least five years.”
From the military: “Mr President, we can certainly do serious damage to Iran’s known nuclear facilities. The above-ground targets are easy to hit, and even the buried centrifuge facilities at Natanz—reportedly about 30 feet underground and covered by at least 10 feet of concrete—can probably be destroyed with our GBU-28 “bunker-busters.” But we might have to strike it many times—or possibly even consider using tactical nuclear weapons—to be certain. Moreover, to do this job right, we’d need to hit dozens of different facilities scattered around the country, many of which are in built-up civilian areas and/or protected by air-defence sites that would have to be destroyed. So there would be considerable collateral damage.”
From the state department: “Mr President, we would have almost no international support for an attack on Iran and our image throughout the world—especially the Muslim world—would be seriously damaged. But the real problem would be Iran’s potential retaliation. This would almost certainly include efforts to destabilise Iraq and Afghanistan (including attacks on our 150,000 troops in those two places), support for terrorist attacks against US citizens and interests and threats to the free passage of oil through the straits of Hormuz. We must also recognise that an attack would likely strengthen Iranian extremists and undermine reformers, that any setback to the program would likely only be temporary, and that any debate within Iran about the utility of a nuclear weapons programme would end.
From domestic political advisers: “Mr President, unlike three years ago on Iraq, we would not have widespread public support, and there is almost no chance that we could get a congressional resolution supporting the use of force. So you—and the Republican party—would have to accept full political responsibility for what comes next. And by the way, oil would probably shoot up to over $100 per barrel.”
He ends with a warning:
If [...] America’s allies decide that even economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation are too much to ask for in the effort to bring Iran back to the table, then Bush’s options will in effect be reduced to a very clear choice between doing nothing and bombing Iran. I still don’t think he’d want to do the latter, but America’s allies and counterparts on the Security Council ought at least to realise that refusing to support sanctions on Iran would be the best way to find out.
The Boston Consulting Group has released a report on 100 emerging-market companies with global competetive potential, according to the Daily Telegraph.
Firms from China (44 companies), India (21), Brazil, and Russia constitute most of the group, with Mexico also making a good showing.
Companies like these will be the shock troops for the redistribution of global economic power. In the process, they will transform their home countries’ global roles and interests.
An emerging market expert points out that the developed world may balk at the process:
“The whole pace of globalisation may have to slow or it could set off a wave of protectionism. So far the West has mostly been losing jobs at the low end, and the process has been mutually beneficial. There is now a big risk of losing jobs at the high end too now that China and India are moving move swiftly up the ladder, as we have already seen in software. This means that incomes in the West may have to adjust downwards, and the workforce is not going to tolerate this.”
[Via Social Technologies; image: Social Technologies]
The Ford Foundation is attempting to address Africa’s preeminent problem, governance.
As reported by the NYT, it is funding a new Group, Trust Africa, that will support “an expanding network of nonprofit groups across the continent that seek to hold governments accountable.”
Thomas O. Melia, deputy director of Freedom House, [...] said efforts like those of Trust Africa represent the next frontier in deepening democracy in Africa and elsewhere. “What has been missing, even in places establishing electoral democracy, is independent voices — think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, university centers — able to monitor government performance.”
The Senegal-based group will also seek support from African emigrants abroad, hoping that their interest in their homelands will translate to engagement in pan-African issues.
The death of Zarqawi could have mixed results for al-Qaeda, the WP reports.
His ruthless targeting of civilians was opposed by the global al-Qaeda leadership, as it alienated both Arab public opinion and the larger Iraqi insurgency; Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq was becoming increasingly isolated.
Analysts argue that Zarqawi’s death could undercut his group’s recruitment of foreign fighters, and other foreign jihadis might turn away from al-Qaeda in Iraq.
They also argue that the Zarqawi group is less militarily important than several other foreign insurgent units, including some led by Egyptians, Saudis, and Algerians.
Al-Qaeda has a chance to assert greater control over its Iraqi franchise, but faces problems if that franchise loses too much “market share” of the insurgency. According to a German counterterrorism expert, “By losing Zarqawi, they run the danger of losing Iraq as a battlefield to the nationalist insurgents and others who aren’t interested in bin Laden or the global jihad.”
This presents broader problems for al-Qaeda:
If al-Qaeda fails to maintain a high-profile stake in the conflict with U.S. forces in the region, the analysts said, its relevance in the jihadist movement will quickly diminish. …. Others said Zarqawi’s death is likely to widen the factional splits that have been developing for years within the global movement. More and more, Islamic radical groups are becoming splintered and are only loosely affiliated. While they may be united in a broader struggle against the United States and the West, they often have different aims and tactics.