Archive for March, 2006
A curious intelligence experiment is underway on the Web, the NYT reports.
American intelligence agencies are putting 48,000 boxes of captured Iraqi government documents online, in Arabic.
The idea, pushed by conservatives, is that this will give more attention to neglected details of Iraqis activities and intentions, possibly bolstering the case for war.
This particular scheme may be amateurish in execution, but the underlying idea — truly open-source intelligence — is profound.
Open-source intelligence traditionally refers to publicly available sources analyzed by conventional intelligence agencies.
But the newer meaning of “open source” — opening information, methods, and output in a system to broad participation — could be applied in the intelligence sphere.
Civilian analogues are already in operation:
- Amber Alerts to find missing children are a method of rapidly creating a dispersed intelligence gathering apparatus.
- Fighting child exploitation, investigators have released images with the victim digitally removed, in hopes that the public can identify something from the background or other clues. These methods have sometimes yielded results.
Applied to intelligence, open-source methods could address two problems: inadequate attention resources, and inadequate information gathering. Both are enabled by the networked information revolution that connects ever more people and devices.
Attention: networks of varying openness could be applied to answer three kinds of problems:
- Is there anything to this? Does an image or document warrant further attention?
- Do you recognize this? Where, who, or what is this?
- Is anything happening? Networks could be tasked with real-time monitoring of sensors or imaging systems.
Gathering: The Internet and mobile phone networks are forming an increasingly pervasive information network that far surpasses that of the world’s intelligence agencies. These networks can be used in several ways:
- Passive gathering: The Web and mobile networks are increasingly good for near-real time monitoring of events. After the London bombings of 2005, it was possible to get multiple images of many of the bomb sites from the photo site Flickr.
- Post-facto gathering: The library of images captured by civilians will grow more and more vast, and it is not long before any public event will be recorded by numerous devices. It will be possible to request images of an event or place from the public with near-certainty that the image is out there. (A version of this was done by the US armed forces during World War II, when they asked the public to send in all their pre-war tourist photos of Europe, in order to compile a visual intelligence database. Flickr could achieve the same results in a matter of minutes.)
- Real-time gathering: In certain circumstances and places, it will be possible to put out a request for civilians to gather data in real time.
The Washington Post reports on popular Islamic activism in Saudi Arabia.
Spurred in part by the Danish cartoon controversy, people are joining grass-roots groups, signing petitions, promoting boycotts, and raising money for pro-Islamic ads to be shown in Europe.
An activist argues that this could reduce support for violence and terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, instead giving “people opportunities to take matters into their own hands and do something positive for their religion.”
It is not clear from the article that this is more than a short-term response to the cartoon flare up.
It is even less clear that this represents a new and constructive direction for Saudi Arabia. It appears more to be an intensification of fervor, and is partially manifested as hostility to the outside world (the boycotts) and a desire to control: activist lawyers “are studying ways to make insulting Islam and its prophet illegal.”
A writer attributes the new activism to “anger” — and anger can contribute to support for violence, whether by terrorists or the state.
Indonesia Matters writes about Indonesia to 2050, based on the PWC study, pointing out that rapid growth could make its economy largest than Germany’s or the UK’s by that time.
This graph by Ed Stephan has long been one of the most useful data sources on Iraq.
Lately, it has revealed a distinct trend: US casualty rates have been falling for months, and are now at the lowest rate since sometime in 2003.
There are several possible explanations:
- Given that overall violence appears to be rising, anti-US forces may be devoting their attention to the incipient civil war rather than strikes against Americans.
- The US may be reshaping its operations to reduce casualties.
- Operations and casualties might be shifting to Iraqi forces.
Whatever the reason, lower casualties would reduce mounting pressure to get out of Iraq quickly.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers has released a study of potential growth in the world’s 17 largest economies out to the year 2050.
The study forecasts the eclipse of the current developed economies. The E7, largest emerging market economies (China, India, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey), were only 20% of the size of the G7 economies at market exchange rates in 2005, but would be 25% larger than the G7 by 2050. By purchasing power, the E7 economies were only 75% as large as the G7 in 2005, but would be 75% larger by 2050.
In purchasing power terms, the shifts in relative GDP would be stark:
COUNTRY — relative econ size 2005 / 2050
US — 100 / 100
Japan — 32 / 23
Germany — 20 / 15
China — 76 / 143
UK — 16 / 15
France — 15 / 13
Italy — 14 / 10
Spain — 9 / 8
Canada — 9 / 9
India — 30 / 100
South Korea — 9 / 8
Mexico — 9 / 17
Australia — 5 / 6
Brazil — 13 / 25
Russia — 12 / 14
Turkey — 5 / 10
Indonesia — 7 / 19
Note that the values are relative within their respective years, but not across them; all economies are projected to be larger in 2050 than at present.
Purchasing power suggests, among other things, the military power the economy can afford to buy, suggesting that the realignment of power toward Asia will have substantially occurred. It will no longer be possible for the US to massively outspend all potential rivals.
The study also offers some startling numbers for per capita income. The figures suggest that the developed countries could have universal prosperity, and the emerging markets could achieve levels of wealth like those of developed countries today, eliminating dire poverty.
COUNTRY — 2005 / 2050 purchasing power GDP per capita (constant 2004 dollars)
US — $40,339 / $88,443
Japan — $30,081 / $70,646
Germany — $28,770 / $68,261
China — $6,949 / $35,851
UK — $31,489 / $75,855
France — $29,674 / $74,685
Italy — $28,576 / $66,165
Spain — $25,283 / $66,552
Canada — $31,874 / $75,425
India — $3,224 / $21,872
South Korea — $21,434 / $66,489
Mexico — $9,939 / $42,879
Australia — $31,109 / $74,000
Brazil — $8,311 / $34,448
Russia — $10,358 / $43,586
Turkey — $7,920 / $35,861
Indonesia — $3,702 / $23,686
These numbers suggest massive value shifts: countries reaching these wealth levels have shifted toward democracy, social freedom, and humane governance.
There is an underlying problem in these hopeful figures: sustainability will be strained with far more of the planet living at developed levels of wealth.
The Washington Post reports on French worries about the future.
In a poll, young people in their 20s were asked what globalization meant to them. Forty-eight percent answered “fear.”
The article does not outline the nature of French angst precisely, but offers several indicators:
- In a poll, young people in their 20s were asked what globalization meant to them. Forty-eight percent answered “fear.”
- Reportedly, “increasing numbers of companies [are] deserting France because of inflexible labor laws and high costs.”
- “France’s share of international auctions of contemporary art is a third of what it was a decade ago,” hinting at declining cultural power.
- People “feel increasingly isolated from the European Union.”
The French seem to fear two scenarios that might be called Sénilité and Anglo-Saxonisme:
- Sénilité: An aging population and uncompetitive economy erode France’s wealth and relevance, reducing quality of life. The 21st century for France is like the 20th for Argentina: a long fall from former prosperity and promise.
- Anglo-Saxonisme: France is forced to adapt to the changing world, but loses much of what it values in the process, from the culture of food to generous social protection systems.
Both — along with more positive scenarios — are possible.
In a message in The Washington Note, Anthony Cordesman assesses US goals in Iraq and their current status. It is in broad agreement with the Future Atlas assessment of goals, status, and prospects.
Cordesman concludes:
In short, being a superpower is not enough. Fighting wars requires both a realistic grand strategy and the ability to implement it. We may salvage the Iraq War on a national level, but there is little or no chance of salvaging the war in terms of our broader strategic objectives.
Future Atlas content appears in the current (April 2006) issue of Wired.
“States of Confusion” is the “atlas” feature on pp. 46-47. It uses Future Atlas data to map effective government presence in every country.
Basically, it depicts whether the government can carry out its intended functions effectively. It is not a model of good government, measured by human rights or human welfare, for instance. That is, it does not differentiate between malign state purposes, such as totalitarian control, and more positive ones, such as delivering effective healthcare.
The model itself is quite simple. Each state starts with a score of 100, and this is then depreciated by its levels of wealth, corruption, and crime, and by the presence and scope of rebellion. The score is also raised or lowered according to state philosophy, from totalitarian to laissez faire. (This might appear to “reward” authoritarians, but the government philosophy factor is always overwhelmed by other factors: authoritarism is associated with poverty, corruption, and unrest.)
The Bush administration and prominent advocates of invading Iraq put forward a variety of goals that the invasion would further. These include:
- preventing Iraq from gaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- enhancing American power in the world
- improving the American position in the Middle East
- weakening al Qaeda
- preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD
- bringing democracy to Iraq
- improving human rights in Iraq
- spreading democracy in the Middle East
- making the Middle East safer for Israel
- making Americans safer
It is worth evaluating the status and prospects for each of these goals.
GOAL: preventing Iraq from gaining weapons of mass destruction
Status: No effect — The regime did not have WMD, and was not seeking them at the time of the invasion.
Prospects: Mixed — A democratic Iraq would be less likely to seek WMD than Hussein, but might still do so; Iraq has not lost the skills it had before the war, and the Iraqi public has now had the experience of being invaded and occupied. The chances increase if Iraq splits into Sunni and Shiite states, each of which may feel the need to protect itself.
GOAL: enhancing American power in the world
Status: Failed — American credibility was damaged by the unraveling of stated reasons for the war. Now, it appears mired in Iraq, unable to get out or achieve its goals. Majorities in almost every country in the world think the war was wrong.
Prospects: Poor — The debacle in Iraq has shown the limits of American power, and directly limited military options in potential face-offs with North Korea and Iran. By making it appear that the US will not be constrained by international law, the invasion may have convinced those two states that they really do need nuclear weapons as a deterrent (though they both appear to have been interested in nukes beforehand).
GOAL: improving the American position in the Middle East
Status: Failed — The invasion and occupation has made it harder for the region’s regimes to be seen collaborating with the US, and deeply unpopular with Arabs.
Prospects: Poor — The Iraq effort will end imperfectly, and possibly very badly, for the US. Ironically, it has greatly improved Iran’s position with regard to Iraq, and Iran may have enhanced influence there in the future.
GOAL: weakening al Qaeda
Status: Failed — Al Qaeda has benefited from the Bush administration’s Iraq actions. The invasion opened up a new battlefield and base that is theirs to win and Americans’ to lose. Far more Muslims now feel the US deserves violence, making them potential tacit supporters of terrorism, if not donors or even recruits. Many experts have reported that the American occupation of Iraq is in fact being used as a recruitment tool by terrorist groups.
Prospects: Poor — Even if it eventually “loses” Iraq, al Qaeda will probably be a net beneficiary of the war. Iraq will be a new base in a way that was not possible under the Baathist police state, and many experienced veterans will emerge from the war, to be used elsewhere, in the same way that veterans of Afghanistan were.
GOAL: preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD
Status: No effect — American government agencies concluded before the war that the only likely scenario in which the Iraqi government would hand over WMD to terrorists is if it faced overthrow by an American invasion. Fortunately, the Iraqi regime apparently had no WMD to give to terrorists.
Prospects: Poor — The war may have marginally decreased the chance that some regimes would contemplate handing over weapons to terrorists. But it strengthens Islamic terror groups overall, and possibly increases the probability of Pakistan’s weapons finding their way to terror groups (in a coup or civil war, for instance). Meanwhile, it did nothing to decrease the threat from materials emerging from the former Soviet Union.
GOAL: bringing democracy to Iraq
Status: Mixed — Successful elections have been held, though with limited Sunni participation.
Prospects: Poor — Sectarian and ethnic tensions and religious extremism make civil war a more likely outcome than a flourishing democracy.
GOAL: improving human rights in Iraq
Status: Failed — Deposing Hussein’s regime has broadened political rights including freedom of expression and freedom of speech, and opened room for politics. But the war has greatly increased violations of the most basic human right, freedom from political violence. American forces, foreign terrorists, the insurgents, and death squads have been killing Iraqis are a far higher rate than the regime was at the time of its overthrow. The regime was brutal, but at a far lower level than it had been at the heights of its campaigns against Kurds and Shiites. (An invasion then might have been justifiable on human rights grounds, but the US was backing the regime, in limited ways, at the time.) Additionally, the Sunni minority seem to experience the occupation as more oppressive than the former regime, and the rights of Iraqi women are under pressure from religious forces.
Prospects: Poor — Violence continues to increase, and civil war is a real possibility; some argue that it has already begun. If Iraq slides into full-scale civil war, the conflict could kill as many people as Saddam Hussein did during his entire dictatorship.
GOAL: spreading democracy in the Middle East
Status: Little effect — The limited efforts the US has made to promote democracy beyond Iraq could have been more effective without the war; invading Iraq was not a necessary prerequisite to democracy promotion. The site of Iraqis voting did catch the attention of some of the Arab public, but the unfolding disaster has not looked like something to emulate subsequently.
Prospects: Poor — If Iraq remains in chaos, it will serve as an excuse and deterrent to democracy elsewhere. The deep anger engendered by the war is likely to ensure that future Middle Eastern democracies will be more hostile to the US than many current regimes.
GOAL: making the Middle East safer for Israel
Status: No effect — Militarily weak and unpopular at home and abroad, Saddam Hussein’s regime did not constitute a significant threat to Israel.
Prospects: Poor — Ongoing difficulties in Iraq reduce the protective and mediating roles the US can play for Israel. Iraq may emerge as a problem for Israel again: many Iraqis appear to blame the occupation on Israel and compare themselves to Palestinians, going as far as calling the US forces “the Jews.” A democratic or at least popularly supported Iraqi government could emerge as a harsh and more effective critic of Israel.
GOAL: making Americans safer
Status: Failed — It is quite unlikely that Hussein’s regime would have killed 2,300 Americans and wounded 17,000, and those numbers will continue to rise. Terrorist groups seem to have been strengthened by the war.
Prospects: Poor — The net result of the failure of all these goals is that Americans will be less safe as a result of the invasion of Iraq.
David E. Sanger, writing in the NYT, considers whether the world might “learn to live with a nuclear Iran.”
Key points:
- “The reality is that most of us think the Iranians are probably going to get a weapon, or the technology to make one, sooner or later. The optimists around here just hope we can delay the day by 10 or 20 years, and that by that time we’ll have a different relationship with a different Iranian government.” — Bush administration official
- As a state, Iran could be deterred, some think.
- Egypt and Saudi Arabia might seek their own nuclear weapons, but the West could dissuade them.
- Nuclear weapons would make Iran “the dominant regional power in the Middle East,” possibly “as powerful as Israel.”
- Iran doesn’t have to build a bomb; it merely needs people to believe that it can do so quickly.
- The US has said that it cannot “tolerate” a nuclear North Korea, but it is already doing just that.
- Containment might work with Iran, but Iran’s going nuclear would trigger “a world of proliferation like we have not seen before,” according to Brent Scowcroft.
Sanger suggests that this is worth thinking about because all other options might be worse. That seems to be case with military options:
- Airstrikes might or might not delay an Iranian nuclear arms program.
- An American invasion would likely end in defeat, leaving Iran bitter and militant for decades.